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The aim of the Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights is to promote mutual understanding and co-operation between 
Europe and Asia in the area of political dialogue, particularly on human rights issues.
Previous seminar topics include:
• Access to Justice; Regional and National Particularities in the Administration of Justice; Monitoring the 
Administration of Justice (1997, Sweden) 
• Differences in Asian and European Values; Rights to Education; Rights of Minorities (1999, China)
• Freedom of Expression and Right to Information; Humanitarian Intervention and the Sovereignty of States; Is 
there a Right to a Healthy Environment? (2000, France)
• Freedom of Conscience and Religion; Democratisation, Confl ict Resolution and Human Rights; Rights and 
Obligations in the Promotion of Social Welfare (2001, Indonesia)
• Economic Relations; Rights of Multinational Companies and Foreign Direct Investments (2003, Sweden)
• International Migrations; Protection of Migrants, Migration Control and Management (2004, China)
• Human Rights and Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Minorities (2006, Hungary)
• Human Rights and Freedom of Expression (2007, Cambodia)
• Human Rights in Criminal Justice Systems (2009, France)
• Human Rights and Gender Equality   (2010, Philippines)
• National and Regional Human Rights Mechanisms (2011, Czech Republic)
• Human Rights and Information and Communication Technologies (2012, Korea)
• Human Rights and the Envronment (2013, Denmark)
• Human Rights and Businesses (2014, Viet Nam)
The Seminar series is co-organised by the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), the Raoul Wallenberg Institute (delegated by 
the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. ASEF has been the secretariat of the Seminar since 2000. 
Supervision of the seminar is entrusted to a Steering Committee, composed of the Seminar’s four co-organisers as well 
as representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of China and Indonesia as well as the European Union. 
The Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights Series is a partnership between:
The 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights was hosted by:
ASEF’s contribution is with the fi nancial support of the European Union.
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The 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights held in December 2014 in Hanoi, Viet Nam was 
timely and relevant. The results reflected in this publication serve to deepen the understanding of the 
linkage between human rights and business in Asia and Europe. On behalf of the organisers, I would 
like to acknowledge all those whose efforts made this dialogue possible and fruitful.
First of all, we would like to thank the participants from the ASEM governments and civil society for 
their substantive and constructive contributions during the Seminar. Their combined knowledge and 
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between human rights and business. Furthermore, the new networks forged over the three-day 
Seminar will strengthen the connections between the two regions.
We also greatly appreciate the valuable support and advice provided by our partners, the Raoul 
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We would like to thank our two prominent keynote speakers as well, Mr Brice Lalonde and Ms Elaine 
Tan. Their insightful knowledge and perspectives shared at the Opening of the Seminar inspired the 
frank discussions over the three days.
We are no less thankful to Ms Sumi Dhanarajan and Ms Claire Methven O’Brien for laying the foundation 
for the Seminar through their extensive background report and compiling the final Seminar Report for 
this publication. Our gratitude also goes to Ms Shahamin Zaman and Professor Dr Karin Buhmann for 
their hard work in accurately recording the exchanges within their respective working groups.  
The working group discussions would not have been as constructive without the skilful facilitation by 
the moderators: Ms Delphia Lim, Mr Jermyn Brooks, Mr Jerome Chaplier, and Professor Maria Elena 
Herrera. We sincerely thank them as well.
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the coordination of the event.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my colleagues from ASEF’s Political and Economic Department, 
Mr Thierry Schwarz, Ms Ratna Mathai-Luke and Ms Grace Foo who manage the Seminar’s Secretariat. 
Their hard work ensured the smooth going of the Seminar and the production of this publication.




PREFACE: THE INFORMAL ASEM SEMINAR 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS SERIES
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)1 brings together 51 member states (30 European and 21 Asian 
countries), ASEAN, and the European Union (EU). The ASEM process aims at strengthening interaction 
and mutual understanding between the two regions and at promoting cooperation leading to 
sustainable economic and social development. It’s an informal process of dialogue and cooperation 
among partners on all issues of common interest to Asia and Europe.
The biennial ASEM Summit meeting is held alternately in Asia and Europe and is the highest level 
of decision-making in the process, featuring the Heads of States or Heads of Governments, the 
President of the European Union, accompanying ministers and other stakeholders.  A total of 10 
Summit meetings have been held in the cities of Bangkok (1996), London (1998), Seoul (2000), 
Copenhagen (2002), Hanoi (2004), Helsinki (2006), Beijing (2008), Brussels (2010), Vientiane (2012) 
and Milan (2014).  
At the first meeting of ASEM Foreign Ministers in Singapore in 1997, Sweden and France offered to 
organise informal seminars on human rights to be held within the ASEM framework. In 2011, the 
Philippines joined ASEF, Sweden and France as a co-organiser of the Seminar series. 
The series employs the following formula:
  A balanced representation between civil society participants from Asia and Europe (invited by the 
organisers) and official representatives (nominated by the 53 ASEM members) in each Seminar;
 Closed-door debates to allow free and direct exchanges of views; and,
 A set of recommendations, elaborated collectively to be sent to the relevant institutions in ASEM 
countries as an informal contribution to the official Asia-Europe dialogue. 
The experience of the fourteen editions has proven the usefulness of the chosen formula: a climate 
of confidence and mutual understanding, in accordance with the ASEM spirit, has grown stronger 
throughout this process. 
The 14th Informal ASEM Human Rights seminar on Human Rights and Businesses was attended 
by 126 participants representing 47 ASEM members, including delegates from international 
and regional organisations working on business and human rights, national agencies on CSR, 
development and human rights, national human rights institutions, diplomats, human rights activists 
and a few representatives from the private sector, to discuss the complexities of business impact 
and involvement in human rights protection, and to share their own knowledge and experiences on 
the topic.
Human rights and Businesses: An Overview of This Volume
This volume contains the proceedings of the Seminar. In addition to the official opening speech  made 
on behalf of the host and the organisers, it includes the keynote speeches of Mr. Brice Lalonde (Special 
Advisor on Sustainable Development to the UN Global Compact),  and Ms. Elaine Tan (Executive 
Director, ASEAN Foundation) who in presenting the Seminar topic, examined the implications of 
business involvement in human rights.  
1   The 53 ASEM Members are Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, the Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Viet Nam, the ASEAN Secretariat, 
and the European Union.  
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The Background Paper was the primer for the seminar discussions.  It was prepared by Ms. Sumi 
Dhanarajan (Research Associate, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore) 
and Dr. Claire Methven O’Brien (Strategic Advisor, Danish Institute for Human Rights).
The Seminar Report, which is based on the working group reports prepared by Sumi, Claire, Ms. 
Shahamin Zaman and Professor Dr. Karin Buhmann, provides an overview of the key issues 
discussed at the seminar as well as reflecting details of the working group discussions, providing the 
key recommendations and challenges raised by the participants.  The working groups addressed the 
following topics:
  State Duty to Protect Human Rights Against Violations by Businesses 
  Corporate Responsibility and its Contribution to Human Rights Implementation
  Monitoring, Reporting and Access to Remedies
 Multi-stakeholder Cooperation
10 key messages were identified by the participants, including the consensus that the UN Guiding 
Principles on Human Rights and Business provide a common framework of globally agreed 
principles that should be promoted and consistently applied across all ASEM member countries. 
Some of following recommendations were included in the key messages that were sent to the ASEM 
governments:
 All ASEM members should implement the UNGPs at the national level and develop National 
Action Plans (NAPs) on human rights and business which are fully inclusive, participatory and 
transparent. 
 States need to identify appropriate measures to regulate and engage with Multi-National 
Enterprises (MNEs) and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to ensure compliance of human 
rights standards.
 Independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and the judicial system are critical to 
ensuring access to effective remedy. Transparency and access to information are imperative to 
ensure victims are fully aware of the facts as well as the processes available to them. It is the 
State’s duty to ensure that this is maintained as part of a strong rule of law.                                          
                                                 
The volume ends with the concluding remarks from the co-organisers, Ambassador Bengt Johansson 
(Sweden’s Ambassador for Corporate Social Responsibility) and Mr. Frédéric Tiberghien (Technical 
Coordinator & Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development of 
France). In addition to their excellent summing up of the discussions, they also provided several take-
away lessons, key among them being the different layers of responsibilities that business, State and 
civil society bear in their efforts to protect human rights.
Mr. Thierry SCHWARZ
Political and Economic Department
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)
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RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PRACTICAL CONCERNS AND POSITIVE 
STEPS THAT COMPANIES CAN UNDERTAKE
Brice LALONDE, Special Advisor to the UN Global Compact
(Keynote speech delivered at the opening plenary of the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let us begin with what we know – we know that 190 countries are member states of the United 
Nations (UN); we also know that it is the duty of States to protect and enforce human rights. All the 
members of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) are also members of the UN; all of them endorse to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We know that all States are responsible to uphold and 
protect human rights in their countries, to oversee the private sector, and to ensure that businesses 
are respecting human rights, both at home and abroad. States are responsible for the nexus between 
business and State, State-owned enterprises and investments, bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements, and also for all government agencies that are credited for public procurement, including 
the privatising of public services. Some countries provide guidance and have national action plans to 
help business respect human rights. 
We also know that, unfortunately, some States do not have the means to enforce human rights 
legislations (some States perhaps do not make it as much as a priority as much as we do). Over the 
past 50 years, we have witnessed major corporate scandals affecting human rights such as the 1984 
Bhopal gas tragedy, the case of Nike in Indonesia, Shell in Nigeria where people died in their efforts 
to defend their indigenous rights, the Rana Plaza incident in Bangladesh took place not so long ago. 
We know that some big companies benefit on the one hand from the consumer markets of rich 
countries, and on the other hand, the labour of poorer countries. This is true for some very big 
industries like mining which has a huge ecological impact, information technology (IT) which has 
an implication on privacy, and finance which has a huge responsibility with investment and support. 
Many companies working in these industries realise that they are going to be held more accountable 
on human rights; I would say that one of the lessons that has emerged from all the scandals is that 
businesses are now getting more strongly involved in human rights. 
The move towards corporate social responsibility led to the creation of the UN Global Compact in 
2000. The Global Compact asks companies to respect the 10 UN Global Compact principles; the two 
first principles are devoted to human rights. Principles one and two require companies to support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights, and to make sure that they are not 
complicit in human rights abuse. In addition to the Global Compact, other multi-stakeholder initiatives 
have also emerged, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI), the Global Business Initiative on Human Rights (GBI), the Kimberley Transparency 
Process for Diamonds – multi-stakeholder initiatives on the environment are also important given the 
important impact that a healthy environment has on the enjoyment of our human rights.  
All these efforts have culminated in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Business must understand, and indeed many are starting to do so, that they are responsible for their 
actions, that they must meet stakeholder’s expectations and that they have reputation to protect. 
All of this leads towards what is known as a ‘social license to operate’ which requires business to 
manage their human rights risks and regulate their behaviour in order to continue their functions.
9
We know, of course, that companies cannot replace State responsibility on human rights. What is 
asked of them is that businesses practice social responsibility within their sphere of influence which 
is the workplace, the marketplace, the supply chain and the community in which they operate. 
At the workplace, they are required to ensure that there is no forced labour, no child labour, no 
discrimination; businesses have to ensure that worker health security, gender quality, the freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining, adequate living wages and working hours are provided. 
Some of these require a huge amount of detail, for example, employers should provide not only 
fair wages but also payment receipts, safe working conditions may require safety equipment and 
appropriate apparel. Remember the Nike scandal in 1997; it was a scandal because women who 
were not wearing the regulation shoes were forced to run in the sun until they fainted.
In a supply chain, there can be one tier, two tier and even a third tier of suppliers, so companies have 
to prioritise and analyse, have unannounced or unscheduled checks on suppliers to see what is 
happening. Suppliers should be asked to join a CSR initiative and seek guidance on complying with 
requirements. At the marketplace, the misuse of products and incorrect or incomplete labelling is 
one issue that companies need to tackle - in some countries for instance, products are not labelled 
correctly in the language of the country.
At the community level as well, businesses must address the impact that their activities can have. 
There have been cases where some big food manufacturing companies which need a lot of water to 
produce food have been forced to move away because they were affecting the local water supply. 
Building infrastructure sometimes displaces people who need to be relocated. Businesses need 
to ensure that the compensation and relocation provisions that they make are in line with the 
community’s requirements and culture. In lots of countries where there are rampant logging and 
mining, companies have been asked to invest in education and health facilities in the places where 
they are situated. In conflict affected areas it is crucial that companies are not feeding into the conflict 
in any way; special attention needs to be paid to private security companies.  
Given all these concerns that need to be factored in what practical steps can we ask companies to 
take to respect human rights?
First, we know that support of such policies depend on senior management, therefore a human rights 
policy must come from the top. It must include a policy commitment which should also be a   public 
commitment that is made to build trust. It should trigger in-house learning processes and embed 
human rights responsibility on all levels of the company. There needs to be due diligence, which 
means to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for how a company address its impact on human 
rights; this in turn requires that there be special attention paid to those who could be more vulnerable 
such as people with disabilities, indigenous peoples, women, children and people with special needs. 
Once due diligence is done, the company needs to have some impact assessments on human rights.
All this requires resources. The company must devote funds and be serious about their human 
rights commitments. The company must consult stakeholders and experts; it must involve all its 
personnel in different functions – the legal department, the procurement department, the human 
resources department all have to work together. In the end, it also has to ensure that there is a 
process that enables litigation. That brings us to what is known as a grievance mechanism which 
must be legitimate, accessible, committable, equitable, transparent, a source of continuous learning 
process and also one that is able to adapt to the cultural context of the local community wherever 
the company operates.
What does ‘grievance’ mean? I was quite interested in the definition; a grievance can be understood 
to be a perceived injustice evoking an individual or group’s sense of entitlement, which may be based 
on law, contract, explicit or implicit policies, customary practices, or a general notion of equality and 
fairness. Similarly, what do ‘remedies’ mean for companies?  It can include apologies, restitution, 
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rehabilitation, compensation, sanctions, a guarantee of non-repetition; it can be judicial or non-
judicial, and sometimes it is better to be non-judicial because of regulation issues. Of course, having 
a fair grievance mechanism can be difficult so some people suggest that such grievance resolution 
can be done by the National Human Right Institution (NHRI); in OECD countries it can be the OECD 
focal point which provides a code of conduct.
I think that the current challenges that companies face is how much such policies cost. Laws such as 
the United States’ Dodd-Frank law prevent companies from using conflict minerals. Many companies 
would like to comply but because the process can be complicated, rather than address compliance 
issues, some companies say that they would prefer to leave the country all together. The problem 
is that while such companies may be contributing to the conflict they are also a source of revenue 
for those living in that country. There is a contradiction between the fact that one must not feed the 
conflict and the fact that one must feed the people, so how does a company do that? It is not so easy.
Other dilemmas are those centred on the misuse of products such as the ultrasound machine in 
India which is a really important product for health issues, however, the technology has been used 
to detect the sex of an unborn baby and reportedly facilitates the practice of female sex-selective 
abortions. How should one deal with that? Cisco sold some smart device and it was misused for 
monitoring and censorship. We have a lot of examples of misuse of products and how difficult it can 
be for companies to cope with these dilemmas.
We have received a very interesting background paper for this Seminar which contains the idea that 
solutions to the negative impact of business activities on human rights can be different from top-
down as well as bottom-up. We know that to cope with corporate social responsibility we also need 
a strong civil society, and when we don’t have a strong civil society it is more difficult to implement 
corporate social responsibility properly.
In conclusion, I have been interested to work with multinational and transnational companies and 
believe they are much better than the regulation that is imposed on them suggests. I think a lot 
of us still follow the idea that transnational companies are doing very badly vis-à-vis respecting 
human rights because they have too much power. The fact is, in our world, and on our planet, there 
is no law that is fully transnational. We have only soft laws slowly making their way in. Transnational 
corporations are much better than national companies because the former want to stay alive for a 
long time, they need regulation and they actually ask for a level playing field. They are vulnerable to any 
negative publicity campaign, especially on the internet which exposes them to criticism much faster 
and a global level too. So lots of companies now believe they belong as much to their stakeholders 
as to their shareholders. This is something historical and this is a trend we will see more and more.
Ultimately, I think the alliance between NGOs, transnational companies and I would say, even cities, 
is the world dynamic today, ensuring much better compliance with human rights.
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INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSR IN 
ASEAN 
Elaine TAN, Executive Director of the ASEAN Foundation
(Keynote speech delivered at the opening plenary of the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights)
Excellencies, Ambassadors, Distinguished Guests and Participants,
It is indeed my great pleasure to attend for the first time the Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights. 
I will be speaking on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Human Rights in ASEAN, drawing on a 
baseline study in ASEAN.
Background
On the outset, I would like to state that member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) are moving steadily and inevitably towards economic integration. The core aims for 
economic integration are: to create a single market and production base, to be a highly competitive 
economic region, to have equitable economic development, and to integrate into the global economy. 
The benefits for ordinary people through economic integration are increased employment and new 
business opportunities. Some countries will reap benefit more than others, but the hope is that all of 
the economies in ASEAN will develop and benefit from further development.
At the same time, ASEAN is very diverse. Its members are at different levels of social-economic 
development. There are high-income economies like Brunei and Singapore; middle-income countries 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam; and lower-income economies, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. ASEAN member States also have different political systems and 
in these countries, there are also a variety of different types of business enterprise (State-led, family 
owned business, MNCs) and industry sectors. 
ASEAN sees itself as a community of opportunities. In wanting to improve its competitive advantage 
in the business arena and fit into the global economy, businesses in ASEAN have to ensure standards 
in corporate governance, accountability, transparency and legitimacy. Businesses in ASEAN region 
face increasingly expectations to show that they are operating in a responsible manner. At the same 
time, governments in ASEAN are slowly providing guidance to businesses, through national stock 
exchanges and corporate regulators and national human rights institutions. 
ASEAN Community 2015 
Overall, ASEAN is making progress in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and human 
rights. It is committed to human rights and established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. It adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in November 
2012. The Declaration underscored the commitment of ASEAN to ensure that human rights 
implementation are in accordance to the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and other international human 
rights instruments to which ASEAN member States are party to.
CSR is a strategic objective of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint. Under the said 
Blueprint, CSR is instrumental in contributing towards sustainable socio-economic development in 
ASEAN member states. In moving CSR in ASEAN forward, several steps are being undertaken. 
First, ASEAN would like a model public policy on CSR as a reference, to guide the promotion of CSR 
in the region. In this regard, the ASEAN CSR Network helped to develop a working document that 
draws from the ISO 26000, a voluntary international standard that provides guidance on social 
responsibility. 
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Second, to address the lack of regional cooperation and information on CSR, the ASEAN Foundation 
catalysed the formation of a regional network for CSR, now the ASEAN CSR Network. The Network 
was formally registered and incorporated in Singapore in 2011. The Network aims to incorporate 
CSR into businesses’ agendas. It provides information exchanges and functions as a centralised 
repository of ASEAN knowledge on CSR through case studies and research, within ASEAN. 
Third, the ASCC Blueprint recommends that ASEAN encourages the adoption and implementation of 
international standards on social responsibility. AICHR has completed its baseline study on CSR and 
human rights in ASEAN. The baseline study on CSR and human rights is part of the Five Years Work 
Plan of AICHR, which allows the Commission to have a better understanding on the emerging human 
rights-related issues pertaining to corporate conducts in ASEAN. 
Fourth, the ASCC Blueprint recommends that ASEAN increases awareness of ensuring sustainable 
relations between commercial activities and communities. 
ASEAN recognises the close link between CSR and respect for human rights. This is encouraging. 
There is still a prevalent view with businesses in ASEAN that CSR is irrelevant to them and not a 
financially worthwhile undertaking. Businesses lack time and know how on how to incorporate CSR 
in their businesses. 
Understanding CSR and Human Rights in ASEAN
The baseline study on CSR and Human Rights in ASEAN commissioned by AICHR revealed the 
significant divergence in the awareness, understanding and implementation of CSR across the 
ASEAN member States. The nexus between CSR and human rights in ASEAN is weak. There is lax 
monitoring of compliance with regard to regulatory requirements. There is an absence of grievance 
mechanisms. Widespread corruption is an obstacle to effective enforcement and undermines the 
rule of law in some countries. 
The baseline study documented the growth in philanthropy across the region, both in monetary terms, 
as well as in profile and approach. Business tycoons and regional conglomerates have donated vast 
sums of money for public services, including education and religious institutions.
However, while philanthropy is a desirable outcome in itself, there is also a risk of companies using 
philanthropy as a public relations exercise to conceal or whitewash their misdeeds. There is also a 
risk that companies may be lulled into a false sense that they are adopting sustainable practices 
because of their philanthropy activities, despite these potentially falling short of international CSR 
practices.
Efforts are thus needed to modify existing practices, such that they conform to international CSR 
norms and standards. 
Finally, the baseline pointed out that despite the economic advancement across ASEAN, much of the 
region’s population still live below the poverty line. There is a need to balance economic development 
with responsible business practices. Additionally, the most commonly accepted measure of a 
country’s economic health is the Gross Domestic Product that only includes goods and services. 
Once again, indicators for measuring economic growth are preferred over contribution of intangibles. 
Challenges
There are challenges with regard to CSR and human rights in ASEAN. 
Across countries in ASEAN, and within the businesses in each country, there is a large gap in terms 
of CSR knowledge and practice. Multinational companies and conglomerates are generally in tune 
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with latest trends, although some small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in ASEAN are providing 
real examples of business innovations through CSR. Accordingly, there is a strong need to increase 
general awareness of and education on CSR-related issues. At the same time, targeting information 
campaign initiative to key sectors and groups — such as ASEAN’s low-income economies, SMEs and 
key industries like agriculture, mining and manufacturing — is required. 
 
An emerging challenge is getting the CSR and sustainability message out. The lack of understanding 
especially among non-business stakeholders is high. Governments, NGOs and media in general still 
do not have a correct appreciation for CSR. They still see CSR simply as philanthropy. Governments 
and NGOs approach companies merely as a source of funding, while media reports primarily on 
corporate giving and volunteer efforts. Consumer education will also have to increase in order to 
provide companies with an added incentive to pursue CSR. 
 
There is low awareness of human rights as an element of CSR. Although the State’s duty is to uphold 
and protect the rights of citizens, the responsibility of businesses to respect the rights of individuals 
is not well understood. Human rights should be made an explicit central element of CSR through -led 
efforts at increasing awareness and understanding. 
The effects of climate change are transforming the way companies look at non-economic 
considerations, such as recycling and wastage, as well as the use of environmentally harmful raw 
materials. Large well-established companies are realising that sustainable business models need to 
include climate change mitigation strategies and that a failure to do so may have an adverse impact 
on their brand. 
 
Migrant labour abuse is common among the labour-sending countries in the region. The lack of 
protection of these workers’ rights and their access to remedies is an important issue. Business and 
governments have a key role to play in respecting the rights of these migrant workers and providing 
an environment in which their rights are protected. 
The potential to speed up the empowerment of women can be realised by providing opportunities for 
more women to move from the informal and agriculture sectors into formal employment. However, 
the risks of exploitation, neglect of labour standards, and abuse of women’s rights are real risks that 
need to be addressed.
Moving Forward 
The ASEAN Community 2015 constitutes a good opportunity to elevate discussions on CSR and role 
of businesses in achieving ASEAN goals, not only in spurring economic growth but also in social and 
environmental sustainability. The promotion of CSR has also been identified as key strategy and CSR will 
continue to emerge as the business response in helping to solve some of the region’s pressing concerns. 
To move forward, ASEAN needs to promote international norms in the region. The development of 
CSR practices in ASEAN should be consistently benchmarked against best practices. 
More capacity building support is essential to establish the capabilities, knowledge and implementation 
systems to entrench the practice of CSR in the region. Capacity building support in the form of skills 
training, workshops and seminars would support the systems required to ensure that all countries in 
the region can effectively embark on CSR projects and collaborate with relevant stakeholders. 
Lastly, ASEAN, as a whole, also needs to improve the documentation of good practices and the 
sharing of knowledge across countries in the region. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESSES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ASEM MEMBERS 
(Seminar report of the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights1)
Introduction
According to a 2013 report, 40 of the world’s 100 largest economic entities were business 
corporations.2 Given their economic influence, the impacts of businesses also extend to socio- political 
issues and, increasingly, their role and accountability in relation to human rights have come under 
examination. These questions provided the focus for the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human 
Rights, titled “Human Rights and Businesses” (held on 18–20 November 2014, in Hanoi, Viet Nam). 
The 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights was organised by the Asia-Europe Foundation 
(ASEF), the Raoul Wallenberg Institute (as delegated by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, and the Philippine Department of 
Foreign Affairs. It was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam and brought together over 
125 official government representatives and civil society experts, representing 47 ASEM3 members 
to discuss the protection and promotion of human rights in, and by, the business sector. Additional 
events at the Seminar included side-events on Collective Bargaining and on National Action Plans on 
Business and Human Rights. In addition, a panel discussion was organised on the role of the private 
sector in protecting migrant workers’ rights. 
The Seminar convened four working groups for in-depth discussion on the relationship between 
businesses and human rights protection. The working groups focused on the State duty to protect 
human rights against violations by businesses; corporate responsibility and its contribution to 
human rights implementation; monitoring, reporting and access to remedies; and multi-stakeholder 
cooperation. These discussions were guided (though not limited) by this initial list of cross-cutting 
questions as articulated in the concept paper: 
1. What are the limits to the responsibilities of corporations under international law and international 
criminal law? Are there regional differences about the role of businesses in society (e.g., are 
there different understandings of the concept of corporate citizenship?) 
2. At the international level, what can be done to make corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
human rights protection a bigger consideration in trade agreements and practices? What is 
the role of organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in this aspect?
3. How can policy coherence on business practice and human rights protection be enhanced 
at the national and international level? What role and support can regional mechanisms and 
institutions provide in policy coherence?
1.  The main rapporteurs of this Seminar Report are Sumi Dhanarajan and Claire Methven O’Brien. The report captures the 
discussions of each of the four working groups as summarised by Working Group Rapporteurs Claire Methven O’Brien 
(Working Group 1), Shahamin Zaman (Working Group 2), Sumi Dhanarajan (Working Group 3) and Karin Buhmann (Working 
Group 4). The authors gratefully acknowledge their contributions. 
2.  See Corporate Clout 2013’s “Time for Responsible Capitalism”, http://www.globaltrends.com/knowledge-center/features/
shapers-and-influencers/190-corporate-clout-2013-time-for-responsible-capitalism  
3.  ASEM brings together 53 members: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, the Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Viet Nam plus the ASEAN Secretariat and 
the European Union.
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4. Apart from reputational damage, what is the actual risk to companies for poor practice in respect 
to human rights standards?
5. What are the different approaches required for different industries and business sectors (e.g., 
extractive industries, textiles, media, service providers, financial institutions, etc.) when it comes 
to human rights protection (in the context of each of the four working group topics)?
6. What considerations need to be kept in mind for vulnerable groups such as women, LGBT, 
children and indigenous communities as well as ethnic and religious minorities? 
7. Which organisations/institutions have the legitimacy to decide on business standards?
A Background Paper was prepared to provide an informational and analytical premise for the dialogue. 
The following key messages emerged from the working group discussions and were shared with 
ASEM members:
While States remain the main duty bearers of human rights obligations, the private sector has a 
growing responsibility to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights in all its activities. 
There was consensus that the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights and Business (UNGPs) provide 
a common framework of globally agreed principles that should be promoted and consistently applied 
across all ASEM member countries as a means of framing policies and practices at the national and 
regional levels. All ASEM members should develop National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement the 
UNGPs effectively. 
At the country level, existing legislations that protect human rights should be strengthened and 
effectively implemented. In order to achieve government policy coherence, business-related human 
rights should be integrated into the portfolios of all government departments that touch upon the 
subject. States should put human rights and business on the agenda of international meetings and 
inter-regional dialogue, including those meetings that take place on trade, exports and investment. 
Regional mechanisms are required that will document, evaluate and share best practices in human 
rights and business to strengthen policy coherence across Asia and Europe; such an institution could 
be set up at the ASEM level. 
By failing to protect human rights, businesses can lose their social license to operate, which can 
have disruptive consequences for their operations. The issue of corporate governance is key for 
strong compliance measures to be incorporated and some multinational enterprises (MNEs) are 
increasingly motivated to incorporate human rights into their core business activities. In comparison, 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) may lack the financial resources and technical know-how to 
incorporate human rights concerns into their daily business operations. Governments need to build 
awareness and sensitise businesses, particularly SMEs, to their human rights responsibilities. Clarity 
on concepts regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) and human rights in business will help 
create a consensus of understanding and assist in the engagement of companies.
Companies should conduct both detailed human rights due diligence and impact assessments in their 
value chain management. As various industry codes of conduct are already imposed on suppliers there 
needs to be a coordinated approach for social audits which can enhance the implementation process 
on business and human rights by companies in their value chain management. States themselves 
purchase a large variety of products and services through State-led procurement systems, which 
can be an effective tool to promote and build awareness on corporate responsibility for human rights 
among companies that do business with State agencies.
Remedy — as defined in the UNGPs — can take on various characteristics and functions, but a focus 
upon the risks and effects on the victim may be a good frame for articulating an effective remedy. 
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Victims of business-related human rights abuses face a range of legal and practical barriers in their 
access to effective remedy and may need support in receiving the requisite knowledge, skills and 
resources to do so. It is important to extend full protection to human rights defenders working in 
the area of corporate accountability and human rights and business; awareness-raising amongst 
national law enforcement and judicial authorities is required in this regard. 
States should encourage support to both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. When non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms (State-based or otherwise) are engaged, adequate protection to the victims 
and efforts to ensure fairness in both process and outcome are required and efforts to ensure 
transparency, such as the effective application of freedom of information legislation, need to be 
strengthened. 
States and international organisations should support and work with multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(MSIs) to learn what human rights means to business. MSIs can bridge the “language gaps” between 
policy makers and businesses by emphasising a specific objective or context in which companies 
operate, through reference to risk management, minimum wages, occupational health and safety. In 
addition to helping businesses align their activities with the UNGPs, MSIs should develop a roster of 
good practices with regard to the operationalisation of human rights in business practices.
General recommendations to ASEM members:
1.  States should implement the UNGPs at the national level and develop National Action Plans 
(NAPs) on human rights and business that are fully inclusive, participatory and transparent.
2.  States should adhere to their existing international human rights and labour commitments by 
improving the implementation of national legislation that promote and protect human rights. 
National reporting on human rights in business should be incorporated into existing processes 
such as the Universal Periodic Review and other treaty reporting.
3.  States need to identify appropriate measures to regulate and engage with multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to ensure compliance of human 
rights standards.
a)  All companies should be required to report on the non-financial impact of their activities both 
at home and abroad. Human rights impact assessments should be a requirement for all new 
business developments;
b)  SMEs should be encouraged to participate in the United Nations Global Compact’s national 
networks as these can support businesses in their CSR and human rights commitments. 
4.  Business responsibilities on human rights protection should be integrated into start-up support 
and advice provided by public agencies to new companies, especially SMEs. 
5.  States should consider developing soft incentives (such as preferential treatment in public 
procurement or in exports support) as a means to encourage businesses to adopt good practices. 
6.  Human rights impact and diligence are important in supply chain management. Corporate 
human rights codes for suppliers could be standardised to cover most of the requirements that 
are applicable to all companies. Simplified compliance requirements will allow for a harmonised 
base for social audits.
7.  When governments act as investors, procure goods or privatise the delivery of public services, 
they should aim to safeguard human rights by: 
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a)  Following a socially responsible investment approach that encompasses human rights in all 
State investment policies;
b)  Ensuring transparency in the public procurement process as a precondition of monitoring 
and accountability;
c) Incorporating human rights impact assessment into privatisation processes;
d)  Integrating human rights standards into public awarded contracts and service user 
agreements (for example, through the Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Quality or 
AAAQ criteria). 
8.  Independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and the judicial system are critical to 
ensuring access to effective remedy. Transparency and access to information are imperative 
to ensure victims are fully aware of the facts as well as the processes available to them. It is 
the State’s duty to ensure that this is maintained as part of a strong rule of law. In addition, 
States should support non-judicial mechanisms, which are an important complement to judicial 
grievance mechanisms and can have both remedial and preventive functions. 
9.  Strengthening the capacity of victims as well as civil society groups (i.e., NGOs and trade unions) 
and other institutions, such as national human rights institutions (NHRIs) that can support them 
in their pursuit of remedies, is necessary. Free legal aid for victims bringing human rights-related 
cases is one means of ensuring this. 
10.  To enable NHRIs to fulfil their Paris Principles mandate on human rights and business, certain 
measures are needed, such as: 
a) Safeguarding the independence of NHRIs;
b)  Ensuring NHRI mandates are adequate to address and remedy human rights and business–
related abuses;
c) Training and resources to work on human rights and business issues. 
11.  The UNGPs note that multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have important contributions to make 
in the fields of business and human rights. Governments and intergovernmental organisations 
should work with MSIs to share best practice of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights and assist firms in exercising human rights due diligence. MSIs can help States and 
intergovernmental organisations reach across the legal and policy limitations of international 
law, and focus on what human rights means to business. 
12.  MSIs are not ends in themselves. Their effectiveness is dependent on their internal dynamics 
and governance, and on their level of transparency and accountability to all stakeholders. In this 
regard:
a) MSIs need to engage SMEs also and not just large businesses;
b) National Action Plans must include the role MSIs can play;
c)  MSIs themselves may need to be aligned with the guiding principles. They may need to have 
their own grievance and reporting mechanisms. 
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WORKING GROUP REPORTS
Working Group 1: State Duty to Protect Human Rights Against 
Violations by Businesses
Pillar I of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) addresses 
States’ duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses, within 
their jurisdiction, and disaggregates this duty into a number of themes, around which discussion was 
structured in Working Group 1 (WG1).
1. General regulatory and policy functions
1.1 Current status and challenges in Asia and Europe
Guiding Principle 1 (GP1) requires States to protect rights-holders by taking appropriate steps to 
prevent, investigate, punish and redress business-related human rights abuses through effective 
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication, while GP2 refers to States’ duty to set out clearly the 
expectation that business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human 
rights. These principles, along with those of corporations’ responsibility to respect human rights, and 
the right to remedy for business-related abuses, attracted strong consensus in the Working Group. It 
was felt that challenges to human rights from business activities globally, including in both Asia and 
Europe, were substantial, both in connection with transnational corporations and, on the other hand, 
SMEs that — while they constitute the majority of corporate entities in most jurisdictions — typically 
lack resources to make significant investment in establishing sustainable business practices. 
Simultaneously, there was agreement amongst participants that, so far, governments had not done 
enough to address these challenges, with most having yet to react directly to the GPs. An appropriate 
response, it was agreed, was likely to include both regulatory and “top-down” measures, such as 
legislation, as well as steps to improve capacity and incentives for businesses to act with respect for 
human rights — the so-called “smart-mix” previously referred to by the UN Special Representative on 
Business and Human Rights. Yet, most States were still some way off from achieving this, participants 
observed, with the need to improve methods and tools for developing policies and legislation, such 
as regulatory impact assessment, seen as an important stepping stone in this regard. Views varied 
and no consensus emerged on whether a new UN treaty on business and human rights was needed 
or would contribute to closing these gaps.
A further obstacle to establishing the right regulatory framework, in both Asia and Europe, was the 
residual influence of past concepts of CSR, with their emphasis on philanthropy and voluntarism.  This, 
along with other factors leading to State capture, such as corporate lobbying, government reliance 
on business in general (or on specific corporations) for revenues, personal or party political interests 
or investments, made it difficult in many contexts to secure support for regulatory approaches, with 
political will being particularly weak on the human rights impacts of business activities abroad.  
Although civil society organisations (CSOs) had already played a role in triggering progress towards 
new binding standards, consumer and civil society awareness of the human rights dimensions of 
CSR still remained limited, in both regions. Organised labour was another potentially strong lever with 
power to influence business behaviour towards respect for human rights, however, trade unions and 
the full range of labour rights have yet to be accepted in all countries in Asia or Europe. Indeed, trade 
unionists and labour activists, along with other human rights defenders tackling business-related 
abuses were subject to increasing attacks, exacerbated in many cases by restrictions on media 
freedom, transparency and freedom of information. These shortcomings also undermined the role 
of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which, in many jurisdictions, was not currently functioning 
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as an effective mechanism of good governance that safeguarded human rights, with participation of 
affected rights-holders often weak or completely absent. In the area of non-financial reporting, some 
progress had been made, for example, the new EU Directive, and requirements introduced by Asian 
stock exchanges were notable advances — but generally, legal requirements were still too weak in this 
area, with insufficient awareness and consensus around appropriate reporting frameworks.
1.2 Opportunities and recommendations 
Notwithstanding such challenges, there were encouraging examples from some States of specific 
legislative and policy measures taken to promote implementation of the UNGPs, for example, the 
development and adoption of National Action Plans on business and human rights, and new laws 
on corporate transparency and reporting, as mentioned. Some States had also developed tools 
and published dedicated guidance for businesses in specific industry sectors and SMEs on how 
to respect human rights in practice. Communications technologies were seen as holding great 
potential to harness and expand consumer power in both Asia and Europe, for instance, through 
mobile applications that could support consumer purchasing on the basis of certification and 
labelling schemes. Multi-stakeholder initiatives and labour unions were also valuable resources that 
could be better integrated into State-based regulatory approaches; this equally applied to business 
associations, in relation especially to strengthening business capacities in the human rights field. 
Expanding the scope of existing EIA policies and standards to encompass human rights could also 
deliver important gains in terms of improved governance and moving closer to human rights-based 
approaches to development.
WG1 recommended ASEM governments to: 
1. Ensure full and effective implementation of all their existing commitments to human rights and 
labour standards. 
2. Ensure the GPs are translated into local languages in all ASEM countries.
3. Put human rights and business on agendas for international meetings and inter-regional 
dialogues to raise political awareness.
4. Identify appropriate measures to regulate TNCs and step up engagement with TNCs to secure the 
achievement of human rights standards through supply and value chains.
5. Establish mechanisms to evaluate and share best practices intra-regionally and inter-regionally 
to economise efforts across States, and to ensure consistent application of the GPs across 
national contexts and regions, informed by any differences in the background concepts of CSR 
in Asia and Europe, and with special attention to TNCs.
6. Require companies to report on non-financial impacts, specifically including human rights, and 
both at home and abroad. 
7. Strengthen awareness and actions on the links between the anti-corruption and human rights 
and business agendas, and ensure transparency, including through freedom of information 
legislation.
8. Integrate human rights and business into start-up support and advice provided by public 
agencies, especially to SMEs.
9. Integrate human rights and business issues into regulatory impact assessments.
10. Extend full protection to human rights defenders working in the area of human rights and 
business and corporate accountability, including through awareness-raising amongst national 
law enforcement and judicial authorities.
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2. The State-business nexus
2.1 Current status and challenges in Asia and Europe 
WG1 considered experiences in Asia and Europe relating to the State-business nexus under three 
headings: government ownership or control of, or support to enterprises; private delivery of public 
services; and public procurement. There was general consensus on the importance of the role of 
the State as an economic actor in both regions. In the Asian context, joint ventures, State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public procurement were issues identified as important in terms of human 
rights impacts.  In Europe, privatisation had diminished the significance of SOEs in some countries, 
but public procurement remained an issue of high concern. Privatisation and contracting typically 
had left gaps in human rights accountability in its wake, given that human rights remedies remained 
State-focused, and not applicable to private companies delivering public services on behalf of the 
State, whereas human right issues might not lie within the scope of administrative accountability 
mechanisms. Across both regions, the State’s role as investor or supporter of investment was 
also highlighted, for instance, through public pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, export credit 
agencies and development banks. Likewise, the tendency towards liberalisation of essential public 
services through trade and investment agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) in Europe, was of universal concern. 
Today’s legal frameworks internationally, regionally and nationally were observed to be inadequate in 
this area, and had not yet been aligned by duty-bearers with the GPs. For example, the requirements 
on public purchasers to accept the lowest bid, and interpretations of the Most-Economically 
Advantageous Tender (MEAT) by courts and bodies issuing procurement policies and guidance, 
are often in direct contradiction with the State’s duty to protect human rights in its commercial 
transactions.  Such rules had historically prevented public authorities from considering production 
processes and their social and environmental externalities in making procurement decisions and 
needed urgently to be revisited. International standards, such as the International Finance Corporate 
(IFC) Performance Requirements, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Common Approaches on export credits and World Bank Safeguards, were often used as benchmarks 
or proxies by public purchasers, where they did attempt to assess business partners’ respect for 
human rights — yet these standards themselves were not yet fully consistent with the GPs. It was 
acknowledged, however, that the goals of effective monitoring of public supply chains, and the 
establishment of adequate accountability mechanisms and remedies for those affected, were 
challenging, particularly given the current lack of know-how and learning networks amongst public 
authorities in this area. 
In aggregate, the discussion highlighted these issues as posing a potential threat to States’ 
commitments to and delivery on the new Sustainable Development Goals, with the expansion of 
private delivery of public services noted in particular as a possible challenge to accountability in this 
context. 
2.2 Opportunities and recommendations 
Aspects of the status quo were however identified as possible platforms for stronger and more 
effective State action in to protect human rights in connection with the State-business nexus.  
For instance, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and its jurisprudence already clearly 
articulate that the positive obligations of public bodies to protect human rights from third parties — 
and the right to a remedy — extend to the domain of privatised public services. There were encouraging 
examples from some countries where the executive was intensifying its requirements on SOEs to 
report on non-financial impacts, including human rights, and to take action on the basis of impacts or 
risks identified. Some countries had undertaken extensive analysis to establish how contract terms 
for private delivery of health and social care should be defined in order to safeguard human rights of 
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service users. Measures to integrate due diligence and respect for human rights into the investment 
policies and practices of pension funds could draw on the experiences of the private sector, even if 
they did not need to be limited to the latter’s scope or approach. Citizen-users of services and utilities 
could be valuably mobilised to monitor respect for human rights in their delivery, if provided with the 
right information and resources. 
On this basis, WG1 recommended that ASEM governments:
1. Integrate human rights and business standards into the public procurement process, and 
also ensure transparency in public procurement as a precondition of effective monitoring and 
accountability.
2. Safeguard human rights where public services are delivered privately, including by: 
 a) incorporating human rights impact assessment into privatisation processes;
 b) integrating human rights into framework terms and service contracts;
 c)  integrating human rights into service user agreements, for instance with reference to the 
AAAQ criteria.
3. Concerning public pension funds, and elsewhere the State acts as an investor:
 a) introduce adequate disclosure and non-financial reporting requirements; 
 b) adopt a socially responsible investment (SRI) approach that encompasses human rights;
 c)  consider establishing grievance mechanisms by which policies and practices of public 
investment vehicles can be held to account by rights-holders.
3. Policy coherence
3.1 Current status and challenges in Asia and Europe
It was widely felt that the GPs were correct in identifying policy coherence — or rather, the lack of it — as 
a problem in connection with business and human rights.  Strong tensions existed, in many countries, 
between the desire to attract and retain investment, and the perceived need to compromise human 
rights protections to secure the former goal. Horizontal incoherence, i.e., the pursuit of conflicting 
policies and objectives by different arms of the executive, was seen as a universal challenge. This 
might be owed to a range of factors, for example, political rivalries or turf wars between ministries; 
the typical division of labour within governments that situates human rights often within justice or 
foreign affairs ministries, and the general lack of exposure of business, trade or economic ministries 
to human rights issues; and the need for business-related ministries or agencies to be seen as the 
“friend of business” and the perception of regulation as a burden on corporations.
Concerning trade, while liberalisation might yield positive results for human rights, for instance, 
in terms of a boost to employment in sectors where protective measures are eliminated through 
new trade agreements, there were also typically negative impacts for sectors newly exposed to 
competition, which could hurt employment and livelihoods, while standards and accountability with 
regard to public services subject to liberalisation could also suffer, as discussed above. Risks in this 
area were currently aggravated by the lack of accepted practical methods for conducting human 
rights impact assessments of trade agreements.
Similarly, in some cases investment agreements had been witnessed as restricting the scope of the 
State to protect human rights, while international arbitration was not itself accountable to human 
rights standards, nor a mechanism by which States could be held accountable to their human rights 
obligations. Most States had not attempted yet to integrate the GPs into export and investment 
promotion activities, such as trade and commercial missions, or advice provided to prospective 
exporters. 
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3.2 Opportunities and recommendations
There was thus ample room to strengthen horizontal coherence, within individual States, and vertical 
coherence, between States’ human rights obligations and the policies and agreements they conclude 
at international level. Both could be addressed by National Action Plans on business and human 
rights, which were strongly welcomed and urged as an opportunity to anchor the GPs firmly in national 
law, policy, practice and institutions; with NAPs processes presenting an excellent opportunity to 
align information and views, and gradually build trust, across stakeholder groups. 
Concerning vertical coherence, participants felt much remained to be done in Asia: while the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) had undertaken some relevant and 
positive work, the greater number of regional and sub-regional entities, and their differing human 
rights mandates, complicated the picture. This was true also for federal States, with a key question 
being what central governments of federal States had done, or needed to do, to inform State-level 
legislatures, executive bodies, and agencies about the GPs.
National human rights institutions were identified as having a positive role to play in promoting 
coherence, through fulfilment of their mandates to monitor and promote respect for human 
rights.  NHRIs, in conjunction, for instance, with other experts, legal practitioners and CSOs, could 
valuably contribute research and advice for necessary revisions to law, policy and practice. While 
NHRIs had taken steps to increase their engagement with the business agenda, including through 
the ICC Working Group on Business and Human Rights, challenges remained, including the lack of 
government responsiveness to NHRI recommendations, the need for stronger modalities for cross-
border cooperation between NHRIs of home- and host- States, and the failure of some States in both 
Asia and Europe to establish Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs.
WG1 recommended that ASEM governments:
1. Undertake to develop NAPs on human rights and business and follow fully inclusive, participatory 
and transparent NAPs processes — for instance, providing financial support to enable civil society 
participation where needed, especially for groups at risk of vulnerability and marginalisation, 
and through timely information sharing.
2. Provide for exchanges of experiences around NAPs and national implementation of the UNGPs, 
for example, through EU-ASEAN, and other inter-regional dialogues; dialogues with and between 
sub-regions; side-events; peer reviews based on NAPs; and East and South Asian Regional 
Forums on human rights and business.
3. Integrate human rights and business into existing human rights processes such as the Universal 
Periodic Review and treaty reporting.
4. On trade and investment:
a) identify appropriate standards and methods for performing human rights impact 
assessments (HRIA) of trade and investment agreements, and implement these;
b) Ensure that such HRIA are followed up, with a participatory approach to monitoring impacts 
of trade and invest agreements involving labour and civil society representatives.
5. On Special Economic Zones, learn from past experiences, and ensure that human rights 
standards are not curtailed, for instance, with reference, to land, labour and environmental 
rights.
6. Recognise that taxation regimes, especially measures in one jurisdiction permitting corporations 
to evade or avoid taxes in others, can be a human rights and business issue, and respond 
accordingly.
7. Take steps to permit NHRIs to fulfil their Paris Principles mandates on human rights and business, 
including:
a) Safeguarding the independence of NHRIs;
b) Ensuring NHRI mandates are adequate to address and remedy business-related abuses;
c) Providing support for adequate training and resources to work on business issues.
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Working Group 2: Corporate Responsibility and its Contribution 
to Human Rights Implementation
Working Group 2 (WG2) participants, across all stakeholder categories, were in accord in their support 
for the UN framework and its second pillar, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Pillar 
II defines business respect for human rights as acting with due diligence to avoid infringing human 
rights and addressing any negative impacts on rights resulting from corporate activities. In order 
to mitigate adverse impacts that harm communities or individuals, businesses need to adhere to 
national and international rules and regulations. 
Currently, however, most companies interpreted their human rights obligations through their own 
pre-established agendas, especially in developing countries where there is weak implementation of 
national laws and regulations, while international laws lack direct applicability to non-State entities. 
Even if under international law there may not be legal implications for businesses that do not respect 
human rights, in reality businesses that fail to respect human rights may create negative reputations 
for their customer base. They may also lose their social license to operate. Businesses operating in 
host countries where legal frameworks and standards differ from those in their home countries may 
find it challenging to understand which standards to follow. 
It was therefore desirable that all national laws and regulations uphold respect for human rights, such 
as in the area of fair wages for workers, other workplace conditions and transparency. This was true 
even while the influence of global legal and policy frameworks on the national level was acknowledged. 
Governments should implement a legal framework including measures to eliminate human rights 
abuses, and create tools and mechanisms towards due diligence by businesses. Participants felt that 
CSR initiatives and best practices should be shared, and that dissemination of lessons learned from 
some European States in particular would be valuable, for example, in relation to soft law approaches. 
It was observed that many businesses in developing nations consider companies in the developed 
world to be role models with regard to CSR.
Overall, it was felt that the role of the government in supporting the implementation of human rights 
in, and by, businesses was crucial and could not be ignored. Many countries in the global North 
were engaging in the development of National Action Plans to identify strategic actions on issues, 
for example, pertaining to labour, environment, operating standards, and non-discrimination. Such 
processes could furthermore identify business sectors posing the greatest risks to the rights of 
people and communities. Businesses had a role to play in highlighting to governments the need to 
promote CSR, such as through dissemination of best practices. It was imperative to embed human 
rights in CSR dialogue and discussions at local and global levels, and to promote the engagement 
and involvement of relevant national, regional and international institutions in the understanding and 
implementation of business human rights obligations.
Many multinational enterprises had adopted CSR policies, and most had sufficient financial and 
human resources to implement human rights due diligence procedures and encourage human 
rights compliance in their own and their business partners’ activities. However, SMEs accounted 
for the large majority of companies numerically, and they frequently lacked the financial resources 
and know–how needed to incorporate respect for human rights into their daily business operations. 
Wherever relevant national legal standards did not themselves guarantee the necessary minimum of 
rights to the individual, SMEs inevitably lagged behind in upholding business responsibilities. It was 
agreed amongst participants that the State’s duty to sensitise and build awareness of human rights 
required both a top-down effort, with steps at the inter-governmental level, and bottom-up measures 
to promote education, knowledge and better business behaviour. Finally, greater commitment was 
required from businesses to fulfil their human rights obligations in relation to their supply and value 
chains, even if monitoring could be challenging. This is especially critical in the informal sector, where 
a potentially vast number of small businesses operate to insufficient or no standards at all.
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1. Europe
The EU had made a number of policy commitments in support of the GPs, such as the European 
Union’s 2012 Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy. Before 2011, the European 
Commission’s policy on CSR described corporate responsibility as “a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with 
their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. With its 2011 Communication on CSR, the Commission, 
however, adopted a new definition of CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society”, removing the suggestion of voluntariness. Over recent years, more European multinational 
companies had begun to report on CSR, representing an indirect acknowledgment of such 
responsibility: reporting on corporate responsibility had increased to about 5,800 reports in 2010, 
compared to less than 50 in the early 1990s.  
Individually, some advanced economies had put policies in place to address business responsibility to 
respect human rights. As a result of an EU-level commitment, member States had pledged to produce 
National Action Plans (NAPs) on business and human rights, a State-driven initiative to engage multiple 
stakeholders in addressing the challenges of business and human rights. Some European countries 
had already initiated or were working towards such plans. Processes for NAPs had great potential 
to encourage, inspire and provide incentives to other countries to do the same; they could further 
provide a basis for exchanging human rights’ practices and defining and supporting implementation 
of regional-level measures. NAP processes need to involve businesses in consultations and design, 
and NAPs that are finally adopted should be widely disseminated amongst the business community. 
A NAP could sensitise businesses to the need to engage with human rights by communicating about 
risk mitigation measures and clarifying the “business case” for respecting human rights, alongside 
the legal and ethical case for human rights alignment. 
Corporate non-financial reporting provided an opportunity for companies to prove they had undertaken 
human rights due diligence processes. Significant numbers of large businesses in the global North 
already published sustainability reports relying on frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), which was seen as an important first step towards transparency and accountability. Yet even 
businesses reporting on the basis of such frameworks needed to ensure that reporting processes were 
inclusive and adequately involved stakeholders. Reporting and other transparency and disclosure 
measures had potential to reveal businesses’ positive impacts, for instance, by highlighting good 
practices through case studies. States could improve non-financial reporting by providing supporting 
guidance: some countries in Europe, for instance, had developed formal guidelines to help companies 
identify human rights risks. 
WG2 noted the inter-dependence of Pillars I and II of the UN Framework, particularly in the area 
of public procurement, which are effective tools to promote adoption and implementation of due 
diligence. States purchase an enormous volume and large variety of products and services, and 
procurement systems could build awareness of CSR and contribute importantly to implementation 
of the responsibility to respect human rights among companies, which do business with State 
agencies. Where the procurement system permits the deployment of purchasing by public authorities 
to promote green and social objectives, relevant rules and procedures should be expanded in scope 
to human rights.
2. Asia
Although disparate laws and regulations addressing CSR exist in most developing countries, within 
Asia, Southeast Asian nations were seen still to take the lead. CSR had been included in the 
ASEAN 2009 Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint with an objective to promote the involvement of 
the private sector in its development strategy. It was also addressed by recent work of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). 
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Civil society, government and business all had a role to play in strengthening awareness of business 
and human rights issues, however, Asian businesses, it was felt, were yet to address risks and 
abuses. A large proportion of businesses in Asia, as in Europe, are SMEs, which, as noted earlier, may 
be often constrained by scarcity of financial and human resources. To complicate matters, definitions 
of SME varied between the Asian and European contexts.  The role of large businesses in securing 
respect for human rights through supply chain management was important, and here a business-to-
business approach could be beneficial to promote incorporation of CSR and human rights initiatives 
and policies amongst SMEs. Businesses at the top of supply chains should require their suppliers to 
sign on to codes of conduct before purchases of products or services were made. Participation in the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC) and UNGC Local Networks could also help businesses in working towards 
respect for human rights and meeting purchasers’ CSR requirements. Internal and external social 
audits could be valuable in monitoring and demonstrating impacts on implementation of relevant 
standards.  
In terms of the government’s role, corruption in the public and private sectors was acknowledged as 
a continuing problem, where it could lead to weak enforcement of laws and standards. Governments 
need to work with civil society organisations and business to eradicate corruption as far as possible. 
Overall, there was a need for strong regulatory framework and effective enforcement to avoid 
business-related human rights abuses, including in supply chains. This should permit governments 
to highlight and reward human rights and CSR best practices, for example, through tax incentives and 
other soft law instruments. 
As regards civil society, collaboration between CSOs and business was viewed as essential to address 
communication gaps and create transparency. If the need for community engagement was ignored, 
businesses risked adverse impacts on communities, which could easily escalate. It was accordingly 
important to involve all rights-holders as well as other stakeholders in human rights due diligence 
and impact assessments. While philanthropy could not be used to offset abuses, businesses could 
in some circumstances valuably contribute to education, health and livelihood restoration processes. 
Another issue identified by WG2 as significant for developing Asian countries was that of the 
difference between a minimum wage and a living wage. Government needed to ensure mechanisms 
were in place to monitor the evolving cost of meeting basic needs and to ensure minimum wage 
levels changed appropriately in response. Generally, illiteracy and poor access to education hindered 
understanding of human rights, so that bottom-up capacity building initiatives were needed to enhance 
understanding of global standards and human rights, especially for groups at risk to vulnerability, 
marginalisation and discrimination, to empower them to address denials of human rights and to 
demand the social services to which they were entitled.
Overall, greater efforts were needed to raise awareness amongst all stakeholders which could in turn 
stimulate commitments from businesses to build their capacity on human rights issues, including 
at the level of boards and senior management. In developing nations, greater clarity concerning 
definitions of CSR that adequately reflect human rights and the UN framework and GPs would help 
create consensus and help to bring SMEs along on this journey.
3. Opportunities and recommendations 
There was overall consensus that the State played a crucial role in supporting the implementation 
of human rights practices by business. Human rights need to be embedded in CSR dialogue at the 
local and international levels in which the full participation of the relevant national, regional and 
international institutions is required. Furthermore, businesses needed to demonstrate greater 
commitment to fulfilling their human rights obligations, especially in their supply and value chains, 
particularly in the informal sector where a vast number of small businesses are operating to 
insufficient or no standards at all. 
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1. Governments should implement a legal framework including measures to eliminate human rights 
abuses, and create tools and mechanisms towards due diligence by businesses. All national laws 
and regulations should uphold human rights and ensure transparency in practice, such as in the 
area of fair wages and workplace conditions.
2. NAP processes need to involve businesses in consultations and design. NAPs that are finally 
adopted should be widely disseminated amongst the business community.
3. Non-financial reporting and other transparency and disclosure measures have potential to reveal 
businesses’ human rights’ impacts. States could improve non-financial reporting by providing 
supporting guidelines to help companies identify human rights risks. 
4. State procurement systems can be used to build awareness of CSR and procurement 
requirements should include human rights requirements for companies that do business with 
State agencies. 
5. Governments need to ensure mechanisms are in place to monitor the evolving costs of meeting 
basic needs and to ensure the difference between a minimum wage and a living wage are 
addressed. 
6. SMEs would benefit from greater clarity at the domestic level about the definitions of CSR, which 
should adequately reflect human rights and the UN framework and GPs. A business-to-business 
approach could be beneficial to promote incorporation of CSR and human rights initiatives and 
policies amongst SMEs.
Working Group 3: Monitoring, Reporting and Access to Remedies
Working Group 3 (WG3) considered the issue of access to remedy with regard to business-related 
human rights abuses. It was widely agreed that access to effective remedy was one of the more 
neglected issues with regard to business and human rights. It was the issue where there had been 
least progress albeit that its neglect has had profound negative impact. This was acknowledged by 
the UN Working Group, the Council of Europe and a number of States in their national action plans on 
business and human rights, as well as civil society actors and academics.
Victims of business-related human rights abuses face numerous practical barriers that can significantly 
hamper their access to effective remedy. These include prohibitive costs, lengthy processes, and 
the inability to understand or engage with the legal system as well as the more insidious obstacles 
presented by social exclusion. Women and young adults often are excluded from participating in 
grievance mechanisms. 
There are many available laws as well as access to remedy mechanisms, but the political will to 
implement these effectively and to the benefit of rights-holders is generally weak. This is perhaps 
one of the greatest impediments to protection and remedy for rights-holders affected by abusive 
corporate activities.
A particularly acute challenge is victims’ lack of information and knowledge with regard to what rights 
they hold, how to seek protection, and how to access remedial mechanisms when their rights have 
been abused. Overcoming this particular challenge is critical to achieving access to effective remedy 
and it is important to explore various strategies including the role of legislation, for example, the right 
to information laws.
Victims of business-related human rights abuses who use grievance mechanisms — whether judicial 
or non-judicial, State or non-State based — are often the disadvantaged party when they are up 
against more powerful and better resourced corporations or where the State and corporation have 
been complicit in perpetrating the abuse. Addressing this power imbalance remains a persistent 
challenge. Further, raising a grievance can put communities at real risk of retaliation. Whistle-blowers 
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and human rights defenders are equally at risk and recent events have demonstrated the physical 
danger these present.
Independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and the judicial system are critical to ensuring 
access to effective remedy. It is the State’s duty to ensure that this is maintained as part of a strong 
rule of law. Where this is compromised, affected individuals or communities lose faith in judicial 
mechanisms and are thus less inclined to pursue them. This can then lead to an even further 
weakening of the judicial system’s capabilities in addressing business-related human rights abuses. 
Non-judicial mechanisms are an important complement to judicial mechanisms. They can provide 
speedy and inexpensive recourse as well as fulfil a preventive function (“early warning system”). They 
are promoted by the UNGPs for this reason. It is important, however, to consider the suitability of 
engaging non-judicial remedial mechanisms according to the kind of human rights abuses that have 
taken place. A further issue is how remedies are defined and who defines them in the course of these 
processes.
Follow-up on judgments, findings or agreements at the end of a grievance process — whether 
judicial or non-judicial, State or non-State based — can be poor. Judgments often go unenforced and 
mediation outcomes, unfulfilled. 
Corruption is a key — and cross-cutting — barrier to access to remedy. The links between corruption 
and human rights remain underexplored, hampering efforts to develop effective measures to address 
the problem.
Finally, international law could be a useful tool for framing State duties and obligations regarding 
human rights. Engaging it to flesh out accountability of non-State actors for human rights violations 
is important. The question remains whether there is a need for an international, legally binding 
instrument in this regard.
WG3 identified and focused its discussions upon the following seven areas:
1. Practical barriers to accessing remedy: Awareness raising 
and capacity building
It is important to give primacy to victims’ agency when considering how best to address the barriers 
that they face, including strategies to empower and build capacities and capabilities to engage 
effectively with grievance mechanisms. Ensuring that victims have the information and skills to 
navigate the mechanisms, to organise effectively and to enlist adequate support from other actors 
is crucial.
Communities also need to know what their rights and entitlements are, and what remedial measures 
are available, and how to use them. In order to address broader issues concerning the vulnerability of 
victims, it is important to think in terms of changing mind-sets not just of the affected communities, but 
of all stakeholders in the process. The idea of capacity-building workshops for different stakeholders 
— NGOs, media, government, companies — was explored. The aim of such workshops would be to 
achieve a shared understanding of the issues. For communities, some issues that require raising 
awareness include understanding (i) the project-cycle; (ii) the purpose of and the data within social 
and environmental impact assessments; (iii) the various business actors involved. Additionally, it is 
important to help manage expectations as to what is achievable with regard to remedy. Who should 
fund capacity building on access to remedy was a moot point. Whereas, in some ways, businesses 
should contribute, there is a need to maintain independence and guard against undue influence. The 
group also discussed awareness-raising workshops for companies and the media, noting the media’s 
important role in helping to place pressure on companies to respond appropriately to grievances. 
Bottom-up processes for rights-holders to defend their rights or seek remedy are particularly desirable 
in situations where bureaucratic and procedural barriers may prevent effective use of mechanisms.
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2. Judicial mechanisms
Without a strong rule of law it is difficult to build effective remedy mechanisms. Where judicial 
mechanisms fail to deliver effective remedy, this can often be traced to fragmented or corrupt 
judiciaries and judicial systems. Judicial independence could be encouraged and supported through 
regional and international networks of judges. Such networks could also support judges in sharing 
experiences, expertise and jurisprudential approaches towards addressing human rights liabilities 
of non-state actors. As an example, the use of the writ of amparo by the judiciary in the Philippines, 
could be used in other jurisdictions as a way of providing speedy, injunctive relief to victims that are 
under imminent threat of human rights abuses. 
3. Non-judicial mechanisms
Business-related human rights abuses necessitate a multi-pronged approach and as such, non-
judicial mechanisms play an important role in ensuring access to remedy. The State should be engaged 
in supporting such mechanisms, particularly with regard to State-based non-judicial mechanisms, 
such as national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and the OECD national contact points (NCPs). 
How effective (or impartial) these institutions are, however, varies from country to country. Where 
the NCP function is shared between the relevant government departments and is interdisciplinary, 
there is generally greater effectiveness. With regard to NHRIs, whilst some have made good efforts 
to address business-related human rights complaints, others continue to be unfamiliar and ill-
equipped to address these kinds of abuses. One persistent problem is that State-based non-judicial 
mechanisms often do not have enforcement powers. As an example, the French NCP engages in 
sound inquiries but only has the power to issue a communiqué stating that it has solved the dispute. 
No details are provided and as such, its findings may have little deterrent effect.  
Whilst the idea of an ombudsman function received much attention, there were different views on 
whether it is feasible to achieve at an international level. Certainly, at a national level, it was viewed 
as an idea worth pursuing given its potential advantages in terms of speed, independence, and 
expertise.
There was a tendency to dichotomise access to remedy discussions into judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, but the two were seen by the WG3 as inherently linked. At least at the national level, a 
strong rule of law is often as imperative to achieving access to remedy via non-judicial mechanisms, 
as it is to judicial mechanisms. Without the threat of successful legal action as a viable alternative, 
companies are not incentivised to engage or take the process seriously, nor are victims assured of 
proper enforcement of outcomes; in other words, non-judicial mechanisms are compromised in a 
“justice-free” zone.
One means of bolstering the remedial effects of non-judicial mechanisms is by engaging a range 
of mechanisms when addressing an incident of abuse and to tie together different processes for 
greater impact. This has the advantage not only of widening the potential for gaining a remedy but 
also in enabling a degree of cross-fertilisation between the different remedial mechanisms both in 
normative as well as process terms. 
4. Mediation as a non-judicial mechanism
Mediation, as a type of non-judicial mechanism, is increasingly utilised to address business-
related human rights disputes. It can be appropriate particularly where resolution of the dispute is 
premised upon building relationships between the parties. Often, in cases of human rights abuses, 
there continues to be a relationship between the company and the victims after the conclusion of 
the dispute. Mediation, however, always involves compromise and, for this reason, it needs to be 
conducted in good faith and with a high degree of trust.  Mediation is not suitable for all types of human 
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rights violations. In cases of serious or gross human rights abuses, there must be recourse to the 
courts. The question of how to balance frank and open negotiations against the need to ensure public 
accountability when designing and implementing a mediation process was highlighted as demanding 
further attention. The skills of mediators and the relatively small pool with expertise in handling 
sensitive cases of business-related human rights abuses was here an important consideration, and 
considering how to build that skill base — especially at the local level — should be a priority. 
5. Definition of remedy
How remedy is defined in the course of both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms is attracting debate. 
As defined in the UNGPs, remedy can take on various characteristics as well as functions. Remedy can 
be about financial compensation, but it should also help to establish truth. It may also seek to secure 
a commitment from the perpetrator not to repeat the abusive behaviour. In keeping with prioritising 
protection of rights-holders, it was suggested that a shift towards the idea of restorative justice, with 
its focus upon the effects on the victim rather than upon the act, may be a good frame for articulating 
an effective remedy. The nexus between remedy and justice was also discussed, especially in the 
context of financial compensation. Where non-judicial grievance mechanisms are engaged, there 
is sometimes a risk that the injury suffered by the victim is no longer defined as a human rights 
violation, especially when the negotiation focuses upon compensation. In these circumstances, the 
ideal of justice being done may be compromised.
6. Engaging international law
Engaging international law in addressing access to remedy is important, but how to do so effectively 
remains a question. Utilising existing international human rights law mechanisms, such as the Universal 
Periodic Review and the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council, offer possibilities. The 
working group discussed the possibility of a treaty — as has been considered in a recent UN Human 
Rights Council resolution. There were concerns about the practicalities of bringing a convention to 
fruition. Nevertheless, WG3 felt it was important to engage with the current discussions and process 
in an open-minded and constructive way.  States should be pressed to translate international human 
rights standards into national law. Doing so would boost protection with regard to business-related 
human rights abuses, including access to remedy.
7. Extraterritorial jurisdiction
The transnational nature of many business-related human rights abuses present particular obstacles 
for victims seeking remedy. Extraterritorial jurisdiction can provide greater access to remedy in some 
circumstances. For example, the liabilities of the subsidiaries of transnational companies (TNCs) 
may be better secured through extraterritorial proceedings, and victims may be better ensured of 
impartial judicial proceedings. Further, there may be benefits where the perpetrator’s liabilities in 
extraterritorial cases are judged against international human rights standards. The prospects of 
engaging extraterritorial jurisdiction are however unrealistic for many victims given the costs involved 
and other practical barriers to taking a case outside of their own country, though support through civil 
society organisations working in partnership across countries can assist in this context. 
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8. Conclusions and recommendations
1. Access to remedy for business-related human rights abuses has received far less attention and 
resources than is commensurate with the problem. This needs to be urgently addressed. One 
way to do this is to support the documenting and sharing of good practices through political 
forums, professional networks and judicial networks. As part of its mandate, the UN Working 
Group is well placed to play this role. Further, the Working Group would encourage ASEM to 
support relevant institutions to facilitate such sharing between the two regions. For example, in 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) could be supported 
in taking on this role.
2. When considering the mechanisms for addressing access to remedy for business-related human 
rights abuses, protection of rights-holders and remedies suitable to the victims must be the 
ultimate goals.
3. Ensuring victims of human rights abuses can engage with or participate in grievance mechanisms 
in ways that support access to effective remedy requires them to have the requisite knowledge 
and skills. Supporting awareness-raising activities and putting in place right-to-information-type 
legislation are useful and important first steps. It is also important to ensure governments and 
business actors are equipped with the requisite knowledge to enable them to establish and 
engage in rights-compatible grievance mechanisms to achieve rights-compatible remedies.
4. Strengthening the capacity of victims to achieve access to effective remedy is critical. Free 
legal aid for victims bringing human rights-related cases is one means of ensuring this. Further, 
growing the capacity of civil society groups and institutions, such as National Human Rights 
Institutions that provide victims support in their pursuit of remedies, is necessary. 
5. Non-judicial mechanisms are an imperative and States should encourage and support them. Both 
their remedial and their preventive function should be recognised and developed. It is important 
however that rights-holders are accorded adequate protection within these mechanisms and 
that they are fair both in process and outcome. Whether or not non-judicial mechanisms are used 
should be evaluated according the circumstances of the case. Implementation of outcomes is an 
important aspect of accessing effective remedy, though often lacking. 
6. Many countries across Europe and Asia have legislation that can promote and protect human 
rights. Stronger efforts should be made however to implement or where necessary, to strengthen, 
such laws so that they are more human rights- compatible.
7. The UNGPs should be actively promoted as a means of framing and influencing policies and 
practices at the national level with regard to access to effective remedy, as well as monitoring 
and reporting of business-related human rights abuses. 
8. There should be a mandatory requirement for Human Rights Impact Assessments for all new 
business projects. The concept of “free, prior and informed consent” should be integrated into 
all national development and investment projects.
9. Corruption often poses a considerable barrier to achieving access to effective remedy. The 
relationship between corruption and human rights should be better explored so as to enable an 
understanding of how it directly and indirectly enables human rights abuses to take place, and 
how it can block recourse to remedy.
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Working Group 4: Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation
Working Group 4 (WG4) focused on collaboration through multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and 
their particular contributions to promoting and achieving the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights. Precisely due to their multi-stakeholder composition and collaboration, MSIs have 
important contributions to make to the field of business and human rights and the implementation of 
the UNGPs. States and international organisations may support and work with MSIs to reach across 
the legal and policy limitations of international law and focus on proactive learning on what human 
rights means to business.
MSIs apply various modes of governance that broadly involve collaboration between private and/or 
public organisations. Key stakeholders and players in MSIs include individual businesses, business 
associations, multinational firms, SMEs, governments and intergovernmental organisations, 
civil society organisations, investors, buyers and private consumers and development partners. 
Collaboration through MSIs may take diverse forms and multiple stakeholder composition does 
not necessarily imply multiple sectors or actors: an MSI can be within a single firm or organisation. 
The working group drew attention to the UN Global Compact, ISO26000, GRI, International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Providers, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 
Thailand’s Liveable and Happiness Cities, the Swedish Development Agency’s (SIDA’s) collaboration 
with the Cambodian garment sector and the ILO’s “Better Factories Cambodia”, China’s CSC9000T 
for the textile sector, the Vietnamese government’s promotion of dialogue between employers and 
workers, and the ICMM (the International Council of Mining and Metals) as examples. The Working 
Group observed great variance between countries in terms of engagement with MSIs. This may be 
influenced by differing income levels among consumers, which may affect their expectations of firms 
and their ability to apply and economically enforce these expectations through their buying decisions 
or patterns.
1. Strengths and weaknesses of MSIs for business and human rights
Governance gaps are a key factor permitting business-related human rights abuses and MSIs may 
act to address these. While they are not “necessarily the best way to govern”,4 they can address 
critical issues of knowledge transfer and awareness raising, capacity building and monitoring. They 
may also offer remedies or act as channels to business- or State-based remedies, including National 
Contact Points under OECD’s Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. 
In particular, MSIs have the capacity to “translate” human rights standards — formulated in legal terms 
and originally addressing States — into norms that refer to business activities. Given their experience 
in terms of stakeholder outreach and operationalising human rights for business practices, MSIs also 
offer insights to States and intergovernmental organisations with regard to their efforts to improve 
business respect for human rights. MSIs may also collaborate with other stakeholders in providing 
teaching on human rights responsibilities for business, whether to firms, government officials, NGOs/
CSOs or educational institutions.
Importantly, MSIs are not limited by the territorial and jurisdictional borders of States. Further, 
whilst MSIs’ norms may lack legal enforceability per se, their Codes of Conduct (CoCs) and similar 
standardised requirements may be incorporated in the terms and conditions of business contracts 
between parties. MSIs may also affect a firm’s reputation and decisions of investors, buyers and 
consumers.  
Amongst weaknesses of MSIs, however, were felt to be that their norms and decisions are not 
directly legally enforceable, and that they lack of uniformity and are sometimes insufficiently clear 
4. See Background Paper, section 9.5.
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on standards and expectations. Moreover, certification, a widely relied on governance modality 
for MSIs, is not always a meaningful way of targeting human rights risks. Where there are a large 
number of MSIs functioning in a similar sector or field, firms may select less strict or less pertinent 
alternatives. The UN Global Compact’s sanctions regime was discussed as a relevant example. This 
delists companies that do not provide their Communications of Progress for two consecutive years. 
The Working Group saw both strengths and weaknesses in this approach: the strength being that 
the firm is expected to account for and report on its implementation of the ten UNGC principles; the 
weakness in that firms with little experience in the field of business and human rights, or CSR in 
general, may risk being de-listed before they even start to grasp and work with the complexities of 
participation, or decide against becoming active in the first place. 
2. Human rights-focused MSIs
MSIs explicitly or implicitly work around a range of human rights issues, amongst which the Working 
Group highlighted labour rights, human rights and security (including private security providers), 
food security and consumers’ rights, land rights, host communities, vulnerable groups (including 
indigenous groups and migrant workers), supply chain management, and investors (including 
international financial institutions). 
Labour rights are a key focus issue of many MSIs. Working hours, rest and leisure, salary and 
remuneration, occupational health and safety (OHS), child labour and forced labour, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining and discrimination on prohibited grounds remain problems in 
many states and sectors — including construction and agricultural, and sectors whose products enter 
global value chains, such as electronics, garment and food in both Asia and Europe. MSIs may provide 
awareness-raising and capacity building for firms as well as communities and workers, for example, 
with reference to the rights of migrant workers and of union members. MSIs may also contribute to 
strengthening public governance, for instance, by supporting labour inspectorates, as observed in 
one Asian example. MSIs may collate and share best practices across sectors and countries, with 
examples in relation to sourcing and fair trade practices. MSIs may also provide capacity building 
for unions to strengthen awareness of labour standards in accordance with ILO conventions and UN 
human rights instruments. 
Investors can hugely influence firms by imposing requirements on those firms they decide to invest in. 
MSIs deriving from financial institutions such as the Equator Principles and the UN Global Compact 
Principles for Responsible Investment were noted as important developments. 
3. Designing and implementing MSIs 
Inclusion, participation and consultation of stakeholders are important in effecting human rights due 
diligence since these elements enable firms to accurately identify, avoid, mitigate and/or remedy 
adverse human rights impacts. Rights-holders and other stakeholders may have expertise on the 
issue or sector in question. Drawing upon such expertise and knowledge in order to identify relevant 
human rights risks and processes provides “process legitimacy” that can ensure the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of MSIs. Measures may be needed to facilitate stakeholder participation, for instance, 
providing translations in the languages of local communities.
Whilst issues of process and inclusion are important in the development of MSIs, learning and 
appreciation of what exactly human rights risk means, in terms of practical business activity, becomes 
a priority in the implementation phase. MSIs, by providing normative content, can enable dialogue 
that sensitises a firm to human rights concerns and links these to the implications for the firm and its 
activities that may then contribute changing practices.  
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Civil society plays many different roles across diverse MSIs, ranging from initiators to watchdogs. It 
is important that the role of CSOs is clear in the specific context. CSOs do, however, sometimes fear 
losing their integrity when working with MSIs and it is important to ensure modalities to address this, 
both for CSOs as well as for other participants. 
MSIs may have a particular role in assisting SMEs. Given their size, SMEs often face particular 
challenges in devising and carrying out processes to manage their human rights impact. MSIs may 
help to address the costs and other resources necessary for SMEs to respect human rights when 
they supply to larger firms. 
4. Effectiveness of MSIs
MSIs should draw on people in businesses who have knowledge of human rights and how to bring 
them into business practice. For companies in particular, the impact that an MSI has on the human 
rights issue at stake in the context of the business operation and the locality are key. While one 
participant noted the appeal of the UN Global Compact as a result of being based on global standards 
such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and ILO core labour standards, others observed 
that in some contexts, specific national or sector MSIs may add greater value. 
Corporate participants recommended addressing human rights issues in ways that will make the 
firm’s officers see the need and benefits of complying with human rights standards. For example, 
corporate buyers can talk to suppliers about risk management, minimum wages, occupational health 
and safety. When involving corporations in MSIs, it is important to realise the positive contributions 
that they can make to human rights. National Global Compact Networks can play a major role in terms 
of disseminating best practices in this regard. MSIs need to consider carefully who best to engage 
within firms. It was noted that CSR departments are not always the right target group, since they may 
sometimes lack the requisite human rights knowledge. However, these departments are created in 
recognition of the corporate need for stakeholder engagement and responsible business practices. 
Thus, it is advisable to further emphasise and encourage the acquisition of specialised human rights 
expertise within the existing CSR functions. 
The large range of MSIs and an emergence of new MSIs could lead to an undermining of human rights 
focus. This should be given attention, as human rights, even in the context of the business, have a 
specific set of norms that go beyond ethics and the voluntary approach often associated with CSR. 
“MSI fatigue” is also a risk — and States, firms and other stakeholders have an important role in 
limiting this by striving towards consistency, comprehensiveness and relevance of current and future 
MSIs.
Modalities to provide a measure of accountability are important for trust and confidence in MSIs. 
Transparency is key, as is the legitimacy derived from demonstrated commitment from those involved. 
Reference to the UNGPs as a normative based can also aid legitimacy, as has been the case in the 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, the UNGC and ISO26000. Legitimacy and trust also 
presuppose engagement with relevant stakeholders and a process to ensure that the interests of 
actual or potential human rights victims are represented in a way that ensures attention to competing 
or non-aligned interests among such groups.
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5. Human rights due diligence
Human rights due diligence forms a core principle of the UNGPs. One corporate participant observed 
that due diligence is a well-known corporate governance concept at least in large firms, and thus an 
entry point for explicating human rights. It was however critiqued for its lack of clarity. Conventional 
understandings of due diligence envisage a static process by ending at the point where a certain 
decision is made, whereas human rights due diligence is, critically, an open-ended process. Thus, 
exactly how human rights due diligence is operationalised by a firm is a key question. MSIs may make 
important contributions by developing human rights due diligence guidelines in this regard. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations
1. In working with MSIs to support the corporate respect for human rights, their specific context 
and objectives should be kept in mind. This may be global or specific to the issue, sector, socio-
cultural or political context, country, supply chain; and/or related to monitoring, certification, 
learning and stakeholder involvement and consultation. The emphasis should be on the concept 
or interest that creates the difference for human rights. Companies will often understand this 
from the perspective of impact on their core business. For example, human rights may be made 
meaningful to businesses through reference to risk management, minimum wages, occupational 
health and safety, and knowing about and respecting the regulations in the area as an element 
in the preservation of the social licence to operate. 
2. A distinction must be made between the development of MSIs and their implementation. In 
both cases, the focus should be on how they assist firms in respecting human rights. This may 
mean different key stakeholders at the different stages. For the development of MSIs, process 
and inclusion is very important. For implementation, learning and appreciation of what exactly 
human rights at risk means in terms of practical business activity is important. MSIs may open a 
dialogue on the implications for the firm and how its activities can contribute changing practices 
to ensure respect for human rights. 
3. For legitimacy, trust, effectiveness and efficiency, MSIs should consider bottom-up approaches, 
transparency and the incorporating the normative basis of human rights. The UNGPs are one of 
the most novel and globally agreed guidance instruments for business on human rights. Several 
other MSIs such as the UN Global Compact, ISO26000 and others make references to the 
UNGPs, which facilitate a common basis and human rights coherence across MSIs.
4. As part of their State duty to protect, governments should encourage firms to engage in MSIs. 
At the same time they should pay attention to potential weaknesses and pitfalls of MSIs. 
Governments and intergovernmental organisations should work with MSIs to share best practice 
of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and assist firms in exercising human 
rights due diligence. 
5. Finally, there is a need for modalities to ensure that members of MSIs — especially civil society 
organisations — retain their integrity while contributing their expertise to the MSI. States and 
intergovernmental organisations should consider how to support these.
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this Background Paper is to give an overview of the topic of human rights and business 
and to provide some common foundations for discussion by participants during the 14th Informal 
ASEM1 Seminar on Human Rights. 
Section 1 reflects on the evolution of the business and human rights field. Propelled by community 
mobilisation and networked social activism during the 1990s and 2000s, a proliferation of 
transnational corporate accountability norms, standards and initiatives led ultimately to the 
endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011. Section 1 then 
recalls some of the central principles and concepts of international human rights law most relevant 
to area of business and human rights. 
Section 2 relates developments with regard to business and human rights in the European and Asian 
regions respectively, including steps taken to implement the UN Guiding Principles specifically. 
Section 3 addresses the four working group themes:
1. State duty to protect against human rights abuses by businesses
2. Corporate responsibility and its contribution to human rights implementation
3. Monitoring, reporting and access to remedies
4. Multi-stakeholder cooperation 
The paper concludes by highlighting some emerging issues that may influence the business and 
human agenda in the future.
In this paper, broad references to Asia refer to the Asian ASEM Member States of Bangladesh, China, 
India, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan; the ASEAN Member States of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, and also the 
ASEM Member States of Australia and New Zealand and Russia. 
Europe refers to the European ASEM Member States of the 28 European Union Member States of 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Norway and 
Switzerland are also ASEM members2. 
1.   The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an intergovernmental forum for dialogue and cooperation which fosters political dialogue, 
reinforces economic cooperation, and promotes cooperation in other areas. 
2.   At the time of writing, Croatia and Kazakhstan were not yet ASEM members. Croatia and Kazakhstan acceded to ASEM at the 
10th ASEM Summit (16–17 October 2014).
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2. The evolution of the business and human rights agenda
 
The social and environmental implications of commercial activity have been a constant feature of 
our political economy. From abhorrence of the transnational trade in slaves, to the harsh working 
conditions associated with the Industrial Revolution, incidences of human rights abuses from earlier 
era have played a role in shaping today’s business and human rights discourse. Likewise, responses 
to such abuses, such as the birth of the trade union movement, recognition of fundamental workers’ 
rights, and the establishment of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) at the end of World War 
I, manifestly influenced the contemporary scene. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
heralded the first global expression of human rights to which “all organs of society” bore responsibility 
for its respect. At that moment some of history’s worst business-related human rights abuses were 
also revealed, with companies both facilitating and benefiting from the horrors of war.3 
The post-War era witnessed decolonisation and corresponding calls for economic self-determination 
by newly independent States marked, for instance, by the establishment of the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development and Group of 77 developing countries.4 Amongst this group, the power 
of transnational business was perceived as a threat and, in 1972, the UN General Assembly 
was warned by them of “… a coming conflict between multinational corporations [‘MNCs’] and 
democratic governments.”5 A UN Commission and Centre on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) was 
duly established with one of its tasks to devise a TNC Code of Conduct.6 This project was highly 
controversial: capital-exporting States sought a non-binding instrument to secure protections for 
MNCs in host States, whilst conversely, developing countries pursued a set of binding rules to allow 
them to regulate TNC activities and social impacts, including on human rights.7 After ten years, 
negotiations were suspended and the UN bodies focused on TNCs dismantled.
 
During this period, however, other international organisations did manage to conclude soft standards 
addressing TNC activities. The OECD Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) were 
established in 1976 and addressed issues such as employment relations, environment, science and 
technology, competition and consumer protection.8 The ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, promulgated in 1977, stated that all parties 
should respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), as well as the Constitution of the ILO and its principles, according to which, freedom 
of expression and association are essential to sustained progress.9 The 1970s and 1980s saw 
the first steps towards socially responsible investment, with the Sullivan Principles and MacBride 
3.  See, for example, Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance between Nazi Germany and America’s Most 
Powerful Corporation (Dialog Press, 2001). See further discussion of the IG Farben case below.
4.  Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999).
5.   This was given by Salvador Allende, President of Chile, in part reacting to allegations that ITT, the American telecoms compa-
ny, was conspiring with the CIA to overthrow his government. He continued, “We are faced by a direct confrontation between 
the large transnational corporations and the states. The corporations are interfering in the fundamental political, economic 
and military decisions of the states. The corporations are global organisations that do not depend on any state and whose 
activities are not controlled by, nor are they accountable to any parliament or any other institution representative of the 
collective interest. In short, all the world political structure is being undermined.” (Salvador Allende, Speech to the UNGA, 4 
December 1972).
6.   See “UNCTC Origins”, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCOrigins.
aspx. This followed a 1973 study by UN-appointed Group of Eminent Persons on the impact of multinational corporations on 
the development process and on international relations.
7.  Claire Methven O’Brien, “Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: For a Multi-Level Governance Approach”, PHD The-
sis, European University Institute (2009). The UN “Draft Code on Transnational Corporations” can be found in United Nations 
Center on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations, Services and the Uruguay Round (New York: United Na-
tions Publications, 1990), Annex IV, p. 231. See also Surya Deva and David Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business: 
Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
8. “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/. 
9.  International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(17 November 2000). 
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Principles brought forth to address companies’ conduct in apartheid South Africa and Northern 
Ireland, respectively.10
 
Alongside continuing economic liberalisation, a steady rise in the number and size of TNCs continued 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Relaxation of trade, investment and capital controls brought about a gradual 
shift from locally-integrated to globalised supply chains and, to some extent, downwards pressure on 
protective regulations. Manufacturing sites could now be readily relocated according to labour costs 
and tax advantages, weakening the bargaining power of organised labour and triggering, amongst 
other things, Special Economic Zones designed to attract foreign direct investments. 
Yet globalisation brought other changes. Wider access to the means of receiving and distributing 
information through new communications technologies and networks opened the way to transnational 
activism and coordinated global campaigns by NGOs and trade unions. Early targets of such actions 
were consumer-facing brands such as from the garment sector and abusive working conditions 
prevailing amongst their suppliers were brought to public attention.11 Another focus was the extractive 
industry. The 1990s saw a series of allegations that security forces had committed gross human 
rights abuses against communities while acting on behalf of oil companies. 
A tragic, stark example is seen in the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists who had 
campaigned against environmental damage resulting from Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta. This 
sparked widespread outrage around the world and crystallised public concerns about corporate 
impunity.12 So did the Bhopal disaster of 1984, in which an estimated 24,000 died and more than 
half a million were injured as a result of a gas leak at a pesticide plant belonging to Union Carbide 
India Limited (UCIL)13. A 1989 settlement with the Indian Government for US$470 million secured 
an average of a mere US$400 per victim.14 From an ethical viewpoint, international human rights 
standards such as the UDHR and subsequent international and regional human rights instruments 
ought to have provided the natural frame for those seeking redress for corporate human rights 
abuses. Yet legal as well as political obstacles stood in the way of using human rights instruments 
and courts to challenge corporate wrongs. Top amongst these, at the time, was the limited scope 
to apply human rights obligations to non-State actors and in the “private sphere”.15 Another was 
the transnational character of the companies usually in question, which often obscured both the 
locus of responsibility within firms. Although the State duty bearer could be held accountable in 
those circumstances, Home States denied all responsibility for their companies’ activities abroad; 
host States, equally, were unwilling or unable to challenge the conduct of TNCs as vehicles of much-
needed foreign direct investment. 
Business itself actively resisted any expansion of the scope of the social “licence to operate” to 
encompass human rights through the 1990s. Popular concern and frustration at the apparent 
governance “vacuum” attaching to globalisation prompted world-wide mobilisation against institutions 
perceived as its vehicles, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation, climaxing in the 
1999 “Battle of Seattle”16. 
10.  Christopher McCrudden, “Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What Can the Sullivan and MacBride Prin-
ciples Tell Us?”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19, no. 2 (1999), 167. Though less well-known, two further codes, both 
concerned principally with forced labour, focused respectively on the then Soviet Union and China: the Slepak Principles and 
the Miller Principles. See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, “Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights through Business Codes 
of Conduct”, Fordham International Law Journal 17 (1993), 9. 
11.   See, for example, Jeffery Ballinger, “The New Free Trade Heel. Nike’s Profits Jump on the Backs of Asian Workers’, Harper’s 
Magazine, August 1992.
12.   Other high-profile cases presenting in this period included those relating to operations connected to BP and Occidental Pe-
troleum in Colombia, ExxonMobil in Indonesia and Total in Myanmar.
13.   The US-based Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was the majority owner of UCIL, with Indian Government-controlled banks 
and the Indian public holding a 49.1 per cent stake. 
14.   See further Peter Muchlinski, “The Bhopal Case: Controlling ultra-hazardous industrial activities undertaken by foreign inves-
tors”, Modern Law Review 50 (1987), 545. 
15.  Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
16.   On November 30, 1999, anti-globalisation protests surrounding the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle saw an unprece-
dented protest crowd of at least 40,000.
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Yet into this vacuum had already crept the beginnings of an alternative approach to the social 
regulation of transnationally-integrated markets. With early supply chain campaigns directed at 
consumer-facing brands hitting their mark, companies under pressure to respond — often with 
cajoling or support from civil society organisations (CSOs) — had begun to develop “voluntary” human 
rights codes of conduct. Soon, a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives emerged based often upon 
voluntary codes. Perhaps the highpoint of this trend, in 1999 the UN established its own “Global 
Compact”, comprising initially nine principles for companies drawn from the UDHR, ILO Core Labour 
Standards and other international conventions relating to the environment, with a tenth on anti-
corruption added later.
In terms of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), this represented the beginning of the integration 
of human rights into the social component of the “triple-bottom line” concept, to be identified, 
measured, audited, verified, reported and assessed as a risk, along with financial and environmental 
factors.17 Nevertheless, during the 1990s and early 2000s intense debate continued over the virtues 
and value, or otherwise, of corporate “voluntarism” as an approach to addressing companies’ human 
rights impacts18, and what room there might be under existing international law to hold States and 
companies accountable for the latter’s defaults.19
 
Within the UN, these issues were taken up for a second time in 1998, when a Working Group on 
the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations was established by the then Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. By 2003, this Working Group had 
drafted its set of “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”. According to these “Draft Norms”, while the State had a 
primary duty to protect, respect and promote human rights, within their respective spheres of activity 
and influence, companies were also identified as human rights duty-bearers.20 Though greeted warmly 
by most NGOs, the draft norms were criticised by business associations and some trade unions and 
finally rejected by States in the then Commission on Human Rights as having “no legal standing”.21 
 
With reported corporate involvement in abuses still increasing however,22 the UN Human Rights 
Commission invited the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative (SRSG) on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises in 2005. 
Assuming this role, Professor John Ruggie was requested inter alia: to identify and clarify standards 
of corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights; to elaborate on the role of States 
in effectively regulating and adjudicating business enterprises; and to clarify the implications of 
business enterprises for concepts such as “complicity” and “spheres of influence”.23
17.  John Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: Triple bottom line of the 21st century business (Oxford: Capstone Publishing Ltd, 
1999).
18.  According to Stephens, the “economic incentives [remained] insufficient to trigger voluntary compliance with international 
human rights standards”. See Beth Stephens, “Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights”, Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 20 (2002), 45. 
19.  International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing International Legal 
Obligations of Companies (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002). 
20.  United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 
(13 August 2003). The “Draft Norms” provided a detailed enumeration of human rights and how they applied to companies, 
and provided for their implementation via internal adoption, assessment, monitoring, verification and compensation.
21.  Commission on Human Rights, Agenda Item 16, E/CN.4/2004/L.73/Rev.1 (16 April 2004), para. (c). Exceptionally amongst 
the business community, the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights that made commitments to “road test” the Draft 
Norms. See “Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR)”, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, http://
business-humanrights.org/company-policysteps/other/business-leaders-initiative-on-human-rights-blihr.
22.  The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre contributed significantly to dissemination of reports of business 
involvement in human rights abuses from its launch by Chris Avery in 2002: “Who and Where We Are”, Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/about-us/who-and-where-we-are.
23.  Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, E/
CN.4/2005/L/87 (15 April 2005).
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2.1 The UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights
The SRSG sought to apply an approach of “principled pragmatism” to his mandate, with the aim of 
devising a framework that would “reduce corporate-related human rights harms to the maximum 
extent possible in the shortest possible period of time”24. From the outset, he rejected the Draft 
Norms, criticising what he suggested were their “exaggerated legal claims and doctrinal excesses”.25 
Accepting that human rights laws did not place direct obligations on companies, the SRSG accordingly 
emphasised the status of human rights norms as much as an ethical and moral framework as one of 
legal responsibilities. Cautioning against an international treaty, he argued that negotiating such an 
instrument would take years, and could result in a lowest common denominator outcome.26 
In 2008, at the end of his first three-year mandate, the SRSG outlined a “three-pillar” framework as 
a conceptual architecture for understanding the respective roles and responsibilities of government 
and business for human rights: Pillar 1 is the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by 
third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication; Pillar 2 
is corporate responsibility to respect human rights, meaning that companies are expected to avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others and to address adverse human rights impacts with which 
they are involved; and Pillar 3 is access to remedy, which requires both States and businesses to 
ensure greater access by victims of business-related human rights abuses to effective judicial and 
non-judicial remedies.27
Unanimously welcoming his report, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) granted the SRSG a 
second mandate to “operationalise” the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, and to provide 
guidance on steps that States, businesses and others should take to implement it. In 2011, at the end 
of this second term, the UNHRC, again unanimously, endorsed its principal product, the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (hereafter referred to as the GPs),28 whose contents are 
discussed at length in the sections relating to Working Groups I–III below. 
2.2 Implementation and ongoing challenges 
At the same time as it endorsed the GPs, the UNHRC established a new Working Group on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (UNWG)29, 
and mandated it to promote the dissemination and implementation of the GPs; promote good 
practices and lessons learned on GPs implementation; support capacity-building and the use of 
the GPs; undertake country visits;30 make recommendations at national, regional and international 
levels for enhancing access to effective remedies for those whose human rights are affected by 
corporate activities; and develop dialogue with governments and other actors, such as the UN Global 
Compact, ILO, World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and UNDP, as well as TNCs and 
other business enterprises, national human rights institutions (NHRIs), representatives of indigenous 
peoples, civil society organisations and regional and sub-regional international organisations. The 
UNWG is also requested to integrate a gender perspective into all its work.
24.   John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2013)
25.  The SRSG attributed the Draft Norms’ failure to win support to, amongst other things, their assignation to companies of du-
ties ranging over matters that had not yet been accepted by states such as the “principle of free, prior and informed consent”. 
Ibid. 
26.  Ibid.
27.  John Gerard Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/
default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf
28.  John Gerard Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ’Protect, Respect 
and Remedy Framework, Annex, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-
principles/text-of-the-un-guiding-principles.
29.  Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (16 
June 2011), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement. 
30.  To date, the UNWG has conducted visits to Mongolia, United States of America, Ghana and Azerbaijan: “Country visits of the 
Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises”, United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGCountryVisits.
aspx. 
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The UNHRC further provided for an annual, global Forum on Business and Human Rights to 
discuss trends and challenges and promote dialogue and cooperation with participation from all 
stakeholders.31 Additionally, the UNWG has held regional forums in Latin America32 and Africa, with 
plans for others.33 Renewing the mandate of the UNWG in 2014, the UNHRC expressed its support in 
particular for the development of guidance in the areas of national action plans (NAPs) on business 
and human rights, and study of possible developments in the areas of domestic law remedies to 
address corporate involvement in gross human rights abuses, including with regard to a possible 
international instrument on legal remedy.34 
In parallel, other UN human rights bodies35 and international organisations36 have aligned their 
own frameworks and standards to the GPs. Many governments, business associations, individual 
corporations, NGOs, labour organisations and NHRIs have likewise responded to the GPs to varying 
degrees, and numerous initiatives of this kind are discussed in later sections. 
As a significant marker in the contemporary evolution of norms and standards on the responsibility 
and accountability of corporate actors for their social, environmental and human rights impacts, 
the GPs set down a framework that — consistent with the conventional restrictions imposed by 
international human rights law — maintains the primary responsibility of States to protect against 
human rights violations. At the same time, they give explicit recognition to the responsibility of 
businesses to respect, and not harm, human rights. Arguably, they thus contribute to preserving the 
legitimacy of human rights through a re-orientation of human rights norms, if not laws, in line with 
a changed global environment, and at a time when this is essential to ensuring their relevance as a 
narrative responsive to people’s lived experiences of indignity and injustice. 
Notwithstanding, doubts persist about the regulatory effectiveness of the GPs’ voluntary approach. 
In 2014, only 272 out of 80,000 or so transnational firms have a human rights policy. While the GPs 
rhetoric may have captured the policy-making “peaks”, uptake on the ground seems slow, prompting 
claims that “firms are still not ready to be safe rather than sorry”.37 It may be the case that only law 
can bind,38 but questions remain as to whether a legal approach would yield any better results, in 
terms of increased awareness, implementation and enforcement. A hard law, punitive approach has 
long had its own sceptics, particularly where corporations are the objects of rules,39 with numerous 
empirical studies disclosing the significance of social factors, both internal and external to regulated 
companies.40
31.  “United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights”, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx.
32.  “2013 Regional Forum on Business and Human Rights for Latin America and the Caribbean”, United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/
Pages/2013LACRegionalForumBusinessandHumanRights.aspx.
33.   “African Regional Forum on Business and Human Rights, 16–18 September 2014, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)”, United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/
AfricaRegionalForum.aspx.
34.  Human Rights Council, “Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises”, A/HRC/26/L.1 (23 
June 2014), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G14/062/40/PDF/G1406240.pdf?OpenElement. 
35.  See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the obligations of states parties 
regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights, E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011), http://tbinternet.
ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2f2011%2f1&Lang=en; and United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 16 regarding the impact of the business sector on 
children’s rights, CRC/C/GC/16 (17 April 2013), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.
aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fGC%2f16&Lang=en.
36.   The 2011 revision of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs included a new chapter on human rights intended to align with the GPs; 
likewise the ISO26000 social standard.
37.   Susan Ariel Aaronson and Ian Higham, “‘Re-righting Business’: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human 
Rights Standards for Transnational Firms”, Human Rights Quarterly 35:2 (2013), 333.
38.  Bilchitz contrasts the GPs’ “moral normativity” with “binding normativity”, which in his view is needed to achieve corporate 
accountability for human rights abuses and which he argues only law can provide: David Bilchitz, “A chasm between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’? A critique of the normative foundations of the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding Principles”, in Surya Deva and 
David Bilchitz (eds.), Human Rights Obligations of Business Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 107-137. 
39.  See, for example, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation 
in a ‘Post-regulatory’ World”, Current Legal Problems 54 (2001), 103.
40.  See, for example, Neil Gunningham et al., Shades of Green: Business, Regulation and Environment (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003).
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If these questions are not settled empirically, neither will their political debate be over. In June 2014, 
the UNHRC adopted two human rights and business resolutions. One was advanced by the Core 
Group of States supportive of the GPs.41 The other, proposed by group of States led by Ecuador 
and South Africa, pushed for the establishment of an intergovernmental working group with a 
mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument on human rights and transnational 
corporations.42
3. International human rights law and business: concepts and 
principles
3.1 Corporations as non-State actors under international law
Classically, public international law recognises only States as its actors and subjects.43 Since 
positivist international human rights law takes the same position, its instruments principally address 
the relationship between States and individuals. International law does not therefore impose direct 
liabilities upon corporate actors for human rights violations, except in very exceptional cases44 — a 
limitation that some human rights lawyers and advocates have questioned.45 
Human rights instruments and jurisprudence do however assert the responsibility of non-State actors 
not to harm human rights. The preamble to the UDHR states that every individual and every organ of 
society is expected to promote human rights. Article 30 of UDHR further states that non-State actors 
have a duty to not engage in the destruction of rights.46 Beyond this, though, international law as it 
currently stands does not provide precise and explicit legal standards for civil or criminal liability of 
corporations at the domestic level with regard to human rights abuses as such. Regional and national 
systems, however, have in some cases developed what might be termed “functional equivalents” of 
direct corporate liability, through jurisprudential developments connected to the State duty to protect, 
on one hand (see section 3.2 below), and civil causes of action in tort, on the other (as discussed 
further in section 8.2).
With regard to international criminal liability, the statute of the International Criminal Court provides 
for jurisdiction over natural, not legal, persons.47 Individuals within or connected to corporations can 
however be held liable for acts of corporations leading to human rights abuses.48
41.   Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/25/L.1. This 
resolution was supported by 22 countries.
42.   Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights, A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (24 June 2014). This resolution was supported by 
20 countries. Commentaries from a range of actors, including the former SRSG, in response to Resolution and the idea of a 
treaty, can be found here: ‘Binding Treaty’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/
binding-treaty.
43.   Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Ch.3.
44.   These exceptions include where the company perpetrates or is complicit in genocide, war crimes and some crimes against 
humanity.
45.   See Philip Alston et al, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Olivier De Schutter, Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).
46.   See also Article 17 of European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights (4 
November 1950).
47.   Art. 25§1. A motion was tabled to the Preparatory Committee and the Rome Conference to consider liability for legal persons, 
see Mordechai Kremnitzer, ‘A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law’, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 8 (2010), 909; Andrew Clapham, ‘The Question of Jurisdiction Under International 
Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’, in Menno T. 
Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability of Multinational Enterprises under International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 
2000). 
48.  In the IG Farben trial, 23 company directors of a German chemicals conglomerate that manufactured and supplied Zyklon B 
gas to Nazi extermination camps were prosecuted for crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity: Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X (London: HMSO, 1949), and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda convicted the 
owner of a company for its logistical support to the Rwandan genocide: Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze [3 
December 2003] ICTR No. ICTR-99-52-T.
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3.2 Extraterritoriality
Within human rights law, as in public international law more broadly, jurisdiction remains primarily 
territorial.49 Jurisdiction over matters beyond the State’s territorial boundaries is exceptional and 
requires an internationally recognised basis, such as nationality, where the actor in question, or 
the victim, is a national; where the acts concerned have significant adverse effects on State,50 or 
universality; and where specific international crimes are involved.
On the basis of current rules, setting or enforcing standards for corporate behaviour in another 
State’s territory, or adjudicating on matters that occur there, in the absence of one of the exceptional 
bases mentioned above, would exceed the jurisdiction of a home State, that is, the State in which 
a corporation is domiciled. The exercise of such jurisdiction may thus “prove controversial if other 
States regard it as interference in their sovereign rights to regulate corporations within their own 
borders and to pursue their own economic, social and cultural interests”.51
The persistence of human rights abuses implicating TNCs, however, gives rise to ongoing debate 
about the extent to which current rules are adequate, with some commentators arguing for a more 
expansive interpretation of extraterritorial jurisdiction, based on the State duty to protect human 
rights and the doctrine of positive obligations.52 Some UN treaty bodies, indeed, appear already 
to have taken this or similar positions.53 Thus, the future direction of the issue of extraterritoriality 
remains open to speculation (see further section 8).
3.3 Positive obligations
Under most human rights instruments, State Parties agree to guarantee the effective enjoyment of 
the rights described to all persons within their jurisdiction. International law does therefore impose 
duties on States to ensure that private actors within their jurisdiction do not abuse human rights.54 
In the jurisprudence of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), this duty to guarantee the 
effectiveness of human rights has led to the development by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) of the doctrine of “positive obligations”. This is discussed more fully in section 5.1 below. 
49.  Higgins, Problems and Process, Ch. 4-5.
50.  See discussion on Singapore’s Trans-boundary Haze Pollution Act in Section 8.3.
51.   The EU reacted against US legislation that was viewed as a “violation of the territorial jurisdiction of EU Member States 
and an abuse of the nationality principle”, in Daniel Augenstein, Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the 
Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union (University of Edinburgh, 2010), 
p.12, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/business-human-rights/101025_ec_study_final_
report_en.pdf. 
52.   Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, “Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial 
Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law”, The Modern Law Review 70, no. 4 (2007), 598. See also 
Expert Meeting, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Maastricht Centre of Human Rights and the International Commission of Jurists, 2011).
53.   In particular, UN CESCR has indicated that States should “take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by 
corporations which have their main seat under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the 
obligations of the host States under the Covenant” (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the 
obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights, E/C.12/2011/1, para. 
5). CESCR has made similar statements in some of its Concluding Observations and General Comments. The UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has also indicated that states should take appropriate measures to 
prevent adverse impacts on the rights of indigenous peoples from corporations registered in their state. See Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Canada, CERD/C/CAN/CO/18, 25 May 2007 [17]; 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: United States of America, CERD/C/USA/
CO/6, 8 May 2008; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Australia, CERD/C/
AUS/CO/15-17, 27 August 2010 [13]; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: 
United Kingdom, CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20, 14 September 2001.
54.   See Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1989] 28 I.L.M 291 where the Inter-America Court of Human Rights held that states 
parties are required to take active measures to protect against, prosecute and punish private actors who commit human 
rights violations.
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3.4 Serious or gross human rights violations or abuses 
The term “abuses”, rather than “violations”, is used to refer to infractions of human rights by non-
State actors as opposed to States or other public actors. However, international human rights law 
currently neither relies on nor defines the terms “serious” or “gross”. Previously, this question gave 
rise to some discussion within the UN system, in connection with attempts to define the scope of the 
right to reparation for human rights violations. An early proposed definition of gross violations would 
have encompassed genocide, slavery and slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary executions, 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance; 
arbitrary and prolonged detention; deportation or forcible transfer of population; and systematic 
discrimination.55 Yet, complexities were identified. For example, what should be the relationship 
between the widespread or systematic nature of violations or abuses, and their status as “serious” or 
“gross”? Ultimately, though the term “gross violations” was included in the relevant soft law standard, 
owing to various complications recognised in preparatory works, it was left undefined.56 
Notwithstanding, the GPs mention “gross” human rights abuses in GP7, saying that such abuses 
are more likely in conflict-affected areas. Again, the term “gross” was left undefined, though the 
Interpretive Guidance on the GPs later produced by OHCHR does venture a definition. It states: 
There is no uniform definition of gross human rights violations in international law, but the 
following practices would generally be included: genocide, slavery and slavery-like practices, 
summary or arbitrary executions, torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary and prolonged 
detention, and systematic discrimination. Other kinds of human rights violations, including of 
economic, social and cultural rights, can also count as gross violations if they are grave.57 
What may be at stake here is the potential for the establishment of a hierarchy of corporate human 
rights abuses, with acts also counting as crimes against humanity having the status of “gross”, while, 
for example, environmental devastation or land grab leading to loss of livelihood, would not. Many 
voices caution against such an approach.58 In principle, corporations may in any case be charged for 
complicity with public actors in relation to crimes against humanity, at least where domestic criminal 
law permits, raising a question as to why a new legal regime is needed to address this category of 
wrongs (see next section on “complicity”). For now, the matter is thus open and likely to be the subject 
of much further debate. 
3.5 Complicity
In criminal law, complicity is defined as aiding and abetting human rights violations committed by 
third parties.59 A finding of complicity requires evidence of substantial contribution to the crime. In 
jurisdictions where corporations can be liable under criminal law, direct complicity could thus occur 
when a company knowingly and actively assists State actors in perpetrating human rights violations, 
55.   UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Study concerning the right to restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms: final report, E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (2 July 1993), p. 56.
56.   UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/35 on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 (19 April 2005), Preamble.
57.   Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative 
Guide, HR/PUB/12/02 (2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf, p. 6. This definition 
relied was adopted in the Zerk study referred to above (p. 27–28).
58.   For example, see Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Submission to the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Zerk Report on Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses (May 2014), 
http://globalinitiative-escr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/GI-ESCR-Submission-re-Corporate-liability-for-gross-human-
rights-abuses-May-2014.pdf.
59.   See further, Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, “Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses”, Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 24 (2000), 340.
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or where it should have known that its actions would have those consequences, for example, where 
a company promotes, or assists with, forced relocations in circumstances that would constitute a 
violation of international human rights law.
Human rights scholars have identified other, non-legal forms of complicity relevant in the business 
context. Thus, a business benefiting from human rights violations committed by the State, where 
it knew that the benefits derived from an activity causing a human rights violation, might be guilty 
of beneficial complicity. Silent complicity, on the other hand, refers to corporate culpability where a 
business failed to exercise influence in a situation where it could have acted or drawn attention to 
systematic or continuous human rights abuses. For their part, the GPs stipulate that the extent of a 
company’s responsibility to act varies according to whether it causally contributed to a violation or 
was merely linked to it.60 It has been argued that this limited formulation excludes silent complicity 
and thus neglects some of the complex interconnections there can be between  violations and 
corporate abuses of human rights.61 
3.6 Sphere of influence versus leverage
The “sphere of influence” was a term used in early discussions of business and human rights. It 
encompassed the idea that: (i) a company has influence over people closest to a company and those 
that it has a special relationship to; (ii) within this sphere, a company is most likely to know, or ought 
to know, the human rights consequences of its actions or omissions; and (iii) the company has most 
power, authority, influence, leverage or opportunity within its sphere and thus should use this to 
prevent or mitigate human rights abuses.62 But the SRSG challenged the concept, on the basis that 
it implies, ‘“can” equals “ought”’.63 In his view, companies should not be held responsible for the 
human rights impacts of every entity over which they have some leverage because this would include 
cases that they are not contributing to, nor are the causal agent of the harm in question. The SRSG 
preferred that companies’ responsibility be defined with reference to their impact on human rights, 
and what leverage the company might have over abuses through its business relationships.64 The 
idea of leverage is discussed further in section 7.4 below.
SECTION II: IMPLEMENTING THE UN FRAMEWORK  
IN ASIA AND EUROPE
This section relates business and human rights developments in Asia and Europe. In line with 
respective governance configurations of the two regions, for Asia the national level and business-led 
initiatives provide the main focus, while in Europe’s case, responses at regional level are highlighted.
4. An evolving business and human rights agenda in Asia
Rapid economic development has delivered growth and reduced poverty in a number of Asian States65. 
It has however also placed pressures upon marginalised, disenfranchised and disadvantaged groups 
whose human rights have been often traded off in the interests of short-term investment and financial 
gains. This manifests in systemic business-related human rights abuses, such as land-grabbing, 
gender discrimination, abusive working conditions, environmental degradation and associated 
violations of the rights to health, water, food, housing and livelihoods. Two-thirds of the world’s 
60.  John Gerard Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, A/HRC/17/31, 2011, Guiding Principles 13, 19. 
61.  Florian Wettstein, “Making Noise about Silent Complicity”, in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds.), Human Rights Obligations 
of Business Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 243–268. 
62.  John Gerard Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of influence” and “Complicity”, A/HRC/8/16, 15 May 2008.
63.  Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65.  General references to Asia in this section exclude Australia, New Zealand and Russia.
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indigenous peoples live in the Asia-Pacific, and these communities often bear the brunt of growth-
related human rights violations. Ethnic conflicts, corruption and institutional capacity problems also 
limit the human rights benefits that could derive from economic development in the region.66 The 
impact on human rights from an influx of investment in countries in transition, such as Myanmar67 
and Cambodia requires particular attention.
Asian civil society actors have engaged with these issues from a human rights perspective. Asian 
companies and governments, however, have mostly addressed them through the lens of CSR. The 
advantage of this is that a growing number of firms in Asia are integrating CSR into their policies and 
practices. The CSR paradigm in Asia is however voluntary, top-down and philanthropic, making it 
difficult to embed human rights-compatible policies and practices into core business operations.68 
Compounding these challenges are the weak rule of law and human rights protection, high levels of 
corruption and the lack of watchdogs in the form of strong civil society and independent media in 
some Asian States.69 
Where Asian companies have engaged with human rights as CSR, they have largely taken a risk-
management approach, measuring risk to the corporation rather than risk to the human rights 
of individuals and communities. This is partly because Asian firms have usually adopted CSR 
practices to integrate into global value chains of TNCs: the pressure to do so whilst still maintaining 
competitiveness has sometimes resulted in a “de-coupling” of company policies from actual human 
rights impacts.70 As an example, global garment retail brands have been known to keep “double-
books” in order to satisfy both the ethical teams of global firms (who want good working conditions 
and fair wages for workers) as well as the buying teams (who want cheaper prices and faster turn-
around times).71 As such, this approach has not provided the optimal response to business-related 
human rights abuses.
State responses to the business and human rights agenda in Asia are in flux. A recent study on the 
State duty to protect human rights concludes that, by and large, ASEAN States have “fairly robust 
legal frameworks governing the core areas of land, labour and the environment”.72 Yet, these laws 
are not always being effectively implemented or enforced.73 Similar conclusions can be reached with 
regard to the legal frameworks in the countries of South and East Asia.74 Since the business and 
human rights discourse is still a ‘State-driven act” in most of Asia, where the State does not actively 
demand corporate respect for human rights, this may signal to companies that human rights are not a 
requisite for operating within that State’s jurisdiction.75 Conversely, where the State does make clear 
that human rights is important, companies may be more likely to follow suit.76
66.   “OHCHR Human Rights Programme for Asia-Pacific (2008-2009)”, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/AsiaPacificProgramme0809.aspx.
67.   Ron Gluckman, “Why Western Oil Companies Love Myanmar’s Moe Myint”, Forbes Asia, 3 April 2013, http://www.forbes.
com/sites/forbesasia/2013/04/03/why-western-oil-companies-love-myanmars-moe-myint/
68.   Thomas Thomas and Alex Chandra, A baseline study on the nexus between corporate social responsibility and human rights: 
An Overview of Policies and Practices in ASEAN (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 2014). Similar 
findings emerge from studies on CSR in China with regard to the predominance of philanthropy, as well as in other Asian 
states. See Jian Wang and Vidhi Chaudhri, “Corporate Social Responsibility Engagement and Communication by Chinese 
Companies”, Public Relations Review 35, no. 3 (2009), 247–50; Bindu Sharma, ‘Discovering the Asian Form of Corporate 
Social Responsibility’, Social Space (2010), 28–35, https://centres.smu.edu.sg/lien/files/2013/10/SocialSpace2010-
BinduSharma.pdf.
69.   Carl Middleton and Ashley Pritchard, Corporate Accountability in ASEAN : A Human Rights-Based Approach (Asian Forum for 
Human Rights and Development, 2013). 
70.   Elisa Giuliani, Human Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries’ Industrial Clusters (Lund University, 
CIRCLE-Center for Innovation, Research and Competences in the Learning Economy, 2014). 
71.  Sumi Dhanarajan, “Managing Ethical Standards: When Rhetoric Meets Reality”, Development in Practice 15, no. 3–4 (2005), 
529–38.




74.   Thomas and Chandra (2014) as well as Lim (2013) reach similar findings apropos the ASEAN region, supra; Bindu Sharma, 
however, highlights Japan as the exception. See Bindu Sharma, “Contextualising CSR in Asia: Corporate Social Responsibility 
in Asian Economies”, (Singapore: Lien Centre for Social Innovation, 2013), http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lien_reports/5/.
75.   Robert J. Hanlon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2014).
76.   Hanlon looks at three countries: Thailand, Cambodia and China (Hanlon, supra). Larry Catá Backer, “China’s Corporate 
Social Responsibility with National Characteristics: Coherence and Dissonance with the Global Business and Human Rights 
Project”, in Jena Martin and Karen E. Bravo (eds.), Human Rights and Business: Moving Forward, Looking Back (2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448030 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2448030 
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4.1 Laws and policy instruments 
A recent ASEAN-based study suggests that weak enforcement of laws regulating corporate behaviour 
is due to a lack of implementation mechanisms, technical capacity and resources, inadequate 
awareness of relevant regulations, problems with central-local government coordination, pro-
investment attitudes and policies that incentivise lax enforcement by local governments, and public 
corruption. Additionally, the pace of law reforms in this area is apparently out of synch with the ability 
of regulatory entities to implement and enforce provisions.77
Very few States have integrated provisions that address social and environmental impact into 
corporate governance laws. A rare example of this is Article 5 of China’s Company Law which provides 
that:
… a company must, when engaging in business activities, abide by the laws and administrative 
regulations, observe social morals and business ethics, be in integrity and good faith, accept 
regulation of the government and the public, and undertake social responsibilities. 
Directors and supervisors are required by law to act in a socially responsible manner towards internal 
and external stakeholders in pursuing shareholder wealth.78 
A more common mechanism in Asia is CSR-type legislation imposing obligations on companies to 
contribute financially towards States’ development policies, particularly in middle-income ASEAN 
States, where CSR is seen by governments as an opportunity to “fill funding gaps in key government 
programmes in education, livelihood development and health services, amongst others.”79 The 
Companies Act 2013 of India mandates companies to spend 2% of the previous three years’ average 
net profit on CSR projects and activities in order to establish a culture of sustainable development 
governance and board level.80 The Act includes the Corporate Social Responsibility Voluntary 
Guidelines previously issued by Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in 2009. Section 135 of the 2013 
Act provides that every company having a net worth of a certain amount during any financial year shall 
establish a CSR committee of the board to put in place a range of community investment activities.81
Other examples of CSR-type legislation include the Philippines Corporate Social Responsibility Act 
of 2011, which mandates all large taxpayer corporations, whether domestic or foreign to allocate a 
reasonable percentage of their net income to CSR-related activities.82 In Indonesia, various legislative 
provisions makes it mandatory for limited liability companies (domestic and foreign),83 that manage, 
utilise or impact natural resources,84 or are involved in mining,85 or are State-owned enterprises86 to 
77.   Delphia Lim and Geetanjali Mukherjee, “Business and Human Rights Challenges in ASEAN: The Role and Modalities of the 
State”, in Mahdev Mohan and Cynthia Morel (eds.), Business and Human Rights in South East Asia: Risk and the Regulatory 
Turn (Taylor & Francis, 2014). 
78.   The People’s Republic of China, Companies Law (2006), Articles 17, 18, 52, 117, 118 and 126. Article 17 requires a 
company to “protect the lawful rights and interests of its employees, conclude employment contracts with the employees, 
buy social insurances, [and] strengthen labour protection.” 
79.  Thomas and Chandra, A baseline study on the nexus between corporate social responsibility and human rights.
80.   Indian Ministry of Law and Justice, The Companies Act (No.18 of 2013) (29 August 2013), http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/
pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf
81.  See Schedule VII, ibid.
82.   These are tax-deductible and defined as charitable, scientific, relating to youth or sport development, educational, providing 
service to veterans and senior citizens or address environmental sustainability, social welfare health and disaster relief: 
Fifteenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Senate Committee Report No 22, 16 March 2011, https://www.senate.
gov.ph/lisdata/109799357!.pdf
83.   The Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 25 of 2007 concerning Investment (2007), Article 15(b), http://www.bkpm.go.id/file_
uploaded/Investment_Law_Number_25-2007.pdf. Article 34 of the said law provides for sanctions for non-compliance. 
84.   The Republic of Indonesia, Government Regulation No. 47 of 2012 Concerning Social and Environmental Responsibility 
of Limited Liability Companies (2012); The Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 4 of 2009 on Minerals and Coal Mining 
(2009), Articles 71, 79, 96 and 107; The Republic of Indonesia, Law of East Belitung Regency No. 13 on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (2011), Article 6; The Republic of Indonesia, Batam Law No. 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility (2012), 
Article 10. 
85.   The Republic of Indonesia, Government Regulation No. 23 of 2010 Concerning the Implementation of Mineral and Coal 
Mining Business Activity (2010).
86.   The Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 19 of 2007 on the State-Owned Enterprise and Regulation of the Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprise (2007).
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make contributions to community development and empowerment,87 and to disclose these in their 
annual reports. Law No.25 of 2007 concerning investment defines CSR as an inherent responsibility 
of every investor to continuously maintain harmonious and balanced relations with the environment, 
values, norms and cultures of the local communities.88 In the Government of Indonesia’s Medium-
Term Development Plan of 2010-2014, CSR is seen as a funding scheme that contributes towards 
national development.89 
No extant CSR-type legislation however reflects the GPs’ human rights due diligence requirements 
(see further discussion in section 7.1). As a regulatory instrument, it has also been criticised for 
relegating State responsibilities for development to the private sector.90 Emphasising corporate 
contributions may also divert attention from the adverse impacts of business operations and the 
State’s duties to protect against them.91 Whilst CSR-type legislation at least secures the concept of 
corporations having such responsibilities within the political and economic paradigm, there is a risk 
that these are overly associated with philanthropic obligations rather than what is termed “strategic 
CSR”.92 
In terms of Asian governments’ policies on CSR, again, these only occasionally reference human 
rights per se although references to “social impacts or issues” could be seen as inclusive. In India, 
the National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and Economic Responsibilities of 
Business state that businesses should respect and promote human rights and provides a framework 
for business responsibility reports, which includes a statement on their human rights policy as well as 
a statement on complaints of human rights abuses filed during the reporting period.93
China has perhaps been most prolific amongst the Asian States in promulgating such policy 
instruments.94 The Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government 
on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities issued by the State Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2008 encourage State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to publish 
CSR or sustainability reports with information on the status of their CSR practices, planning and 
measures to improve CSR and to enhance the communication and dialogue mechanisms to facilitate 
responses to opinions and suggestions of stakeholders in the wider society.95 Other Chinese examples 
include the Draft Guidelines on Performing Social Responsibility of Foreign Investment Enterprises as 
published by the Investment Ministry of Commerce, which encourage foreign companies to integrate 
best-practice CSR standards to “advance China’s social fabric, having regard to their social and 
 
87.   Cornel B Juniarto and Andika D Riyandi, “Corporate social responsibility regulation in Indonesia”, International Bar 
Association (2012), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=103427a1-0313-4d6c-b7f7-c5deb0bedbb5 and 
Lim and Mukherjee, ‘Business and Human Rights Challenges in ASEAN’. 
88.  Ibid.
89.   For example, Presidential Instruction No.3 of 2010 concerning the Equitable Development Program provides that the 
National Planning and Development Agency of Indonesia construct a Guideline for Harmonising CSR Implementation with 
the Acceleration of the Millennium Development Goals Attainment in Indonesia. 
90.  Lim and Mukherjee, “Business and Human Rights Challenges in ASEAN”. 
91.  Ibid; Sabela Gayo, “Mandatory and Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility Policy Debates in Indonesia”, ICIRD (2012).
92.   Ghuliani observes, for example, that given Indian companies still equate CSR with philanthropy rather than with addressing 
their social and environmental impacts of their operations, the legislation could distract companies who are poised to 
embrace “strategic CSR”. (See Chhavi Ghuliani, “India’s Company Act 2013: Five key points about India’s CSR mandate”, 
BSR, 22 November 2013, http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/india-companies-act-2013-five-key-points-about-
indias-csr-mandate).
93.   See Shulagna Sarkar and Punam Singh, “CSR Guidelines for Indian Companies”, Indian Journal for Corporate Governance 
6, no. 1 (2013), 76; and Afra Afsharipour and Shruti Rana, “The Emergence of New Corporate Social Responsibility Regimes 
in China and India”, UC Davis Business Law Journal 14 (2014), 175, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472146, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2472146
94.   Li-Wen Lin, “Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change”, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 28 (2010), 64. The basis of these instruments, it has been argued, is the “harmonious society” concept 
put forward by President Hu Jintao in 2005, the purpose of which was to reconcile aspects of the Chinese socialist market 
economy with the problems faced in “rural areas, farmers and agriculture, the drainage of farmland, heavy pressure in the 
workplace and an incomplete social security system”. See “Harmonious Society”, People’s Daily, 29 September 2007. Cited 
in Jingchen Zhao, Corporate Social Responsibility in Contemporary China (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014). 
95.   See Section 18 in “Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate 
Social Responsibilities”, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), the 
People’s Republic of China, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964712/4891623.html.
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environmental impact on Chinese society”; and the Shanghai Municipal Local Standards on Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 2008 issued by the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Quality and Technical 
Supervision, which encourages enterprises to self-assess their CSR performance periodically and 
release the results to the community and employees.96 
4.2 Stock exchanges and business-led initiatives
In Asia, various countries’ stock exchanges have put in place either mandatory or voluntary disclosure 
requirements for social and environmental impacts. Apparently, stock exchanges based in emerging 
markets are on track to overtake those based in developed markets by 2015, in terms of the 
proportion of their large listings that disclose the seven first-generation sustainability indicators.97 
The Malaysian Stock Exchange, Bursa Malaysia, mandatorily requires listed issuers to annually 
report on the CSR practices and activities undertaken by them and their subsidiaries. In 2012, the 
Securities Commission adopted a CSR Framework and a Code for Corporate Governance that applies 
to government-linked and publicly listed companies. Further, the Bursa Corporate Governance 
Guide encourages directors to consider producing sustainability reports that address community 
involvement, equal opportunity, workforce diversity, human rights, supplier relations, child labour, 
freedom of association and fair trade. It has been recently announced that the Singapore Stock 
Exchange will follow suit with mandatory disclosure requirements for listed companies with regard to 
sustainability policies, social and environmental activities.98 
Other bourses with environmental and social impact disclosure requirements — albeit voluntary 
ones — include the Stock Exchange of Thailand, which refers to human rights as one of the core 
subjects of social responsibility referencing ISO2600099; the Indonesian Capital Market and Financial 
Institution Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK); the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility 
Guidelines for Listed Companies100; the Shanghai Stock Exchange101; the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Limited102; and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)103. Some operate 
96.   Shanghai Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, Corporate Social Responsibility, DB31/421-2008 (2008), http://
csrshe.com/info/3764-1.htm
97.   Doug Morrow, Michael Yow, and Brian Lee, Trends in Sustainability Disclosure: Benchmarking the World’s Stock Exchange 
(CK Capital, 2013), http://static.corporateknights.com/StockExchangeReport2013.pdf
98.  Vaidehi Shah and Jessica Cheam, “SGX to make sustainability reporting mandatory”, Eco-Business, 17 October 2014,




99.   The Securities and Exchange Commission, in conjunction with the Corporate Social Responsibility Institute (under the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand), plans to make it mandatory for firms to disclose their CSR operations on form 56–1 and their annual 
report. Any firms planning to issue new securities will have to disclose whether they have operated in accordance with the 
2012 guidance from 1 January 2014 onwards.
100.  Listed companies are encouraged to establish a social responsibility mechanism prepare social responsibility reports on 
a regular basis. The disclosure requirements are mandatory for only companies in SZSE 100 index. The SZSE also trains 
companies on how to apply the guidelines. See: ‘Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed 
Companies,’ Shenzhen Stock Exchange, www.szse.cn/main/en/rulseandregulations/sserules/2007060410636.shtml
101.   Research & Corporate Development Department, Initiatives in Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility in the Marketplace 
by HKEx and Overseas Exchanges (Exchange, 2011), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/newsltr/2011/
Documents/2011-10-13-E.pdf
102.   In 2012, it published its Consultation Conclusions on Environmental, Social and Governance Reporting Guide as a guide for 
‘recommended practice’ within the Listing Rules, but there are plans to establish a “comply or explain” basis of ESG reporting 
by 2015. Entities following the guide make disclosures on workplace quality, environmental protection, operating practices, 
and community involvement.
  “The Exchange Publishes Consultation Conclusions on Environmental, Social and Governance Reporting Guide”, HKEx News 
Release, www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2012/120831news.htm
103.  Its CSR Voluntary Guidelines 2013 are applicable to all public companies. They identify processes that companies can 
undertake to integrate CSR policies and practices including developing a CSR Policy, establishing a CSR consultative 
committee, disclosure and reporting practices and seeking independent assurance of CSR performance. The Board of 
Directors is expected to play an active role in formulating CSR policy. There is no set definition of CSR but the Guidelines 
suggest issues that companies can focus on including climate change, governance and product responsibility. See Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Corporate Social Responsibility Voluntary Guidelines 2013 (2013), http://www.
secp.gov.pk/notification/pdf/2013/VoluntaryGuidelinesforCSR_2013.pdf and Nazish Sheka, “Regulating Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Pakistan”, TBL Sustainability Advocacy, http://www.tbl.com.pk/regulating-corporate-social-responsibility-in-
pakistan/
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on a “comply or explain” principle, including Japan’s Financial Services Authority (FSA)’s “Principles 
for Responsible Institutional Investors”104. India’s Securities and Exchange Board mandates that the 
top 100 companies by market capitalisation meet this principle with regard to disclosures on their 
“National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and Economic Responsibilities of Business”.
Sector-specific regulatory initiatives are also emerging. China Banking Association’s Guidelines on 
CSR for Banking Financial Institutions apply to all banking institutions with corporate status in China. 
They address CSR in relation to economic responsibility, social responsibility and environmental 
responsibility and make recommendations for management control mechanisms and systems, and 
annual reporting on CSR.105 The Guidelines on Social Responsibility for Industrial Corporations and 
Federation issued in 2011 encourage companies across a range of sectors106 to establish a CSR 
system for management and to produce an annual report.107 Finally, the Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines for Apparel and Textile Enterprises set out indicators for Chinese companies publishing 
annual reports on sustainability.108 The impact of these regulatory initiatives, however, is yet to be 
measured.
4.3 Asia and the GPs 
The institutional uptake of the GPs in Asia has been low so far. At regional level, only the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has engaged with them specifically through 
its thematic study on CSR and human rights.109 Its baseline study into the CSR practices of States, 
businesses, civil society and other actors in the region that reference human rights, is aimed at 
identifying promotional activities; tools and mechanisms that facilitate engagement between the 
different stakeholders; and mechanisms that enabled access to remedies for victims of corporate-
related human rights abuses.110 
The Asian landscape is changing, however, and current developments may lead to a greater 
prominence of the GPs in the future. Public protest against corporate-related human rights abuses is 
becoming more commonplace. With the aid of mobile communications technologies, these protests 
are supported through transnational advocacy where actors draw from international human rights 
standards.111 Affected communities, with support from CSOs, are also increasingly seeking remedies 
in transnational fora, raising the profile of abuses and framing them as violations of international 
human rights standards. The struggle of some 450 families from the Koh Kong province in Cambodia 
provides a pertinent example. In response to alleged illegal land grab by the government in connection 
with new sugar plantations, the families filed complaints with the Cambodian courts against the sugar 
 
104.  “Global CSR Disclosure Requirements”, Initiative for Responsible Investment at Harvard University, http://hausercenter.org/
iri/about/global-csr-disclosure-requirements.
105.   China Banking Association, Zhongguo yinhang ye jinrong jigou qiye shehui zeren zhiyin [Chinese Banking Social Responsibility 
Report of 2009], 2009, http://www.docin.com/p-281617256.html. Cited in Yunwen Bai, Michael Faure, and Jing Liu, “The 
Role of China’s Banking Sector in Providing Green Finance”, Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum (2014), Vol. XXIV.
106.   This covers national industrial federations and associations engaged in iron, steel, oil, chemicals, light industry, textiles, 
building materials, non-ferrous metals, electric power and mining.
107.   This should address scientific development, environmental protection, energy conservation, production safety, interests of 
employees, interests of stakeholders and social commonwealth. 
108.   “China”, Global Reporting Initiative, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/policy/initiatives-worldwide/Pages/China.
aspx.
109.   The report was completed in June 2014 but to date, the various country studies have not been made public. See “Workshop 
on CSR and Human Rights in ASEAN: Outcomes of the AICHR Thematic Study”, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights, 17 June 2014, http://aichr.org/press-release/workshop-on-csr-and-human-rights-in-asean-outcomes-of-the-
aichr-thematic-study/. 
110.   The study sought to make recommendations for a common framework for the promotion of CSR and human rights in ASEAN 
in alignment with the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint’s aspirations to incorporate CSR principles into the agenda 
of ASEAN-based businesses so as to contribute towards sustainable socio-economic development of ASEAN member states. 
See C.3 (29) of ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), http://www.asean.org/
archive/5187-19.pdf.
111.   A large-scale strike against low pay by 30,000 workers at a Hong Kong-owned Chinese facility garnered so much attention 
that the strike ended when China’s Ministry for Human Resources ordered the company to rectify the benefit payments. See 
Stephanie Wong, “Yue Yuen Resumes Production at Dongguan Factory After Strike”, Bloomberg, April 28 2014, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-28/yue-yuen-resumes-production-at-dongguan-factory-after-strike.html.
50
companies; with BonSucro, a socially-responsible sugar industry initiative; the Thai National Human 
Rights Commission, concerning the Thai sugar company involved; and with the U.S. National Contact 
Point for the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises in relation to the US-based company 
purchasing sugar grown in the plantations.112 The victims also filed a case against the UK-based 
sugar companies seeking a declaration that they are the rightful owners of the sugar purchased by 
these companies from the Cambodian companies since it was produced on their land. 
 
Increasingly, Asian companies operating in developing countries are applying or are compelled to 
apply international human rights standards to secure their social license to operate or to address 
the concerns raised. Where projects receive financing through international financial institutions 
or multinational banks, loan requirements may include impact assessments and human rights due 
diligence.113 Malaysian corporations such as PETRONAS and Malaysian Smelting Corporation Berhad, 
in carrying out business in conflict zones in Iraq, Sudan, South Sudan, Myanmar and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), have had to respond to human rights concerns using the language of 
international standards. In 2012, the Chinese International Contractors Association released a Guide 
on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors, the purpose of which is to encourage 
and guide those Chinese companies who take on overseas projects to manage their social and 
environmental impact and abide by disclosure standards.114 
Finally, a focus upon responsible investment in Myanmar has drawn attention to business and human 
rights issues115 that are prevalent throughout the region. Myanmar may prove to be the test-bed for 
business and human rights116 in Asia, with knock-on national and regional effects. This is especially 
so given that the main investors in Myanmar are from the Asian region.
4.4 Critical business and human rights challenges in Asia
Although the region faces a range of concerns, the following four issues perhaps deserve particular 
attention at this time.
Land-grabbing: This is rampant in many countries across Asia,117 and often connected to economic 
land concessions118 supporting agro-industries such as palm oil, rubber and sugar, as well as 
extractive projects, forestry, special economic zones, large-scale infrastructure projects such as 
hydropower dams, tourism and property developments. Though business still accounts for most land-
grabs, State land-grabs, directly or through SOEs or sovereign wealth funds, have increased. 
Investment contracts and negotiations are usually opaque; affected communities are rarely forewarned 
and unlikely to participate in decision-making. Smallholder farmers, pastoralists, indigenous and 
nomadic peoples are amongst those most impacted by land-grabs by agro-businesses or extraction 
companies, with human rights violations often owing to a clash between customary and formal land 
ownership. These may include violations of the right to food, the right to adequate housing, the right to 
112.   “The Sre Ambel communities and the Koh Kong sugar plantation”, EarthRights International, http://www.earthrights.org/
legal/sre-ambel-communities-and-koh-kong-sugar-plantation; and “Koh Kong sugar plantation lawsuits (re Cambodia)”, 
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/koh-kong-sugar-plantation-lawsuits-re-
cambodia.
113.   Where a complaint is made through a mechanism such as the IFC’s Compliance Advisor or Ombudsman office, international 
human rights standards would apply. 
114.  “The First Guidance on Social Responsibility of China’s International Project Contracting Industry Officially 
Released”, Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/
significantnews/201209/20120908367021.html
115.   U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements, U.S. Department of State, 19 
June 2013, http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-burma-responsible-investment-reporting-requirements/; 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), US Department of the Treasury, General License No 17 (2012). 
116.   For example, note the establishment of the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, a joint initiative of the Institute of 
Human Rights and Business and the Danish Institute for Human Rights. 
117.   Surya P. Subedi, “Land Grabbing in Asia: The Response of International Law”, in Andrew Harding and Connie Carter (eds.), 
Land Grabs in Asia: What Role for the Law? (Routledge, forthcoming 2015). 
118.   These are contracts between the government and a state or private actors that give the latter specific rights over the land for 
a (usually extended) period of time.
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water, the right to self-determination, and exploitation of natural resources.119 Civil and political rights 
violations abound where communities resist or protest against being displaced from their land. Over 
the longer term, the broader population may also suffer from human rights abuses especially where 
fresh-water supplies are threatened by large-scale acquisitions of arable land; and where extensive 
land areas are dedicated to mono-cropping, damage is done to ecological systems. Smaller-scale 
and urban land-grabs are equally pervasive in parts of Asia. With the rapid growth of cities, areas 
designated as “wasteland” are often acquired and evictions and displacement of communities in 
occupation likewise result in abuses.
Workers’ rights abuses: According to the ILO, policies aimed at flexibilising labour through deregulation 
are a major contributory factor to poor working conditions in Asia.120 Mostly, abuses occur within the 
labour-intensive manufacturing sector in global supply-chains, agriculture, mining, construction and 
infrastructure projects. Workers face excessive working hours, poor wages, forced overtime, poor 
health and safety conditions, physical abuses, race and gender discrimination, physical and sexual 
harassment, and restrictions on rights to freedom of association, movement and collective bargaining 
rights. A recent empirical study into the impact of voluntary labour codes of conduct indicates that 
whereas “outcome standards” such as health and safety can improve, often “process rights”, such as 
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining remain under threat.121
Nearly 21 million people are subjected to forced labour, with the Asia-Pacific region accounting for 
56% of the total number.122 Migrant workers arriving in receiving States such as Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore, Korea and Japan are not availed of the usual protections offered by labour laws. Under the 
threat of repatriation, many endure unreasonable wage deductions, excessive working hours, verbal, 
physical and sometimes sexual abuse. Employers regularly confiscate passports. When workplace 
accidents happen, they are often denied medical expenses or compensation for injuries sustained. 
Migrant workers rarely have the ability to organise effectively, nor is it common for local unions to 
help protect their rights.123 Access to justice and remedies when abuses occur are regularly denied. 
Many abused workers forgo the opportunity to raise their grievance through the formal channels 
for fear of losing their jobs and working permits. Further, the cost of not earning a wage during the 
grievance process is difficult to endure especially where the worker is in debt as a result of fees 
paid to recruitment agencies. Sometimes, loopholes in the law allow for repatriation to take place 
before the worker has a chance to engage the dispute resolution process. Workers’ rights abuses 
disproportionately impact women workers operating at the lower end of value-chains124 but sex-based 
discrimination is problematic higher up the value chain too.125 Sexual harassment continues to be a 
serious problem.126 As an example, a survey of female factory workers in Guangzhou found that up to 
 
119.   Sumithra Dhanarajan, “Transnational State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations resulting from global land grabs”, in 
Andrew Harding and Connie Carter (eds.), Land Grabs in Asia: What Role for the Law? (Routledge, forthcoming 2015). 
120.   Sangheon Lee and Francois Eyraud (eds.), Globalization, Flexibilization and Working Conditions in Asia and the Pacific 
(International Labour Organization, 2008).
121.   Niklas Egels-Zandén and Jeroen Merk, “Private Regulation and Trade Union Rights: Why Codes of Conduct Have Limited 
Impact on Trade Union Rights”, Journal of Business Ethics (2013), 1–13.
122.   International Labour Organization, Asian Development Bank, Women and Labour Markets in Asia: Rebalancing for Gender 
Equality (Thailand: 2011), http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2011/women-labor-markets.pdf.
123.   Jolovan Wham, Statement to the UN Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, 7 April 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/Discussions/2014/JolovanWham.pdf.
124.   Apart from abuses unique to women (e.g., lack of protection due to pregnancy) women are more likely than men to be hired 
on short-term, casual, seasonal or homework contracts. See Kate Raworth, “Trading Away Our Rights: Women Working in 
Global Supply Chains”, Oxfam Policy and Practice: Private Sector 1, no. 1 (2004), 1–52.
125.   An ADB-ILO study revealed that gender inequality in wage differentials remains entrenched, with women typically earning 
70%–90% less of men. See International Labour Organization, Asian Development Bank, Women and Labour Markets in 
Asia: Rebalancing for Gender Equality (Thailand: 2011). 
126.   In Australia, complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace were one of the most common complaints received by the NHRI. 
See “Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment”, Catalyst (2014), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/sex-discrimination-
and-sexual-harassment-0. In 2013, India passed the Anti-Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, to address a 
critical problem in the country. See Indian Ministry of Law and Justice, The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act (No.14 of 2013) (22 April 2013), http://wcd.nic.in/wcdact/womenactsex.pdf. In 
Japan, although sexual harassment is illegal, the Equal Employment office received 9,981 sexual harassment complaints, 
60% of which were made by female employees in 2012. See “Women and Men in Japan 2013”, Japan Gender Equality 
Bureau Cabinet Office, http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamphlet/women-and-men13. 
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70% had experienced this. Women are however starting to use the law to challenge discrimination, 
although with mixed success.127 
Human rights defenders: Those who work on issues of corporate accountability in Asia are particularly 
at risk of death threats, physical violence, abductions, hounding by law enforcement, assassinations 
or various forms of harassment by the police, defamation campaigns, and threats against family 
members.128 Attacks against these individuals have a high level of impunity with less than one in 10 
cases properly investigated and prosecuted.129 This problem is exacerbated where there is weak rule 
of law and if elite interests are threatened. Activists addressing the extractive industries and agri-
businesses such as palm oil face some of the worst abuses.130 Trade unionists and other workers’ 
rights activists also face violence and intimidation. A recent international fact-finding mission on 
human rights defenders in the Philippines, for example, concluded, “there is compelling evidence that 
HRDs [human rights defenders]… are under serious threat, are constantly vilified, intimidated and 
‘terrorised.’ A climate of pervasive and systematic impunity is at the heart of this alarming situation”. 
The report highlights the effects of the ongoing militarisation including the emergence of multiple 
illegal private armies, legalised paramilitary groups, and the large-scale possession of armament 
contributes to the spread human rights violations with impunity.131
Corruption: This continues to be a serious problem in some Asian countries. According to Transparency 
International’s (TI’s) Corruption Perceptions Index of 2013, only nine of the 28 countries surveyed in 
Asia-Pacific scored above 50 points.132 Further, TI’s Bribe Payers Index 2011 identifies Indonesian 
and Chinese companies as having a high propensity to bribe when doing business abroad.133 
Analysing corruption from a human rights perspective emphasises the harm caused to individuals 
and communities by corrupt behaviour and activities. Corruption can be directly linked to human 
rights abuse when a corrupt act is deliberately used to cause the abuse; or indirectly linked where 
it is an essential contributory factor to the human rights abuses; or creates the conditions that 
enable the abuse to take place and corruption disproportionately impacts upon marginalised and 
disenfranchised groups. Yet, little attention has been paid to the links between corruption and human 
rights in defining responses.134
5. European responses to business and human rights 
As in Asia, understandings of both CSR and business and human rights in Europe, and responses 
to them have many influences. National politics, laws, institutions, attitudes and histories have 
influenced the configurations of national economies as they have the evolution of diverse mechanisms 
regulating business operations and their impacts. A marked difference between the two continents 
does exist, however, in terms of the contribution of regional-level institutions, in particular the Council 
127.   Tania Branigan, “China: Woman Settles in First Gender Discrimination Lawsuit”, The Guardian, 28 January 2014, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/china-woman-settles-first-gender-discrimination-lawsuit.; G Vinod, “Eight 
Women Lose Gender Discrimination Suit”, Free Malaysia Today, 21 March 21 2012, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/
category/nation/2012/03/21/eight-women-lose-gender-discrimination-suit/.
128.   Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Situation of human rights defenders, A/69/259, 5 August 
2014, http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/sr_on_hrd_2014_report_to_ga.pdf.
129.   See “Civil society identifies key issues for the new Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders’, International Service for 
Human Rights, http://www.ishr.ch/news/civil-society-identifies-key-issues-new-special-rapporteur-human-rights-defenders.
130.   See “Thailand: Protect Human Rights Defenders Fighting Corporate Mining in Loei Province”, Asian Human Rights 
Commission, http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/AHRC-UAC-073-2014. 
131.   “Philippines: Defending Ancestral Lands: Indigenous Women Human Rights Defenders In The Philippines”, Indigenous 
Peoples Human Rights Defenders Network, http://www.iphrdefenders.net/country-updates/philippines/237-philippines-
defending-ancestral-lands-indigenous-women-human-rights-defenders-in-the-philippines.
132.   The 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 177 countries and 
territories around the world with 0 equating to “highly corrupt” and 100, to “very clean”. See “Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2013: Asia Pacific”, Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/CPI2013_
AsiaPacific_EN.pdf. 
133.   “Bribe Payers Index 2011”, Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011.
134.  International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Transparency International, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the 
Connection (Geneva: 2009), http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/AbstractDB/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=248148. 
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of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) to shaping the reception of the GPs in European States. 
As will be seen, this derives as much, if not more, from the pre-existing framework of human rights 
and other laws and policies established at regional level, as from specific measures taken since 2011 
to promote the GPs’ implementation.
5.1 Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe (CoE) is the European region’s principal human rights organisation. Of its 
47 Member States, 28 are also EU members. All CoE Member States are parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Individuals can bring complaints of human rights violations 
under the ECHR to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, once all possibilities 
of domestic remedy have been exhausted. The European Union is preparing to sign the ECHR, with 
the aim of creating a common legal space for Europe’s 820 million citizens.135
5.1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights
Like other human rights treaties, the ECHR does not establish direct legal human rights obligations 
for corporations: only States can be sued before the ECtHR, and responsibility for human rights 
violations arises from the acts or omissions of public bodies, not private actors. Nevertheless, the 
ECHR as it has been interpreted and applied in cases by the ECtHR over past decades contains a 
number of protections relevant to business and human rights.136 In other respects, however, the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence imposes limits on remedies potentially available to victims, particularly with 
regard to business-related abuses taking place outside Europe. 
Positive obligations
As already noted above in section 3.3, based on the obligation on States under Article 1 ECHR “… to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention”, the 
ECtHR has developed the doctrine of positive obligations, according to which, a State’s duties are 
not restricted to abstaining from interference with human rights. Rather, States may be obliged to 
adopt protective or preventive measures, “even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves”, where this is necessary to protect human rights and provide remedies for abuses 
perpetrated by private individuals.
In some circumstances, the Court has considered that effective deterrence requires a State to 
criminalise private actors’ conduct; in others, it warrants the adoption of legislation or policies, or the 
deployment of resources. Acquiescence or complicity with the acts of private individuals breaching 
ECHR rights can, in addition, engage State responsibility,137 even where agents of the State act ultra 
vires or contrary to instructions.138 This rule has been widely applied by the ECtHR to hold States 
responsible for abuses by non-State actors.139 States are also obliged to provide effective remedies 
for human rights violations, regardless who the perpetrator is, and whether they are public or private. 
Cases where the doctrine of positive obligations has been applied have included a number where 
States have been found liable for breaches of the ECHR as a result of failure to protect individuals 
135.   Accession of the EU to the ECHR became a legal obligation under the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 6, and is foreseen by Article 59 
of the ECHR as amended by Protocol 14. On 17 March 2010, the Commission proposed negotiation of Directives for the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR (IP/10/291).
136.  See Jörg Polakiewicz, “Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe and 
Japan”, CALE Discussion Paper No. 9 (2012), 8.
137.  Ireland v. UK [1978] Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A, no. 25, p. 64, §159. 
138.  Cyprus v. Turkey [2001] ECHR GC No. 25781/94-IV, §81. 
139.   For example, see Osman v. UK [1998] Judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3164 (relating to Article 2); 
Ireland v. UK [1978] Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64 (relating to Article 3); Siliadin v. France [2005] 
Judgment of 26 July 2005 (relating to Article 4); Storck .v Germany [2005] Judgment of 16 June 2005 (relating to Article 5); 
Wilson and Others v. UK [2002] Judgment of 2 July 2002 (applications nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96).
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from interference with human rights resulting from the acts of corporations.140 The Court has held 
that a “state’s responsibility in environmental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private 
industry,” or from failing to fulfil the positive duty “to take reasonable and appropriate measures” to 
secure rights.141 A limitation, though, is that the actions or defaults of the State or public actors should 
have “sufficiently direct repercussions” on human rights; it may be required to show that the abuse 
would definitely have been prevented had the State taken measures that could reasonably have been 
expected.142 
In relation to the acts of -owned or controlled enterprises or companies performing public functions 
that may breach human rights, under the ECHR, the State can be held directly responsible. The 
ECtHR has held that the “State cannot absolve itself entirely from its responsibility by delegating its 
obligations to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention to private bodies or individuals.”143 This 
principle is, of course, of potential relevance in connection with the “contracting” out of the delivery of 
public services. A combination of criteria is applied by the ECtHR to determine whether a corporation, 
on a given occasion, was acting as an agent of the State.144 These include: the corporation’s legal 
status, asking, for example, whether it is established under public law, or as a separate legal entity 
under private law; the rights conferred upon the corporation by virtue of its legal status, where the 
question is whether the corporation enjoys rights normally reserved to public authorities; whether the 
corporation is institutionally independent; whether the corporation is operationally independence, 
with reference, for instance, to de jure or de facto State supervision and control; the nature of the 
corporation’s activity in question — whether it is ordinarily considered to be a “public function” or rather 
“ordinary business” activity; the context in which the corporate activity is carried out, considering 
issues such as whether the corporation has a monopoly position in the market.145
A second avenue by which the ECtHR subjects the acts of corporations to review, indirectly, is through 
its consideration of the rights-compatibility of domestic court cases between private parties, one of 
which is a private business entity. Cases of this kind adjudicated by the ECtHR to date have considered 
workplace discrimination, freedom of association and collective bargaining,146 privacy against media 
intrusion,147 and freedom of expression and to receive information.148 
Extraterritoriality 
In general the scope of application of ECHR, like other treaties, is territorial and “jurisdiction” under 
Article 1 refers to the national territory of contracting States. Only exceptionally, then, are acts or 
omissions performed or producing effects outside a State’s territory within ECtHR’s jurisdiction.149
140.   In Lopez Ostra v. Spain [1994] ECHR App. No. 16798/90, 303-C (ser. A), Spain was held liable for failing to protect residents 
from environmental and health problems at a nearby waste treatment facility. 
  The plant was built on State property and funded by state subsidies. The ECtHR found the interference with the rights 
protected by Article 8 was disproportionate and hence unlawful. In Taşkin and Others v. Turkey [2004] ECHR No. 46117/99 
10, the State failed to prevent environmental damage by a private gold mining company, breaching the rights of local 
residents. In Guerra and Others v. Italy [1998] ECHR App. No. 14967/89, 7, the state was held liable for having failed to 
inform the local population about the potential for accidents at a chemical factory.
141.   Fadeyeva v. the Russian Federation [2005] ECHR No. 55273/00, §89 and §92. The case related to a private steel point. The 
ECtHR held that the state was “certainly in a position to evaluate the pollution hazards and to take adequate measures to 
prevent or reduce them,” giving a “sufficient nexus between the pollutant emissions and the State Applying similar reasoning, 
the case of Powell and Rayner v. the UK [1990] concerned nuisance caused to the applicants by a private airport.
142.  E and Others v. UK [2002] ECHR (a case concerning private psychiatric care).
143.   Van der Mussele v. Belgium [1983] Judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, pp. 14–15, §§ 28–30; Costello-
Roberts v. UK [1993] Series A no. 247–C, § 27; Storck v. Germany [2005] Judgment of 16 June 2005, § 103.
144.  Polakiewicz, “Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights”, 16.
145.  Yershova v. Russia [2010] Judgment of 8 April 2010 §§ 55–58. 
146.  Young James and Webster v. UK [1981] ECHR.
147.  Axel Springer AG v. Germany [2012] ECHR, Von Hannover v Germany [2012] ECHR–GC, no 2.
148.  Steel and Morris v. UK [2005] ECHR.
149.   Al Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR GC §§ 131 et seq; Issa and Others v. Turkey [2004] Judgment of 16 
November 2004, §§ 68 and 71; Isaak v. Turkey [2006] Decision of admissibility of 28 September 2006; Ilaşcu and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia [2004] ECHR GC App. No 48787/99, §§ 314 and 318.
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The ECHR can apply where a State exercises effective overall control over a foreign territory, or 
authority and control over individuals outside their own territory; but even then, it will apply only to 
the acts or omissions of State organs. According to one authoritative source, “It must therefore be 
concluded that the Convention does not generally require High Contracting Parties (HCPs) to exercise 
control on the conduct abroad of business enterprises incorporated under the High Contracting 
Parties’ laws or having their headquarters in their territories, even when such conduct leads to human 
rights abuses.”150 This is despite the obligation on States to provide an effective remedy before 
a national authority for any violation under the ECHR.151 While corporations are entitled to enjoy 
Convention rights,152 overall, and with the exception of State-owned enterprises, it can be concluded 
that the ECHR “does not apply directly to private entities, nor is there any case law so far requiring 
HCPs to control the activities of their MNES operating abroad, even if they participate in or otherwise 
contribute to human rights abuses”.153
As the discussion relating to Working Groups I to III will highlight, these general principles enunciated 
and given effect to by the ECtHR in decided cases, and the possibilities and limitations they pose, 
provide a large component of the international legal basis for the UN Framework and have strongly 
influenced its three key elements of the state duty to protect, corporate responsibility to respect, and 
the right of victims to remedy. Extraterritoriality in relation to European civil law is considered further 
under Working Group III.
5.1.2 The European Social Charter
The European Social Charter (ESC) is the second major human rights treaty of the Council of Europe, 
guaranteeing social and economic human rights, besides the ECHR’s protections for civil and political 
rights.154 The European Committee of Social Rights monitors compliance with the ESC through State 
reports, and decides on collective complaints that may be brought by European social partners.155 
Less often relied on in the past than the ECHR, the financial crisis and austerity measures have 
brought the ESC into renewed focus.156 
The ESC establishes rights including those to a safe, healthy, just and dignified working conditions, 
a living wage, freedom of employment and protection in cases of termination of employment, 
association and collective bargaining, non-retaliation against workers’ representatives, other 
collective workplace rights, vocational training, health, social security, free movement of workers, 
equal treatment, and to protection against poverty and social exclusion. Employed women, children, 
the persons with disabilities, the elderly and the family are entitled to additional protections.157 
The ESC thus contains many provisions with potential to impact on relations between businesses 
and individuals. However, as with the ECHR, obligations under the ESC are addressed to States, 
not businesses, albeit with scope for reliance on the notion of positive obligations. Similarly, it also 
applies only to the metropolitan territory of each party.158
150.  Polakiewicz, “Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights”, 14. 
151.  European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Article 13.
152.   There are numerous cases where corporations have benefited from the protection of the ECHR: for an overview, see Marius 
Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
153.  Polakiewicz, “Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights”, 31. 
154.  Council of Europe, European Social Charter (1996), http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/. 
155.   The social partners include the European Trade Union Confederation, ESCR Business Europe and the International 
Organisation of Employers, international NGOs with participatory status in the CoE, and social partners at national level. Any 
state can give national NGOs the right to bring complaints before the ESC but to date only Finland has taken this step.
156.   See, for example, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, The European Union as a community of values: 
safeguarding fundamental rights in times of crisis (Luxembourg: Publications Office of European Union, 2013),http://fra.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-safeguarding-fundamental-rights-in-crisis_en.pdf. 
157.  “European Social Charter (revised) CETS No.:163”, Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=163&CM=8&CL=ENG 
158.  Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece Collective [2005] ECSR Complaint No.30/2005, Case Doc. No.1. 
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5.1.3 New standards on human rights and business
Within the Council of Europe, the Steering Committee on Human Rights (CDDH) sets standards on 
human rights. Since 2011, at the request of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, a process 
has been undertaken to develop new standards specifically addressing business and human rights. 
Already this has led to the conclusion of a new Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The Declaration expresses strong 
support for implementation of the GPs by Council of Europe Member States, calling on them, inter 
alia, to take appropriate steps to protect against human rights abuses by companies; to formulate 
and implement policies and measures to promote that all business enterprises respect human rights, 
within and beyond national jurisdictions; to ensure access to remedy within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction, and to develop national action plans (NAPs) on business and human rights.159 
Beyond this Declaration, in September 2014, a Draft Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on human rights and business was discussed.160 This soft legal standard, if 
adopted, would recommend to the CoE governments that they, inter alia: 
 Review national legislation and practice to ensure compliance with legal requirements and 
standards on business and human rights; 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of measures taken at regular intervals;
 Share their NAPs and best practices of implementing the GPs and present these via a shared 
information system, to be established and maintained by the Council of Europe, and accessible 
to the public; and
 Engage in a peer discussion process with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including 
business, to review progress. 
Attached to the Draft Recommendation is a substantial Appendix, which includes guidance for States 
in a number of areas, in particular those addressed by Pillars I and III of the UN Framework.161 Notably, 
regarding extraterritoriality, the Draft Recommendation states that this should have the same 
meaning as under Article 1 of the ECHR. As discussed above, this would entail that extraterritoriality 
should be understood as remaining exceptional and not generally applicable to the conduct of private 
companies outside Council of Europe Member States, unless one of the special circumstances noted 
above has been met. 
5.2 European Union
The founding vision of European federalists following World War II may be described, somewhat 
crudely, as that of binding Europe together in peace through commerce. Though not an explicit goal 
initially, over time, it became evident that, beyond dismantling of barriers to trade and free movement 
of goods, certain rights and freedoms for workers, and common minimum standards in areas such as 
product safety, and environmental quality were also necessary to avoid social dumping and market 
distortion, and to achieve a more fully integrated single European market.162 Early EU legislation 
159.   Committee of Ministers, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the UN Guiding Principles on business and human 
rights (2014), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2185745&Site=CM.
160.   Council of Europe, Draft Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on human rights and business, 
CDDH-CORP(2014)10 (22 August 2014), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/hr_
and_business/Documents/CDDH-CORP%20Draft%20Recommendation%20Human%20Rights%20and%20Business%20
Final%20ENG.pdf.
161.   The Draft also recalls CoE standards in a number of areas that address issues relevant to business and human rights, e.g. 
Article 12 of Convention on Cybercrime, Article 18 of Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.
162.   See, for example, Christian Joerges, “What is left of the European Economic Constitution?”, EUI Working Paper 13 (2004), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=635402; and Christian Joerges and Florian Roedl, “Social Market 
Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?”, EUI Working Paper 8 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=635362. 
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established the right of equal treatment in employment for women.163 The Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 established a range of protections in the employment 
context. The later EU Equal Treatment Directive prohibits discrimination in the area of employment 
and working conditions on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards 
employment and occupation, and applies to both the public and private sectors.164 
Up to a point, protecting human rights in the context of business activities was then incidental to 
other regulatory aims in the EU, perhaps understandably so, given the Council of Europe’s prerogative 
over setting and enforcing standards in the area of human rights. However, this demarcation 
of institutional competence was not to endure. Since the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon, EU 
primary law explicitly provides for an EU that is “… founded on the values of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.”165 
Under the Treaty on European Union, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 is now 
afforded equal legal value to the EU’s founding treaties and the market freedoms for which they 
provide. Thus, the Charter is legally binding on EU institutions and Member States when implementing 
or claiming exceptions from EU law.166 Fundamental rights under the ECHR and Member States’ 
common constitutional traditions also have the status of general principles of EU law167, and the EU 
will itself accede to the ECHR.168
These developments have set the stage for a number of new legal dilemmas and policy challenges. 
Internally, the European Court of Justice has faced clashes between fundamental human rights and 
market freedoms. Whether the EU will in practice retain its character as an essentially market-based 
order, or is capable of resolving such conflicts without weakening human rights protections remains 
to be seen.169 
A second set of tensions attach to the relationship between the EU’s internal and external commitments 
to human rights. The EU has committed at various times to integrating human rights through all policy 
areas and to aligning its external policies in particular with the European Charter.170 Yet, critiques, 
including from the European Parliament (EP),171 have long pointed to a lack of coherence between 
 
163.   Council of the European Communities, Council Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men’ 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, 76/207/EEC (9 
February 1976), and Council of the European Communities, Council Directive on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the 
protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood , 86/613/EEC (11 December 1986).
164.   Council of the European Union, Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, 2000/78/EC (27 November 2000), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0078.
165.  European Union, The Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 2.
166.  European Union, The Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 6(1).
167.  European Union, The Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 6. 
168.   European Union, The Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 6(2). A recent paper revives the case for EU accession 
to the European Social Charter, see Olivier De Schutter, “The Accession of the European Union to the European 
Social Charter”, EUI Working Paper (2014), http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/Presentation/
PublicationCSEUEODeSchutterJuly2014_en.pdf. 
169.   See, for example, Anne CL Davies, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ”, Industrial 
Law Journal 37, no. 2 (2008), 126–48; Cf. Eric Engle, ‘A Viking we will go! Neo-corporatism and Social Europe’, German Law 
Journal 11(6) (2010), 633. 
170.  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
— The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratization in third countries, EU Doc COM/2001/0252 
final (2001).
171.  The EP has passed resolutions regarding companies and their impacts since 1999. Recently, see Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs, Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: promoting society’s interests and a route to sustainable 
and inclusive recovery (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-
0023&language=EN. European Parliament, Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility: accountable, transparent and 
responsible business behaviour and sustainable growth, A7-0017/2013 (6 February 2013).
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the Union’s domestic human rights regime and measures in areas such as trade, commercial, foreign 
policy and development whose impacts on human rights in countries outside the EU have been 
claimed to be often negative.172
5.2.1 CSR and business and human rights in EU policy
The evolution of EU policies on corporate social responsibility reflects these broad tensions, as well 
as changing ideas in the EU and world at large about the role of business in society and sustainable 
development, models for EU-level law and policy-making and approaches to business regulation.173 
Published after the UN Human Rights Council’s adoption of the GPs,174 and also after the start of the 
global financial crisis, the European Commission Communication on CSR of 2011 marks the EU’s 
first explicit engagement with business and human rights, and departs from previous EU CSR policy 
in a number of respects.175 Most significantly, in the present context, this concerns the definition 
of CSR. Up to 2011, the EU defined CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business”. The 2011 Communication, by contrast, makes a point 
of re-defining CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”: CSR is thus no 
longer just an idea, but has become more of a social reality. Though still emphasising the “business 
case” for CSR, in terms of competitiveness, risk management, cost savings and access to capital, 
for instance, this responsibility now integrates the need to respect legal standards, including human 
rights standards: CSR, assumes “respect for applicable legislation, and for collective agreements 
between social partners”, excluding the notion of CSR as purely voluntary affair.
Reinforcing this, the policy asserts a specific approach for European businesses to adopt, consequent 
on their responsibilities to society:
To fully meet their corporate social responsibility, enterprises should have in place a process 
to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their 
business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders, with the 
aim of: 
    maximising the creation of shared value for their owners/shareholders and for their other 
stakeholders and society at large;
   identifying, preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts.
172.  See discussions on EU approaches to trade and investment under WG1 and contributions in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Daniel Augenstein, Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights 
and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union (University of Edinburgh, 
2010), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/business-human-rights/101025_ec_study_
final_report_en.pdf. On TNCs, the European Parliament has proposed measures including a binding code of conduct for EU 
companies in developing countries and a remedy mechanism for victims from third countries in EU national courts: European 
Parliament, Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European 
Code of Conduct (2009).
173.  See, for example, Daniel Kinderman, “Corporate Social Responsibility in the EU, 1993-2013: Institutional Ambiguity, 
Economic Crises, Business Legitimacy and Bureaucratic Politics”, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(4) (2013), 701; 
and Olivier De Schutter, “Corporate Social Responsibility European Style”, European Law Journal 14, no. 2 (2008), 203–36.
174.  2009 Swedish Presidency and incoming Spanish Presidency of the EU held a conference “Protect, Respect, Remedy” on 
CSR, concluded that “EU and its MS [Member States] should take a global lead and service as a good example on CSR…” 
and expressed support for the UN Protect Respect Remedy framework. See also Danish EU Presidency, From Principles to 
Practice: The European Union operationalizing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Expert 
Conference (Copenhagen: 2012).
175.  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for CSR, COM(2011) 
681 final (25 October 2011), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0681:FIN:EN:PDF (known 
as the EU Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility). The Communication states, “The economic crisis and its social 
consequences have to some extent damaged consumer confidence and levels of trust in business. They have focused public 
attention on the social and ethical performance of enterprises.”
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A number of dedicated measures on human rights are then laid out. Responding to the GPs’ call for 
governments to communicate clear expectations to business under Pillar I of the UN Framework, the 
EU policy states a clear expectation by the Commission on all EU companies “to meet the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights as defined in the GPs”. Commitments were also made by the 
Commission to develop guidance based on the GPs for specific industry sectors, as well as small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), based on the GPs (such guidance has now been produced, see 
further WG1 below) and to report on EU-level priorities for the implementation of the GPs.176 As to 
the “external” dimensions of business and human rights, in other words, impact beyond EU borders, 
the policy commits only to “Identify ways to promote responsible business conduct in its future policy 
initiatives towards more inclusive and sustainable recovery and growth in third countries.”177
In the area of Pillar II, the Communication invited large European enterprises “to make a commitment 
to respect the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy” and to take account of the GPs or another “GP-aligned framework” when developing their 
approach to CSR, both by 2014.178 The Commission then undertook to “monitor the commitments 
made by European enterprises with more than 1,000 employees to take account of internationally 
recognised CSR principles and guidelines, and take account of the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard 
on Social Responsibility in its own operations.”179 Yet, as further discussed in Section 7.2 below, a 
2013 study for the European Commission, surveying a sample of European companies found that 
only 33% referred to the UN Global Compact, OECD Guidelines or ISO 26000, and only 3% to the GPs 
as such.180
5.3 NAPs: Connecting regional and national action on business and 
human rights 
An invitation was also issued to EU Member State governments by the Commission’s 2011 CSR 
Communication, namely, to develop NAPs to support the implementation of the GPs.181 This 
invitation built on, but went beyond, an earlier request to EU Member States to produce NAPs on 
CSR. At the time of writing, 24 of the 28 EU Member States had already developed, or were in the 
process of developing, a CSR NAP.182 To support Member States in implementing and improving their 
respective CSR plans, the European Commission set up a process of peer review of CSR NAPs in 
2013, based on collaborative working among small groups of States to scrutinise measures taken on 
a constructive basis, and share best practices.183
176.  Section 4.8.2, p.14. Though a commitment was made to identify EU level priorities by end 2012, publication of this report is 
still awaited. 
177.  Ibid, p.15.
178.  In this connection, the Communication refers to the OECD Guidelines for MNEs, ISO26000 Guidance Standard on Social 
Responsibility, and the UN Global Compact.
179.  Ibid, p.13.
180.  Only 2% of surveyed companies referred to the ILO MNE Declaration. See Caroline Schimanski, An Analysis of Policy References 
made by large EU Companies to Internationally Recognised CSR Guidelines and Principles (European Commission, March 
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr/csr-guide-princ-2013_en.pdf. 
181.  This request was repeated and reinforced by the Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan 
on Human Rights and Democracy, 11855/12 (25 June 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf. 
182.  Including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See European Commission, European 
Commission Communication on CSR 2011: Implementation Table (March, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/files/csr/documents/csr_agenda.pdf. At least two Member States’ CSR plans also include measures 
in support of the GPs. See The Danish Government, Action Plan for Corporate Social Responsibility (May 2008), http://
samfundsansvar.dk/file/318799/action_plan_CSR_september_2008.pdf, and Government of Cyprus Planning Bureau, 
National Action Plan for CSR (2012), on file. 
183.  European Commission and ICF GHK, Peer Review Report: Peer Review on CSR (The Hague: 28 November 2013), http://
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11477&langId=en.
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At the time of writing, four EU Member States have published NAPs.184 Given the reliance on NAPs 
placed by the Council of Europe’s Draft Recommendation on business and human rights, and the new 
focus on NAPs by the UN Human Rights Council in its 2014 business and human rights resolution, 
NAPs, as a vehicle for promoting implementation of the GPs and other business and human rights 
frameworks clearly hold strong potential relevance beyond the EU; notably, in this regard, the US 
Government has recently committed to develop a NAP.185 Consequently, the approaches followed by 
those EU Member States that have already concluded NAPs, and an outline of their contents is briefly 
described here.186 
United Kingdom: The UK Government was the first to publish a NAP.187 This followed a process 
marshalled by a cross-departmental steering group, and a series of stakeholder workshops. The NAP 
applies to all UK government departments and is addressed to all businesses “domiciled” within 
the United Kingdom. It collates actions already taken that promote human rights in the business 
context, including the overall legal framework provided by UK legislation and policy. It also identifies 
some new measures taken specifically in response to the GPs, for example, responsible business 
investment guidelines for companies in Myanmar, and a requirement that new bilateral investment 
treaties incorporate a company’s responsibility to respect human rights. The NAP commits all UK 
government departments to provide advice to companies about their human rights responsibilities. 
Acknowledged as a starting point, a promise is made to review its effectiveness and issue a new NAP 
in 2015.
Denmark: Here, the decision to develop a NAP followed a formal recommendation from Denmark’s 
multi-stakeholder CSR Council, representing Danish trade unions, local municipalities, NGOs, 
business and financial organisations. Following a short dialogue with the CSR Council, although 
not wider stakeholder consultation, a NAP was published in 2014.188 Like the UK NAP, Denmark’s 
summarises actions already taken, however, this is done more transparently, through a table 
identifying, for each GP, its “status in Denmark”, with reference to relevant domestic law and policies 
prior to 2011, as well as specific initiatives taken or planned “as a dedicated measure” to implement 
the GP in question since 2011. Some examples of the latter include: establishing an inter-ministerial 
Working Group to consider the issue of extra-territoriality; providing advice to and holding workshop 
for exporting companies on Responsible Supply Chain management via the Danish Trade Council; 
requiring companies involved in Danida Development Partnerships to undertake CSR due diligence 
including human rights, and including terms in contracts with such businesses to live up to the UN 
Global Compact; and supporting human rights in the negotiation of international standards (e.g. the 
OECD Common Approaches on export credit) and agreements (e.g., trade and development clauses 
in EU trade agreements). 
184.  A list of published NAPs and NAPs in development worldwide is maintained in the “National Action Plans”, Business 
and Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-
examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans. Though not discussed here, draft 
NAPs have been published by Italy and Spain. See Government of Italy, The Foundations of the Italian Action Plan on the 
United Nations “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” (2014), http://business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/foundations-ungps-nap-italy.pdf; and Government of Spain, Draft of National Action Plan on Business and Human 
Rights (2013), http://www.business-humanrights.org/UNGuidingPrinciplesPortal/ToolsHub/Governments/TypeInitiative/
natlactionplans.
185.  The commitment was announced by President Obama on 24 September 2014: “Fact Sheet: The U.S. Global Anticorruption 
Agenda”, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (September 24, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/24/fact-sheet-us-global-anticorruption-agenda. Switzerland has initiated a process towards the development 
of a NAP. 
186.  For a fuller discussion, see Claire Methven O’Brien et al., National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit 
for the Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks (The 
Danish Institute for Human Rights, The International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, 2014).
187.  Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901/BHR_Action_Plan_-_
final_online_version_1_.pdf. 
188.  The Danish Government, Danish National Action Plan: Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/Denmark_NationalPlanBHR.pdf. 
61
The Netherlands: Development of the Dutch NAP was prompted by a request from the Dutch 
Parliament. Led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NAP process proceeded with support from an 
inter-ministerial Working Group involving the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Finance, Security and 
Justice, and Social Affairs and Employment. An internal analysis of how Dutch policy lined up with 
the GPs was conducted, and separate consultations held with business representatives, CSOs and 
public agencies, to ensure to each a chance to voice their opinions adequately. Adopting a risk-based 
approach, the resulting NAP focuses on “five main points” that came up during the consultation 
process: (1) an active role for the government; (2) policy coherence; (3) clarifying due diligence; (4) 
transparency and reporting; and (5) scope for remedy. 
Finland: This time led by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, an inter-ministerial Working 
Group prepared the ground for Finland’s NAP with a memo on the status of implementation of the GPs 
in Finland, on which stakeholders were invited to comment. Taking these inputs into account, a final 
NAP was published in October 2013.189 Its key elements include: preparation of a baseline study to 
review consistency of Finnish legislation with the GPs; carrying forward respect for human rights in new 
legislation on public procurement, pursuant to the EU Public Procurement Directive; actions focused 
on State-owned enterprises; a review of the functioning of Finland’s national contact point (NCP); and 
establishing a multi-stakeholder dialogue on human rights due diligence to identify requirements and 
best practices. Monitoring of implementation of the NAP is proposed to be undertaken on a multi-
stakeholder basis via Finland’s Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility. 
A final word should be reserved for actions triggered amongst civil society by the arrival of NAPs 
in Europe. CSOs and NHRIs have separately190 and together191, engaged in advocacy around NAPs, 
both at the national192 and regional193 levels. In some cases, the formal input of NHRIs have been 
directly sought by governments.194 Business associations and representatives have been involved 
in every NAP process to date. However, based on experiences so far, NAPs dialogues could still be 
better exploited as an opportunity to establish inclusive national discussion on business human 
rights impacts inside and outside the country’s territorial jurisdiction. In particular, input from those 
representing groups experiencing discrimination in employment, access to goods and services, such 
as persons with disabilities and minorities, should be more actively sought; and regrettably, NAPs so 
far pay scant attention to the issue of gender, which should be of matter of concern given strong EU 
legal commitments in that area. 
189.  Ministry of Employment and the Economy, National Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, Publication 46/2014 (2014), http://www.tem.fi/files/41214/TEMjul_46_2014_web_
EN_21102014.pdf.
190.  A full list of responses and commentaries on published NAPs is maintained here: “National Action Plans”, Business 
and Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-
examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans.
191.  See, for example, coordinated responses to UNWG on NAPs by European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ICAR and 
DIHR: “ECCJ Contribution to the consultation on the National Action Plans on UNGPs”, European Coalition for Corporate 
Justice, http://www.corporatejustice.org/UNWG-on-BHR-consultation-on-the.html?lang=en.
192.  See, for example, Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, Advice: Response to the National Action Plan on Human Rights, 
“Knowing and Showing” (February 2014), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/netherlands-
nhri-re-national-action-plan.pdf ; and “Dutch National Plan on Business and Human Rights”, Dutch MVO Platform, http://
mvoplatform.nl/news-en/dutch-national-action-plan-on-business-and-human-rights. 
193.  The ECCJ will undertake a review of published EU Member States NAPs in 2014. See “National Action Plans UNGPs: an 
assessment”, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, http://www.corporatejustice.org/National-Action-Plan-UNGPs-an.
html?lang=en. The European Group of NHRIs published a Discussion Paper on NAPs in 2012. See European Group of 
National Human Rights Institutions, Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Discussion 
paper on national implementation plans for EU Member States (June 2012), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/
files/media/eu-nhris-paper-on-national-implementation-plans-for-ungps-210612-short.pdf.
194.  The French NHRI was requested by the government to develop recommendation: Commission Nationale Consultative des 
Droits de L’Homme, Business and human rights: opinion on the issues associated with the application by France of the United 
Nations’ Guiding Principles (24 October 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/
cncdh-opinion-france-ungp-oct-2013.pdf.
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SECTION III: WORKING GROUPS
6. Working group I: State duty to protect
6.1 General regulatory and policy functions, and due diligence 
requirements
Pillar I of the UN framework reflects the position under international law that States must protect 
against abuses by third parties, including businesses, within their jurisdiction. Accordingly, GP1 
requires States to protect rights-holders by taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish 
and redress such abuses through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication, while 
GP2 obliges States to set out clearly the expectation that business enterprises domiciled in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.
The GPs give further guidance on four specific areas where State action is required to meet these 
obligations, providing that States should:
a)   Enforce laws aimed at, or having the effect of, requiring business enterprises to respect 
human rights, and periodically assess the adequacy of such laws and address any gaps;
b)    Ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing operation of 
business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain but enable business respect 
for human rights;
c)   Provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human rights 
throughout their operations; and
d)  Encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to communicate how they 
address their human rights impacts.195
There are two ways in which a State’s laws can require businesses to respect human rights. First, a 
country’s general laws can indirectly require business to respect human rights, by requiring them to 
meet standards of conduct and performance in areas such as labour, environment, health and safety, 
product safety and anti-corruption, where, without such laws, there would be violations of rights, 
for instance, the rights to life, health, freedom of association, equal treatment, and so on. Here, 
respecting human rights may be incidental to the explicit regulatory goal of the legislation. In many 
countries, current business practice already largely respects human rights because it is in line with 
such national legal requirements. The task then is in detecting shortcomings in the general legal and 
policy framework, which may result in human rights abuses occurring with impunity.196
Second, a State can enact measures specifically intended to secure business respect for human 
rights. Such measures need not explicitly injunct businesses “not to violate” human rights. Rather, 
their focus may be procedural, requiring or encouraging companies to undertake a process of due 
diligence by which they identify and respond to their actual or potential impacts on human rights (see 
further Working Group II below). Though many States already require companies to do due diligence in 
other areas, and human rights-specific due diligence requirements are for the time being rare, recent 
developments in France and Switzerland may indicate the beginning of a broader movement towards 
mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence as a matter of law.197 
195.  See Guiding Principle 3 in John Gerard Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations’ Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.
196.  Such weaknesses may lie in the substance of legislation (e.g., failing to make unlawful discrimination on all grounds 
prohibited by international standards) or in its scope (e.g., exclusion of Special Economic Zones from application of legal 
regime applicable in the rest of the state).
197.  Assemblee Nationale , Proposition de Loi relative au devoir de vigilance des societies meres et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre, No.1524 (6 November 2013); the Foreign Affairs Committee of Switzerland’s Lower Chamber has called for draft 
legislation anchoring company due diligence requirements in law. See “A Milestone for Human Rights”, Corporate Justice, 
2 September 2014, http://www.corporatejustice.ch/media/medialibrary/2014/09/140902_sccj_-_swiss_foreign_affairs_
committee_wants_mandatory_hrdd.pdf.
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Some due diligence requirements have also been instituted in relation to specific human rights 
geographies and issues. The US government, for example, has introduced requirements for disclosure 
of companies’ policies and processes in connection with new investments in Myanmar.198 The UN 
Security Council endorsed due diligence for all companies sourcing minerals from Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) in 2010,199 and the OECD published Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chain of Minerals concerning the sourcing of natural resources from conflict-affected and high-risk 
areas.200 Following suit, Section 1502 of the 2010 U.S. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act requires all companies listed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to carry out due diligence to a nationally or internationally recognised due diligence framework in 
order to determine whether their products contain minerals that have funded armed groups in the 
DRC or bordering countries. In parallel, 12 African States of the International Conference of the Great 
Lakes Region (ICGLR) have made meeting the OECD due diligence requirements a condition of their 
regional mineral certification scheme. In 2012, Congo’s government introduced legislation requiring 
companies operating in its tin, tantalum, tungsten or gold mining sectors to undertake supply chain 
due diligence according to the OECD standard, and Rwanda’s government adopted similar legislation. 
The Chinese government, through the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals 
Importers & Exporters has committed to launching a “Guideline for Social Responsibility in Outbound 
Mining Investments” during 2014.201 The European Commission has proposed a regulation to 
establish a voluntary self-certification scheme, based on the OECD Guidance, for the 300–400 
companies that import tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold ores and metals into Europe.202 Together, 
these measures have prompted some significant changes in companies’ sourcing practices.203 Yet, a 
cost-benefit analysis undertaken for the European Commission in 2013 revealed that only 4% of 330 
companies surveyed were voluntarily preparing a public report on how they identify and addressthe 
risk of funding conflict or abuses in their supply chains, raising questions about the efficacy of a 
voluntary approach at least in the European context.204
6.1.1 National action plans
Since 2011, there has been a concerted movement towards the idea that States should develop 
National Action Plans (NAPs) to support their implementation of the GPs and other business and 
human rights frameworks. As mentioned above in Section 5.3, the EU was the first authority to call 
for NAPS,205 with the UN Human Rights Council following suit shortly after,206 while the Council of 
Europe has called for States to develop NAPs in a recent Declaration of its Council of Ministers, and 
envisages supporting a periodic multi-stakeholder dialogue about NAPs in the future.207 In response 
 
198.  “Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements”, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2013/05/209869.htm.
199.  United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1952 (2010), S/RES/1952 (29 November 2010), http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1952(2010). 
200.  The Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD), Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264185050-en. 
201.  The draft guideline includes supply chain due diligence in accordance with international standards
202.  Proposal for a Regulation for “setting up a Union system for a supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible 
importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict affected and high-risk areas”.
203.  Global Witness, Seeing the Light: Responsible Mineral Sourcing from the DRC (2014), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/
default/files/Seeing%20the%20Light%20April%202014.pdf. 
204.  Katie Böhme, Paulina Bugajski-Hochriegl and Maria Dos Santos, Assessment of due diligence compliance costs, benefits 
and related effects on the competitiveness of selected operators in relation to the responsible sourcing of selected minerals 
from conflicts-affected area (Germany: European Commission, 2014), 61. A recent NGO study found that over 80% of 186 
European companies surveyed did not provide any public information about the checks they had undertaken to ensure their 
supply chains had not funded conflict or human rights abuses. See SOMO, Conflict Due Diligence by European Companies 
(November 2013), http://somo.nl/news-en/sourcing-of-minerals-could-link-eu-companies-to-violent-conflict (note that 19 of 
the companies surveyed by SOMO (11%) are dual listed in the US and Europe, and so are directly impacted by Dodd Frank 
Act Section 1502).
205.  European Commission, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2011) 681 final (Brussels: 
25 October 2011). Notably, 24 of 28 EU Member States had already developed, or were in the process of developing CSR-
related NAPs and to support Member States, the European Commission set up a process of peer review of CSR NAPs in 2013.
206.  Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/26/L.1. 
207.  Council of Europe, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(2014); Council of Europe, Draft Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on human rights and 
business. For these and an overview of Council of Europe action on business and human rights, see ‘Human Rights Law 
and Policy’, Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/hr_and_business/
default_EN.asp. 
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to the EU’s request, NAPs have, to date, been published by the governments of the UK, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Finland, and are being prepared by a number of others.208 
Civil society organisations and NHRIs have however emphasised the need for greater attention to the 
quality and completeness of NAPs.209 One recent report has highlighted that, given the multiplicity 
of regulations that touch on business and human rights issues indirectly, which can include 
regulation by non-governmental public or private bodies, such as independent regulatory or licensing 
authorities, or stock exchanges, developing a coherent NAP requires a baseline analysis as a “stock-
taking” exercise. The report also calls for NAPs processes themselves to be human rights-based, to 
ensure transparency, participation, and inclusion in particular by groups at risk of vulnerability and 
marginalisation such as indigenous populations, women and children.210
6.1.2 Providing effective guidance 
Existing guidance provided by public bodies to companies on topics such as how to meet equal 
opportunities or health and safety requirements in the workplace, can obviously contribute to 
fulfilment of the GPs. However, a wide array of dedicated guidance for companies on how to respect 
human rights and, in particular, how to implement human rights due diligence, has also been 
produced, directly by governments or with their support. The EU, for instance, has published human 
rights guidance for employment and recruitment agencies,211 the information and communication 
technology (ICT)212 and oil and gas sectors,213 as well as guidance for SMEs.214 Yet, measuring the 
uptake of guidance by businesses can be difficult, making “effectiveness” hard to assess and no 
State, to date, has produced statutory human rights guidance, which companies would be legally 
obliged to follow, even if some appear to be venturing in this direction, through rules on corporate 
reporting, discussed above, and on public procurement, considered below. 
208.  An updated list of published NAPs is maintained by the UN Working Group on business and human rights. See “State 
national action plans”, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx. A brief summary of published NAPs is provided in section 5.3
209.  For recommendations on NAPs to their governments from the NHRIs of France and the Netherlands, amongst others, see 
“National Action Plans”, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-
principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans.
210.  Claire O’Brien et al., National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, 
and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks (The Danish Institute for Human Rights, The 
International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, 2014). This Toolkit is being used by governments and other stakeholders 
to inform and evaluate NAPs processes in a number of countries in Europe and the Americas. See further, “National Action 
Plans UNGPs: an assessment”, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, http://www.corporatejustice.org/National-Action-
Plan-UNGPs-an.html?lang=en.
211.  Shift and the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB), Employment & Recruitment Agencies Sector Guide on 
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (European Commission, 2013), http://ec.europa.
eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr-sme/csr-era-hr-business_en.pdf.
212.  Shift and the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB), ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (European Commission, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/
files/csr-sme/csr-ict-hr-business_en.pdf.
213.  Shift and the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB), Oil and Gas Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (European Commission, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/files/csr-sme/csr-oag-hr-business_en.pdf. 
214.  GLOBAL CSR and BBI International, My Business and Human Rights: A Guide to Human Rights for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (European Commission, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr-sme/
human-rights-sme-guide-final_en.pdf.
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6.1.3 Promoting corporate reporting on human rights
In line with the concepts of sustainability and the “triple bottom line”, social and environmental 
reporting is an established practice in an increasing number of countries. In Asia, India issued 
National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and Economic Responsibilities of Business in 
2011, which encourage companies to disclose responsible business practices on “comply or explain” 
basis. In Europe, France was the first to mandate triple bottom line reporting for publicly listed 
companies in 2001, passing legislation requiring companies to report according to a set of qualitative 
and quantitative indicators on issues such as employee contracts, working hours, pay, industrial 
relations, health and safety, disability policies, community relations and environmental reporting.215 
Since 2004, the Netherlands has implemented benchmarking based on companies’ CSR reporting. 
In Denmark, a non-financial reporting duty for the largest 1,100 companies and Danish State-
owned enterprises was established in 2009.216 The Danish Business Authority periodically evaluates 
the effectiveness of the reporting requirement,217 and provides guidance on implementation for 
companies and auditors, who in turn award prizes for the best CSR reports. In 2012, Denmark set 
new requirements for the same class of companies to report specifically on business respect for 
human rights and climate change.218 In 2013, Norway enacted legislation, requiring companies to 
report on steps to integrate considerations for human rights into their strategies.219
In 2014, after prolonged debate,220 the EU resolved to adopt a new Directive requiring all Member 
States to implement non-financial reporting based on a “comply or explain” model.221 Under the 
Directive, “public interest enterprises” with more than 500 employees must be required by national 
law to report annually on principal risks in relation to human rights, the environment and social 
impacts linked to their operations, relationships, products and services, as well as aspects related 
to bribery and diversity. They must also provide information on relevant policies, any due diligence 
procedures for identifying, preventing and mitigating risks identified, and significant incidents 
occurring during the reporting period.222 Whilst the Directive has been welcomed as a step towards 
greater corporate accountability,223 it has also been criticised for its narrow scope, given that only 
approximately 6,000 of 42,000 large companies incorporated in the EU are covered; potentially wide-ranging 
215.  The law was implemented through regulations adopted in 2012, Grenelle I Act 2009 and Grenelle II Act 2010.
216.  Companies are required to report on social responsibility policies; how these are translated into action; and what has been 
achieved through them during the financial year, or, to indicate that they are not reporting. Instead of including social content 
directly in the annual financial statement, companies can refer to separate corporate sustainability reports, information 
on a company website or a UN Global Compact Communication on Progress. See The Danish Government, Action Plan for 
Corporate Social Responsibility. CSR reports are subject to a consistency check by auditors under the Danish Financial 
Statements Act §135. 
217.  The most recent analysis, undertaken by Copenhagen Business School, showed that almost all companies report on CSR 
(97%), while 41% report on human rights and labour rights — a significant increase from 19% doing so in 2009.
218.  Kingdom of Denmark, Act on a Mediation and Complaints-Handling Institution for Responsible Business Conduct, Act no. 
546, 18 June 2012, http://businessconduct.dk/file/298159/act-on-mediation.pdf. In scope, the requirement extends to 
business relationships.
219.  KPMG, United Nations Environment Programme, The Global Reporting Initiative and The Centre for Corporate Governance 
in Africa, Carrots and Sticks: Sustainability Reporting Policies Worldwide-Today’s Best Practice, Tomorrow’s Trends (2013), 
33–34.
220.  “Non-financial reporting reform on thin ice”, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, http://www.corporatejustice.org/Non-
financial-reporting-reform-on.html?lang=en. 
221.  The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive 2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups, A7-0006/52 (4 August 2014). The Directive will enter into force in 2014 and Member States have 
two years to transpose it into national legislation. The European Commission is required to produce guidelines within one 
year to assist companies in reporting.
222.  Public interest entities (PIE) are defined as listed companies, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and any other 
entity designated by an EU Member State as a PIE. In providing information, companies are to be guided by the GPs, the UN 
Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for MNEs and the ILO Tripartite Declaration on principles concerning multinational 
enterprises and social policy, and risks must be disclosed regardless of what a company considers relevant or “material” to 
the interests of its shareholders. 
223.  “EU Directive on the disclosure of non-financial information by certain large companies: an analysis”, European Coalition for 
Corporate Justice, http://www.corporatejustice.org/On-15-April-2014-the-European.html?lang=en
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exemptions for information224; a weak clause on supply chains — a high risk area for many companies 
— that requires reporting only “when relevant and appropriate”; and the lack of a common reporting 
framework or indicators.225 Moreover, the Directive does not provide for monitoring or mechanisms to 
sanction defaults by companies: auditors need only indicate whether non-financial information has 
been provided, or not.226
6.2 The State-business nexus
6.2.1 Government ownership, control or support
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and corporations acting as State agents are directly obliged not to 
violate human rights. This flows from the State’s role as the primary duty-bearer under human rights 
law, and the doctrine of positive obligations. Individual States have their own rules for determining 
if corporations are State agents at national law, which usually refer to State ownership and control, 
the exercise of public functions or a combination thereof.  The ECtHR relies on a set of criteria to 
determine State agency, which includes legal status, institutional and operational independence, the 
nature of the activity, and its context. Despite clarity over States’ duties in this area, it is one which 
has still seen relatively little action in the wake of the GPs.227
The State duty to protect and positive obligations also oblige States to ensure that companies they, 
control, support, do business with, or rely on to provide essential public services, do not abuse 
human rights. Government support for business can by supplied through bodies such as export 
credit agencies (ECAs), official investment insurance or guarantee agencies, and State-owned 
investments, such as sovereign wealth and public pension funds. ECAs are a significant source of 
official finance and insurance for business activities in developing economies228; OECD Guidance on 
ECAs is contained in the so-called “Common Approaches”, which are being aligned with the GPs.229 
Sovereign wealth funds are State-owned funds that can invest in real and financial assets, including 
stocks, bonds, real estate, or investment vehicles like equity or hedge funds. Often amounting to 
thousands of billions of dollars, their funds accrue from the export by the State of commodities, or 
foreign-exchange reserves.230 While the Norwegian Pension Fund Global was until recently viewed as 
the vanguard of responsible investment practice amongst sovereign wealth funds, with investments 
excluded from its portfolio on human rights grounds by an independent ethical council, in 2014 this 
body was disbanded, a move met with criticism from civil society. 231
224.  For instance, information “impending developments” or where disclosure would be “seriously prejudicial” to a company’s 
commercial position: see proposal, Article 1(3) at page 28 of “Non-financial reporting reform on thin ice”, European Coalition 
for Corporate Justice, http://www.corporatejustice.org/Non-financial-reporting-reform-on.html?lang=en.
225.  The European Commission is however mandated under the Directive to publish within two years non-binding guidelines on a 
methodology for reporting, including general and sector non-financial Key Performance Indicators.
226.  European Coalition for Corporate Justice, Why Is the Corporate Reporting Reform Important? (Media briefing, February 26 
2014), http://www.corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/media_briefing_26-02-2014.pdf.
227.  See generally, Camilla Wee, Regulating the Human Rights Impact of State-Owned Enterprises: Tendencies of Corporate 
Accountability and State Responsibility (International Commission of Jurists, October 2008), http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/State-owned-enterprises-Oct-08.pdf; and Clifford Chance, State 
Immunity and State-Owned Enterprises (December 2008), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/bhr/
files/Clifford-Chance-State-immunity-state-owned-enterprises-Dec-2008.PDF. 
228.  Karyn Keenan, Export Credit Agencies and the International Law of Human Rights (Halifax Initiative Coalition, January 2008), 
http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/ECAs_and_HR_law.pdf; “Working with SOEs”, Human Rights and Business Dilemmas 
Forum, http://hrbdf.org/dilemmas/working-soe/#.VMXg4NLF89Q
229.  229. OECD Council, Recommendation of the Council on Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits and 
Environmental and Social Due Diligence (the “Common Approaches”), TAD/ECG(2012)5 (28 June 2012), http://www.oecd.
org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/ECG%282012%295&doclanguage=en. See also Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights and German Institute for Human 
Rights, Submission to OECD Consultation between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Members of the OECD’s Working 
Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG) (2013), http://business-humanrights.org/en/pdf-submission-to-oecd-
consultation-between-civil-society-organisations-csos-and-members-of-the-oecd%E2%80%99s-working-party-on-export-
credits-and-credit-guarantees-ecg
230. “Fund Rankings”, SWFI, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/. 
231.  Emily Woodgate and Nina Berglund, “Critics Attack Oil Fund Changes”, News in English: Views and News from Norway, April 
4, 2014, http://www.newsinenglish.no/2014/04/04/critics-attack-oil-fund-plans.
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6.2.2 Private delivery of public services 
The State retains the duty to protect human rights when it privatises or contracts with private actors 
for the provision of public services.232 Such services, which can include health and social care, 
housing, education, immigration services, criminal justice and security services, and public utilities, 
such as water, energy and transport, frequently touch directly on the human rights of service users.233 
The government or other public bodies must thus provide for adequate service standards; monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms; adequate human rights due diligence in the context of public-private 
partnerships and privatisations. 
In reality, privatisation of public services has often created the context for abuses, with examples 
abounding in relation to water234 and health,235 in particular, but also with regard to other “core” 
public functions, such as housing, immigration detention and removals and criminal justice.236 Gaps 
in protection arise where, for instance, available remedies for human rights abuses can only review 
public bodies even though the perpetrator is a private company. 
As observed by the UK Parliament’s Committee on Human Rights, this entails a heavy onus on public 
authorities to take appropriate measures to ensure human rights compliance when privatising or 
“contracting out” services. This includes developing and actively disseminating accessible guidance,237 
producing template contracts, and checklists and other tools for commissioning authorities to 
address specific service areas. The Scottish Government, with support from the Scottish Human 
Rights Commission, and the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission, has begun to take steps to 
meet these needs.
6.2.3 Public procurement
The GPs call for governments to “promote respect by business enterprises with which they conduct 
commercial transactions.” Public procurement, also called public tendering, is the procurement of 
goods and services on behalf of public authorities. Government spending in procurement of goods 
and services is a major component of the overall global economy, accounting for an average of 
12% of GDP across OECD countries238 and around one fifth of GDP in the EU.239 Governments thus 
wield great influence over respect for and enjoyment of human rights through their procurement of 
goods and services. This includes their capacity to affect conditions in global supply chains, given 
232.  According to GP5, “States should exercise adequate oversight in order to meet their international human rights obligations 
when they contract with, or legislate for, business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment of 
human rights.” See generally Koon de Feyter et al., Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2005). 
233.  See, for example, Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia, 2012); Antenor Hallo de 
Wolf, “Human Rights and the Regulation of Privatized Essential Services”, Netherlands International Law Review 60, no. 02 
(2013), 165–204.
234.  “How Privatisation Undermines the Human Right to Water”, Public Services International, http://www.world-psi.org/en/how-
privatisation-undermines-human-right-water. 
235.  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, In Defence of Dignity: The Human Rights of Older People in Nursing Homes 
(Belfast: 2012), http://www.nihrc.org/documents/research-and-investigations/older-people/in-defence-of-dignity-
investigation-report-March-2012.pdf.
236.  “Privatisation”, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/privatisation. 
237.  See, for example, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Any of Our Business? Human Rights and the UK Private Sector: 
Government Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2009-10 (Great Britain Parliament, 2010), Vol. 1, HL 
Paper 5-I, HC64-I, paras. 132–150, and Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Human Rights of Older People in Healthcare 
(Great Britain Parliament, 2007), HL Paper 156_I, HC 378-I. 
238.  Note, this figure excludes procurement by state-owned utilities: ‘40. Size of Public Procurement Market’, OECD iLibrary,
  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/gov_glance-2011-en/09/01/index  
html?contentType=%2fns%2fStatisticalPublication%2c%2fns%2fChapter&itemId=%2fcontent%2fchapter%2fgov_glance-
2011-46-en&mimeType=text%2fhtml&containerItemId=%2fcontent%2fserial%2f22214399&accessItemIds. 
239.  Including procurement by public utilities European Commission Annual Public Procurement Implementation Review, SWD 




their status as “mega-consumers” and, therefore, their capacity to “make” and sustain markets.240 
Yet, suppliers of goods to governments have been implicated in the use of child labour,241 forced 
labour,242 interference with the right to freedom of association and to form trade unions,243 and 
breaches of other workers’ rights.244 In Denmark, as a further example, the purchase of Chinese 
granite extracted by labourers working under dangerous conditions, and child labour in the supply 
chain for hospital equipment caught public attention.245
Surprisingly, free trade and “fair competition” requirements under international agreements have 
in the past been perceived as obstructing public authorities’ ability to select suppliers who respect 
human rights over those who do not. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement 
Agreement, for instance, requires a WTO-proof justification of public procurement measures aimed 
at protecting human rights against abuse in third countries, allowing the EU, for example, to take 
action against a US State in response to a law it had passed prohibiting government procurement 
from companies that invested in Myanmar.246 Historically, doubts were also cast over whether 
the principles of free movement of goods, services, capital and people within EU boundaries247 
constrained the authority of public bodies in EU Member States to promote equality, “green,” or 
“ethical” considerations through public procurement.248 
Developments over recent years have however emphasised the constitutional status of human rights 
within the EU legal order, as well as the role of public purchasing in securing sustainable development. 
In this context, a new EU public procurement Directive,249 aims to “increase the efficiency of public 
spending to ensure the best possible procurement outcomes in terms of value for money…”, but also to 
“Allow procurers to make better use of public procurement in support of common societal goals such 
as protection of the environment, higher resource and energy efficiency, combating climate change, 
promoting innovation, employment and social inclusion and ensuring the best possible conditions 
for the provision of high quality social services.” Thus, the new Directive will allow for inclusion of 
societal, environmental or other characteristics in technical specifications of the tender, contract 
award criteria, and conditions for contract performance, including obligations concerning sub-
contractors, and permits public bodies to exclude companies or their bids on human rights grounds.250 
240.  Robert Stumberg et al., Turning a Blind Eye? Respecting Human Rights in Government Purchasing (The International Corporate 
Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), September 2014), http://accountabilityroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
Procurement-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
241.  A 2014 audit at Zongtex Garment Manufacturing in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, which makes clothes sold by the US Army 
and Air Force found nearly two dozen under-age workers, some as young as 15: Ian Urbina, “U.S. Flouts Its Own Advice 
in Procuring Overseas Clothing”, The New York Times, December 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/world/
americas/buying-overseas-clothing-us-flouts-its-own-advice.html. 
242.  In a pending lawsuit, the families of Nepalese workers allege that they were fraudulently recruited by a U.S. defence 
subcontractor, transported to Iraq against their will, and kidnapped by Iraqi insurgents while en route to a U.S. military base. 
The workers’ executions were broadcast on Nepali television: Adhikari v. Daoud & Kellogg Brown Root, et al [2013] United 
States District Court Southern District of Texas No. 09–1237, 1–3. 
243.  “Vaqueros Navarra Background”, Maquila Solidarity Network, http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/node/711.
244.  “A defence contractor that makes body armour and tactical gear failed to pay overtime wages at its factory in Tijuana, 
Mexico”, in Bjorn Claeson et al., Subsidizing Sweatshops II: How Our Tax Dollars Can Foster Worker Rights and Economic 
Recovery rather than Fuel the Race to the Bottom (SweatFree Communities, 2009). 
245.  DanWatch and Danida, Har Du Husket Gummiet? (2013), http://www.danwatch.dk/sites/default/files/documentation_
files/danwatch_2013_-_har_du_husket_gummiet.pdf. 
246.  World Trade Organization, United States — Measure Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS88 (14 February 2000). The 
US legislation in question was later found unconstitutional for other reasons.
247.  “EU Internal Market”, Europa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/index_en.htm. 
248.  Consistency of “social” preferences with the on public purchasers to select the most “efficient” or “most economically 
advantageous tender” (MEAT) was questioned: Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government 
Procurement, and Legal Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 10–14.”source”:”Primo”,”event-
place”:”Oxford ; New York”,”ISBN”:”0199232423”,”call-number”:”K884”,”shortTitle”:”Buying social justice”,”language”:”e
ng”,”author”:[{“family”:”McCrudden”,”given”:”Christopher”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2007”]]}},”locator”:”10-14”,”label”:”-
chapter”}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
249.  On 15 January 2014 the European Parliament adopted a Directive on public procurement (COM (2011) 896) as part of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth (see COM (2010) 2020). 
250.  The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission’s proposed Draft Directive explains that contracting authorities are 
required reject tenders if their low price is due to non-compliance with EU legislation or international law related to social, 
labour or environmental standards, or where a business has been convicted of child labour or human trafficking; optional 
exclusions are allowed where a public purchaser is aware of violations of obligations, by a tenderer, in the areas of social, 
labour law or environmental law.
69
6.3 Conflict-affected areas 
Businesses operating in conflict-affected areas risk becoming involved in human rights abuses 
committed, for instance, by security forces, armed non-State actors or de facto governmental 
authorities. Business activities in conflict and post-conflict zones have increasingly been identified 
as a factor in causing, prolonging, re-igniting or exacerbating conflicts in many parts of the world, 
in spite of their potential peace-building role.251 The GPs call on States to take specific steps in 
relation to businesses operating in conflict-affected areas. GP7 stipulates that States should assist 
businesses to avoid being involved in human rights abuses, with special attention to gender-based 
and sexual violence, while denying public support to any recalcitrant businesses that have been. A 
number of government-backed initiatives are found in the former area. The Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights were the first initiative to attempt to address human rights risks arising 
from security operations as such.252 Subsequently, the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Providers has established practice standards for the private security industry as well as 
an emerging independent accountability mechanism.253 Less encouragingly, the Kimberley Process, 
which established a certification scheme for rough diamonds with the aim of eliminating the diamond 
trade as a source of revenue for paramilitary forces, has become severely criticised with doubts cast 
on its governance and effectiveness.254
6.4 Policy coherence
As discussed, States mostly protect rights-holders against human rights abuses by businesses in 
the same way they do against abuses by public or other non-State actors: through their general 
laws, policy and programmes, rather than through dedicated measures with a “human rights” label 
attached. However, just as they can promote enjoyment of human rights unintentionally, so laws and 
policies outside the human rights or CSR area can, without meaning to, undermine them. Given the 
regulatory and institutional complexity of modern States, and the volume of rule-making that goes on 
bilaterally between States, as well as at regional and international levels, ensuring “coherence” with 
human rights commitments across all policy areas is a major challenge.
The GPs accordingly call for States to map the impacts they may have on business respect for 
human rights, via State organs and practices that influence business practices (GP8); agreements 
concluded with other States or businesses (GP9); and membership of multilateral institutions (GP10). 
In this context, NAPs and national baseline assessments can be an important tool for promoting 
both “vertical” coherence, that is, consistency between international human rights obligations, and 
domestic law, policy and practices, and “horizontal” coherence, in other words, consistency with 
human rights across functional units of national and sub-national government.
6.4.1 Trade
At a macro level, there have been three prominent narratives historically about trade and human 
rights. The first has focused on the impacts of the terms of trade255 on poverty, and poverty reduction, 
in connection especially with tariff regimes for agricultural produce.256 The second has concerned the 
251.  See, for example, Red Flags: Liability Risks for Companies Operating in High-Risk Zones, http://www.redflags.info/, 
“Economy”, International Alert, http://www.international-alert.org/economy , Thorbjørn Waal Lundsgaard, ‘Peace for Sale: 
What Is the Role of Human Rights-Based CSR in the Extractive Industry in Post-Conflict Environments?’, Business, Peace and 
Sustainable Development 2014, no. 3 (June 1, 2014), 73–98.  
252.  “What Are The Voluntary Principles?”, The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.
org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/. 
253.  International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, http://www.icoc-psp.org/Home_Page.html. 
254.  The Kimberley Process (KP), http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/. And James Melik, ‘Diamonds: Does the Kimberley Process 
Work?’, BBC, 28 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10307046. 
255.  Especially border measures, i.e., quantitative restrictions (quotas, embargoes and licensing) and tariffs.
256.  Here, the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy has been a particular target for criticism. See, for example, Mark 
Curtis, Milking the Poor: How EU Subsidies Hurt Diary Producers in Bangladesh (ActionAid Denmark, 2011), http://www.
actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/milking_the_poor.pdf.
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use of human rights clauses in trade agreements, and whether these really serve to promote human 
rights, or should rather be viewed as covert protectionism, with ultimately negative effects for human 
rights in that they stifle developing country exports and depress national and individual incomes. A 
third theme, that of whether trade liberalisation is leading to a global race to the bottom in terms of 
labour standards and social protection, is one that has recently been reanimated in connection with 
the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.257
The EU has exclusive competence on trade policy, excluding independent action in these areas by 
Member States. EU common commercial policy must be conducted “in the context of the principles 
and objectives of the Union’s external action”, which includes human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.258 On this front, the EU applies a Generalised System of Preferences for market access 
granted to developing countries that apply. “Duty-free” market access is granted on a range of tariff 
lines to countries designated as “vulnerable”, and which are implementing and accept monitoring 
under international conventions on human rights and labour standards.259 Serious, systematic 
human rights violations can lead to temporary withdrawal of preferences, as happened in the past in 
relation to Myanmar and Sri Lanka.260
EU “economic partnership agreements” are concluded bilaterally or with groups of countries. 
Generally, these have not mainstreamed human rights.261 Recent bilateral trade agreements, 
however, contain provisions on sustainable development, which can include human rights. Under 
the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the parties commit to respecting, promoting and realising ILO 
Core Labour Standards, and to effectively implementing other ILO Conventions, “to promote foreign 
direct investment without lowering or reducing environmental, labour or occupational health and 
safety standards”.262 Bilateral agreements, and the GSP, are subject to the WTO Enabling Clause,263 
which requires that any restrictions imposed on trade in pursuit of “public morals” are strictly limited, 
especially if the object of protection lies outside the borders of the contracting party.264 
257.  “In Focus: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)”, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/in-focus/ttip/. Jacques Pelkmans et al., EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Detailed Appraisal 
of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014), http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/528798/IPOL-JOIN_ET(2014)528798_EN.pdf; John Hilary, The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Charter for Deregulation, an Attack on Jobs, an End to Democracy (War on 
Want, 2014), http://www.waronwant.org/campaigns/trade-justice/more/inform/18078-what-is-ttip. 
258.  European Union, The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1958), Article 207. Article 205 of TFEU and Article 3(5) 
of TFEU provide EU external action shall contribute to human rights, and external action includes common commercial policy 
and development cooperation. Commercial policy is an area of exclusive EU competence and includes trade agreements in 
goods: Lorand Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005).
259.  The European Parliament and the Council of European Union, Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council (25 October 2012) applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC), 
No 978/2012 (25 October 2012), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/october/tradoc_150025.pdf. The scheme 
includes Pakistan, Mongolia and Armenia. 
260.  The Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 552/97 of 24 March 1997 temporarily withdrawing access to 
generalized tariff preferences from the Union of Myanmar, No 552/97 (24 March 1997), based on labour rights violations; 
The Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 11 June 2009 amending Decision 2008/938/EC 
on the list of the beneficiary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance, provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences 
for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011, No 454/2009 (11 June 2009); The Council of the European 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 143/2010 of the Council of 15 Feb 2010 temporarily withdrawing the special incentive 
arrangement for SD and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 with respect to the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (15 February 2010).
261.  The Cotonou Agreement and many agreements do not contain human rights clauses, and sector trade agreements e.g. on 
fisheries, steel and textile do not: Lorand Bartels, The Application of Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s Bilateral Trade 
Agreements and Other Trade Arrangements with Third Countries (the European Parliament’s Committee on International 
Trade, 2008).
262.  Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, 
of the other part, OJ L 127, 14 May 2011, p.8, Article 1(1), Objectives, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:TOC.
263.  World Trade Organization, Differential and more favourable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing 
countries, L/4903 (28 November 1979) http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm. 
264.  Human rights can be addressed via import and export bans on goods harmful to human rights (e.g., conflict diamonds) 
or a WTO waiver requiring adoption of measures at national level, as used in relation to torture equipment, e.g., Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 gives effect inter alia to the UN Convention Against Torture, prohibiting import and export of 
goods with no practical purpose other than capital punishment or torture, etc.
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Trade agreements, then, can be vehicles for fulfilling the State duty to protect and it should be 
considered how their processes and content could give better effect to government commitments to 
the GPs and other relevant frameworks.265 In this context, a variety of ideas have been ventured, which 
include proposals for a standard human rights clause to be included in EU Free Trade Agreements,266 
that States should undertake human rights impact assessments of all new trade agreements,267 
and for more extensive monitoring and remediation mechanisms to apply during the implementation 
phase.268
6.4.2 Investment 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These primarily protect 
and encourage FDI, and whilst they require companies to comply with national law, rarely do they 
refer to respect for human rights.269 BITs typically also allow enterprises to seek compensation from 
host States through legally binding arbitration (for example, for discrimination or expropriation), the 
legitimacy of which, taking place beyond a host State’s courts, has increasingly been called into 
question, with many emerging economies cancelling or renegotiating BITs.270
State-investor contracts, made between a host State and a foreign business investor for the 
development of specific projects, for instance, in the extractive, energy or agricultural sectors, can 
have significant implications for human rights. Such contracts may stipulate operating standards 
for a project, for example, in the area of security, or set the terms on which the State can monitor 
the project’s impacts. So-called “stabilisation clauses” in such agreements can “freeze” social and 
environmental regulation in the host State, inhibiting the progressive realisation of economic and 
social rights.271 Yet, both BITs and State-investor agreements can, in principle, be drafted to avoid 
such outcomes, with new tools and guidance launched towards this goal.272 
6.4.3 External relations and development assistance 
The GPs call on States to mainstream business and human rights in external relations, which naturally 
includes their membership of international organisations. Some of these, such as the OECD, have 
already attempted to align their standards with the GPs. Others, most notably the World Bank, but 
 
265.  Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) for instance, rely of indicators including Employment, Biodiversity, 
Environmental Quality, Natural Resource Stocks, Poverty, Equity, Health and Education but lack any explicit human rights 
focus.
266.  The proposed clause would read: “respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in the 
[UDHR], and for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and international policies of both parties. Respect 
for these principles constitutes an essential element of this agreement”: Lorand Bartels, “The Application of Human Rights 
Conditionality in the EU’s Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other Trade Arrangements with Third Countries”, European 
Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (2008).
267.  Olivier De Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Addendum: Guiding principles on human rights 
impact assessments of trade and investment agreements, A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (Human Rights Council, 19 December 
2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-59-Add5_en.pdf.
268.  Here, the EU FLEGT scheme could be a model to consider. On a voluntary basis, FLEGT establishes a national licensing 
scheme for legal timber, with “legality” defined with reference to national law but also social responsibility agreements, 
cultural norms, health and safety legislation. A new Regulation applying to all non-FLEGT timber imposes due diligence 
and risk assessment obligations on corporations putting timber into the European market, with fines and sanctions for 
non-compliance. See The European Community and the Republic of Ghana, Voluntary Partnership Agreement Between the 
European Community and the Republic of Ghana on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade in Timber Products into 
the Community (2009). 
269.  Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights (Duisburg: INEF, Institute for Development and Peace, 
University of Duisburg-Essen, 2010), http://humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_
human_rights.pdf. 
270.  See, for example, Ben Bland and Shawn Donnan, “Indonesia to terminate more than 60 bilateral investment treaties”, 
Financial Times, 26 March 2014. The EU has exclusive competence on foreign direct investment as part of commercial policy. 
See The European Union, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 2007/C 306/01 (13 December 2007).
271.  See, for example, Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights (IFC and the United Nations Special 
Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights, 2009). 
272.  See, for example, UN Principles for Responsible Contracts by John Ruggie, providing guidance on matters such as operating 
standards, stabilisation clauses, compliance and monitoring, transparency, and grievance mechanisms for third parties. See 
also, Nora Götzmann and Mads Holst Jensen, Human Rights and State-Investor Contracts (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
Human Rights, 2014).
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also other international financial institutions (IFIs), have not, to loud complaints from human rights 
defenders and affected communities, given a poor track record.273 At least at a high level, the EU 
appears to be taking steps in the right direction: business and human rights is now included in its 
principal human rights policy instrument,274 if not yet systematically in its human rights dialogues275 
and regional partnerships.
Recently, the potential role of the private sector an agent and vehicle of international development 
assistance has been emphasised by a number of national governments in Europe and Asia276 and 
by the EU.277 Since many of the same States have committed to a human rights based approach to 
development (HRBA),278 as well as the GPs, there is once again a clear need for “joined-up” policies, 
to ensure that the implementation of development assistance promotes, and does not undermine 
human rights, in practice.279
7. Working group II: Corporate Responsibility to Respect
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights under Pillar II of the UN Framework requires 
businesses to avoid infringing human rights and to address adverse human rights impacts they may 
be involved in. Businesses should thus seek to prevent or mitigate impacts that they have caused or 
contributed to, as well as those directly linked to their operations, products or services through their 
business relationships, both contractual and non-contractual (GP13).
International law still does not establish direct human rights duties on non-State actors.280 Yet, the 
measures and behaviour required of businesses to fulfil their responsibility to respect human rights 
can and should be provided for by each State’s respective national laws and policies, in all the various 
areas these touch on business activities, from labour, environmental, non-discrimination and product 
safety standards, to those in the areas of intellectual property, privacy, financial sector and essential 
services regulation. In many jurisdictions, businesses do, to a large extent, already respect human 
rights, via this route of compliance with existing legal rules. Yet, this mechanism can be an unreliable 
one: it may assume too much, in terms of the ability, or will, of governments and subordinate public 
 
273.  See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Abuse-free development: How the World Bank should safeguard against human 
rights violations (2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/22/world-bank-ducking-human-rights-issues.
274.  The EU’s Strategic Framework and Action plan on Human Rights addresses business and human rights, and undertakes to 
promote human rights in all areas of EU external action, in particular, “trade, investment, technology and telecommunications, 
Internet, energy, environmental, corporate social responsibility and development policy…”. See Council of the European 
Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 11855/12 (25 June 2012), http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf. A joint EU-African Union workshop on 
“Fostering the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights through regional cooperation” 
was held in September 2014, which could serve as inspiration for Europe-Asia cooperation in future. 
275.  The European Union, EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries (2008), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cmsUpload/16526.en08.pdf.
276.  Australia, for example, recently merged AusAid with its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. See Brian Doolan, “AusAID 
into DFAT: opportunity not threat”, Devpolicy, 14 October 2013, http://devpolicy.org/ausaid-into-dfat-opportunity-not-
threat-20131014/.
277.  The EU’s 2011 Agenda for Change identifies the private sector as a “main partner” in EU development cooperation, and 
in 2014 the EU launched a specific policy to promote the role of the private sector in development: European Commission, 
A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries, COM(2014) 
263 final (13 May 2014), http://www.cosv.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/psd-communication-2014_en1.pdf. The 
latter registers the need to promote responsible business practices and HRBA throughout EU development cooperation, and 
indicates the expectation that EU-based companies adhere to global responsible business standards, such as the UNGC, 
GPs, ILO Tripartite Declaration and OECD Guidelines for MNEs.
278.  Stamford Interagency Workshop on a Human Rights-Based approach in the Context of UN Reform, Statement on a Common 
Understanding of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation (Stamford: United Nations, 2003).
279.  “European Commission Risks Putting Business Profits before the Needs of the World’s Poorest”, Oxfam International, http://
www.oxfam.org/en/eu/pressroom/reactions/european-commission-risks-putting-business-profits-needs-world-poorest. See 
further section 4.4.
280.  See further Section I and Working Group I above and Working Group III below. Note, though, companies are subject to limited 
direct obligations under, for instance, international environmental law, and may also be subject to duties under international 
humanitarian and international criminal law in certain circumstances.
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authorities to regulate business conduct in line with human rights requirements — a tendency which, 
arguably, has been exacerbated by pressure on States to relax regulatory regimes in the context of 
liberalisation and a resulting competition between States for FDI.
Such was the backdrop to the governance “gaps” accompanying globalisation highlighted by the SRSG 
when launching the UN Framework and, accordingly, the GPs asserted the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights as a free-standing, universally-applicable minimum standard of business 
conduct, driven by global social expectation while at the same time based on international law. 
Though sometimes criticised for being a legal “fudge”, seen in this setting, the hybrid status of the 
corporate responsibility to respect can perhaps be understood as a necessary compromise. The 
corporate responsibility to respect recognises the enduring role of States as de jure duty bearer for 
human rights, on one hand, but on the other, the ethically unacceptable limitations imposed by the 
still State-centric structure of international law.
7.1 Human rights due diligence
The GPs afford a central role to human rights due diligence, a process said to enable any corporation 
to achieve full respect for all human rights. A business’ first step, in undertaking due diligence, should 
be to have a published policy commitment to respect human rights (GP15). Thereafter, due diligence 
is envisaged to comprise four steps, taking the form of a typical continuous improvement cycle (GPs 
17–20):
1.  Assessing actual and potential impacts of business activities on human rights — human rights 
risk and impact assessment; 
2.  Acting on the findings of this assessment, including by integrating appropriate measures to 
address impacts into company policies and practices; 
3.  Tracking how effective the measures the company has taken are in preventing or mitigating 
adverse human rights impacts; and
4. Communicating publicly about the due diligence process and its results.
Companies should also take steps to remediate any adverse impacts of their activities on rights-
holders (GP22; see further Working Group III below).
 
This process is said to be adaptable to the specific character and context of any enterprise: companies 
are to adjust the scale and complexity of the measures to meet the responsibility to respect human 
rights depending on factors including size, industry sector, and the seriousness of human rights 
impacts to which the company’s activities can give rise (GP14). 
Also, since the corporate responsibility to respect human rights refers to all internationally-
recognised human rights, not just those in force in any one particular jurisdiction (GP11), in terms 
of scope, human rights due diligence should encompass, at minimum, all human rights enumerated 
in the International Bill of Human Rights, the labour standards contained in the International Labour 
Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and, based on its specific 
circumstances, additional standards, such as those relating to indigenous peoples281 or conflict-
affected areas (GP12).
281.  International Labour Organization, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No 169 
(27 Jun 1989). United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/61/L.67 and Add.1 (13 September 2007).
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7.2 Human rights policies
While it is by no means a foregone conclusion that paper promises are turned into reality, at the same 
time, without an explicit written commitment, systemic change within a business towards respect for 
human rights is highly unlikely. At a minimum, a human rights policy should help to raise company 
awareness of the need to consider human rights impacts, and serve as an entry point for dialogue 
for stakeholders such as workers or communities. According to the GPs, a high-level company policy 
statement expressing company commitment to respect human rights is essential: only Board-level 
buy-in will give a policy the authority needed to permit proper implementation, especially in face 
of any conflict with any conflicting business imperatives. A company’s human rights policy should 
furthermore be public, so that external stakeholders have a proper platform for engagement with, 
and scrutiny of, companies affecting them (GP16). 
Establishing the state of play in terms of business practice in this area can be hard. A paper published 
by the SRSG in 2006 found that, amongst a (non-representative) sample of Fortune 500 companies, 
where respondents were mainly based in the US and Europe, 90% reported having an explicit set 
of principles or management practices in place with regard to human rights.282 A survey of 153 
companies of all sizes and from 39 countries undertaken by the UNWG in 2013 (again based on a 
non-random sample) found 58% with a public statement on human rights.283 But the Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, which has recently begun to document published company policies 
on human rights, currently lists just over 350 worldwide.284 Matters are further complicated given 
that companies participating in the UN Global Compact or stating support for the OECD Guidelines 
for MNEs are also now implicitly committed to respect for human rights. Nonetheless, a 2013 study 
for the European Commission, assessing 200 randomly selected, large European companies, found 
that only 33% referred to the UN Global Compact, OECD Guidelines or ISO 26000, only 3% to the GPs 
themselves, and 2% to the ILO MNE Declaration.285 
Unsurprisingly, the same study found that very large companies (those with over 10,000 employees) 
were more likely to refer to international standards in CSR policies than smaller companies. It also 
detected significant variation between surveyed countries in the likelihood that companies have 
a human rights policy — suggesting that national factors, including government encouragement 
or support, can influence outcomes in this area. From the viewpoint of “early adopters” of human 
rights policies, government steps to promote their adoption by the rest would help to level the 
playing field, so that it should be a business-friendly initiative.286 On the basis of available data, 
it seems clear that more needs to be done by both government and business itself to improve 
performance in this area. 
282.  John Gerard Ruggie, “Human Rights Policies and Management Practices of Fortune Global 500 Firms: Results of a Survey”, 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper, no. 28 (2006), http://www.humanrights.ch/upload/pdf/070706_
Ruggie-survey-Fortune-Global-500.pdf.
283.  Human Rights Council, Addendum: Uptake of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: practices and 
results from pilot surveys of Governments and corporations, A/HRC/23/32/Add.2 (16 April 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A-HRC-23-32-Add2_en.pdf. 
284.  The list does not include company policies referring only to employees or suppliers. See “Company Policy Statements 
on Human Rights”, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/company-policy-
statements-on-human-rights.
285.  Caroline Schimanski, An Analysis of Policy References made by large EU Companies to Internationally Recognised CSR 
Guidelines and Principles. 
286.  Danish Institute for Human Rights, International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, and Global Business Initiative on Human 
Rights, Business Dialogue on National Action Plans: Report of Key Themes (London: 2014), http://accountabilityroundtable.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Business-Dialogue-ICAR-DIHR-GBI-Key-Themes.pdf. 
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7.3 Human rights impact assessment 
Human rights impact assessment (HRIA) is the first step in a due diligence process.287 An adverse 
human rights impact may be said to occur when an action removes or reduces the ability of an 
individual to enjoy his or her human rights. Companies can be connected to adverse human rights 
impacts in a number of distinct ways. They are potentially responsible for: 
 Causing a human rights impact through intended or unintended actions, for example, deliberate 
discrimination in hiring practices, or accidental pollution of a local waterway, interfering with the 
right to health;
 Contributing to a human rights impact, by being one of a number of entities whose conduct 
together curtails human rights, for instance, where a global brand changes its order specifications 
at short notice so that its suppliers breach labour standards in meeting them; and
 Impacts directly linked to a business’ operations, products or services: a company may be 
connected to human rights abuses through its business relationships, including those with 
suppliers, joint-venture partners, direct customers, franchisees and licensees.288
The GPs further indicate that companies should, in the course of performing an HRIA, draw on internal 
or independent human rights expertise; undertake meaningful consultation with potentially affected 
rights-holders and other relevant stakeholders; consider human rights impacts on individuals from 
groups that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalisation, and gender issues; and 
repeat risk and impact identification at regular intervals, for instance, before entering into a new 
activity, prior to significant decisions about changes in activities, and periodically throughout the 
project lifecycle (GP18). 
Yet, the GPs’ guidance on HRIA remains high-level, without detailed descriptions of an HRIA 
process or orientation on how HRIA should be adapted to particular industries or contexts. Various 
initiatives are now attempting to address this, with guidance recently issued, for example, on HRIA 
for particular sectors,289 and for thematic HRIAs, for instance, focusing on the rights of children290 
and indigenous people.291 Some individual companies have devised methodologies for impact 
assessment in connection with specific issues arising in their own operating environments.292 So 
far, only a small handful of HRIAs undertaken by companies have been published,293 with most 
287.  For an overview, see Désirée Abrahams and Yann Wyss, Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management 
(HRIAM) (International Finance Corporation, International Business Leaders Forum and the UN Global Compact, 2010), 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8ecd35004c0cb230884bc9ec6f601fe4/hriam-guide-092011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
See also ‘Human Rights Impact Assessment Tools’, NomoGaia, http://nomogaia.org/tools/.
288.  See further Margaret Wachenfeld and Mark Hodge, State of Play: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in 
Business Relationships (Institute for Human Rights and Business and Global Business Initiative on Human Rights, 2012), 
http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/state-of-play/State-of-Play-Full-Report.pdf.
289.  See, for example, International Council on Mining & Metals, Human Rights in the Mining and Metals Industry: Integrating 
Human Rights Due Diligence into Corporate Risk Management Processes (2012), http://www.icmm.com/page/75929/
integrating-human-rights-due-diligence-into-corporate-risk-management-processes, and IPIECA and the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights, Integrating human rights into environmental, social and health impact assessments. A Practical Guide for the 
oil and gas industry (2013), http://www.humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/tools/integrating_hr_into_eshia.pdf. 
290.  UNICEF and the Danish Institute for Human Rights, Children’s Rights in Impact Assessments: A guide for integrating children’s 
rights into impact assessments and taking action for children (2013), http://www.unicef.org/csr/css/Children_s_Rights_in_
Impact_Assessments_Web_161213.pdf.
291.  See, for example, Johannes Rohr and José Aylwin, Interpreting the UN Guiding Principles for Indigenous Peoples (Berlin: 
IWGIA, 2014),
  http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0684_IGIA_report_16_FINAL_eb.pdf; and IBIS, Guidelines 
for Implementing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (2013),http://www.
socialimpactassessment.com/documents/Guidelines_Implementing_rights_Indigenous_Peoples_FPIC.pdf.
292.  See, for example, Coca-Cola Company, Human Rights Due Diligence Checklists Background and Guidance (2011), 
http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/7d/59/b2a85d9344bdb7da350b81bcd364/human-rights-self-assessment-
checklists.7.14.pdf.
293.  See, for example, Nestlé and the Danish Institute for Human Rights, Talking the Human Rights Walk: Nestlé’s Experience Assessing 
Human Rights Impacts in Its Business Activities (2013), http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/
corporate_social_responsibility/nestle-hria-white-paper.pdf, and On Common Ground Consultants Inc., Human Rights Assessment 
of Goldcorp’s Marline Mine (Vancouver: 2010), http://www.hria-guatemala.com/en/MarlinHumanRights.htm.
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meeting criticism from civil society stakeholders inter alia for the methodology adopted. Thus, civil 
society organisations and NHRIs are also undertaking HRIAs,294 which typically go beyond current 
corporate practice, for instance, in terms of involvement of rights-holders and transparency.295 
Thus, the parameters and process of HRIA under the GPs remain emergent and rather contested. One 
question attracting continuing interest is whether HRIA should be integrated into environmental or 
social impact assessment processes, particularly where these are provided for by statute or licensing 
regulations, or undertaken as a separate, “stand-alone” exercise. Another relates to the issues of 
independence, and equality of arms, in the conduct of impact assessments, and how to achieve 
this given power asymmetries between companies and communities, which may taint assessments 
facilitated by company personnel, but also where legislation provides for community consultation to 
be undertaken by public bodies, who themselves may be, or perceived to be, interested parties in the 
outcome of an HRIA.296 Still further questions relate to the potential future role of strategic or sector-
wide HRIA, mirroring environmental practice297; the role in HRIAs of human rights indicators; and the 
value of risk-based approaches298 and of the notion of “impact” assessment itself.299
7.4 Responding to human rights impacts and remediation
Once an assessment is completed, the GPs call for businesses to respond to its findings, to prevent 
human rights abuses and address any that may have been uncovered. Clearly, such responses will be 
wide-ranging. Internally, a company might need to amend recruitment processes or contractual terms 
for employees, change its purchasing, sales or marketing practices, improve worker accommodation, 
introduce due diligence for land acquisitions, and so on. In addition, ensuring the effectiveness of 
any such changes will usually require the allocation of new resources, for instance, for training and 
awareness-raising, monitoring and management of human rights impacts on a continuous basis.300 
Businesses are expected to address all their impacts, though they may prioritise their actions. Here, 
the GPs recommend that companies first seek to prevent and mitigate their severest impacts, or 
those where a delay in response would make consequences irremediable (GP24). 
Where risks or impacts derive from a company’s business relationships, rather than from its own 
activities, the GPs require it to consider what leverage it has over the entity in question; how crucial the 
relationship is; the severity of the abuse; and whether terminating the relationship would itself have 
adverse human rights consequences. According to the GPs, “leverage” is a company’s ability to effect 
change in the wrongful practices of an entity, be that an element within the company itself, another 
business, or a public actor. Modalities of leverage are thus numerous, ranging from communications 
emphasising human rights by top managers to subordinate units to capacity building and amending 
contract terms for suppliers.301 If a business has leverage, it is expected to exercise it. This will be so 
where impacts are caused by elements within the business itself, in which case it should cease or 
 
294.  See, for example, Brigitte Hamm, Anne Schax, and Christian Scheper, Human rights impact assessment of the Tampakan 
Copper-Gold Project, Mindanao, Philippines (MISEREOR and Fastenopfer, 2013) http://www.misereor.org/fileadmin/
redaktion/HRIA_Human_Rights_Impact_Assessment_Tampakan_Copper-Gold_Project_August2013.pdf.
295.  Rights and Democracy, Getting it Right: Human Rights Impact Assessment Guide, http://hria.equalit.ie/en/ ; ‘Community-
Based Human Rights Impact Assessments’, FIDH, http://www.fidh.org/en/globalisation-human-rights/business-and-human-
rights/7502-community-based-human-rights-impact-assessments.
296.  Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, “Democratizing Resource Governance Through Prior Consultations? Lessons from Bolivia’s 
Hydrocarbon Sector”, GIGA Working Paper No.184 (2012), http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/
wp184_schilling.pdf 
297.  “Sector-Wide Impact Assessments (SWIA)”, Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, http://www.myanmar-
responsiblebusiness.org/news/sector-wide-impact-assessments.html.
298.  Mark B. Taylor et al, “Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk-Based Approach”, Corporate Social (2009) http://www.hks.
harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_53_taylor_etal.pdf.
299.  Richard Boele and Christine Crispin, “Should we take the ‘impact’ out of impact assessment?”, Paper presented at IAIA12 
(2012), http://www.iaia.org/conferences/iaia12/Final_Non_Review.aspx.
300.  See, for example, “Monitoring and Remediation”, Gap Inc. Social & Environmental Responsibility Report 2011|2012, http://
www.gapinc.com/content/csr/html/human-rights/monitoring-and-remediation.html, and “Human Rights”, Nestlé Global, 
http://www.nestle.com/csv/human-rights-compliance/human-rights.




prevent the impact, and provide for, or collaborate in, remediation. Where a company has contributed 
to or is directly linked to impacts, it should cease and prevent its contribution, exercise leverage, if it 
has it, and provide, or cooperate in, remediation. If, on the other hand, the company lacks leverage, 
it is expected to seek ways to increase it, for example, by offering incentives, or applying sanctions to 
the relevant entity, or collaborating with others to influence its behaviour.302 
While the GPs’ concept of leverage appears straightforward, views often differ about its application 
in practice. With regard to the financial sector, banks have tended to emphasise constraints on their 
leverage over those they lend to,303 while outsiders argue that, as controllers of access to credit, they 
wield much greater influence,304 and point to opportunities to piggy-back human rights screening 
on anti-corruption due diligence obligations that are already established in many jurisdictions.305 
Another area of concern is that of companies’ leverage over the use of their products by customers,306 
especially with regard to policing and military supplies, information technology and surveillance 
equipment,307 and dual use technologies. Though the export of such products may be permissible 
under national standards, the GPs require companies to look beyond technical legality in order 
to ascertain whether, in reality, their products or services facilitate human rights abuses.308 More 
complex still is the question of the responsibility and leverage of internet service providers and social 
media platforms to prevent their use as a medium for propaganda and the organisation of criminal 
acts, especially given the need, on the other hand, to ensure any restrictions on free speech are 
lawful, rational and proportionate.309
7.5 Supply chain responsibility
Since large corporations usually have the resources on paper to prevent or remediate impacts in 
line with GPs, for many, the widespread persistence of abuses questions whether they have the will 
to do so.310 Yet chronic abuses may be indicative of the existence of genuine dilemmas about how 
to implement and control standards throughout value chains. For some companies, the production 
302.  John Gerard Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations’ Protect, Respect 
and Remedy Framework, Guiding Principle 19. Cf. Stepan Wood, “The Case for Leverage-Based Corporate Human Rights 
Responsibility”, Business Ethics Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2011), 63–98.
303.  The Thun Group of Banks, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Discussion Paper for Banks on Implications 
of Principles 16–21 (2013), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/thun-group-discussion-
paper-final-2-oct-2013.pdf.
304.  BankTrack and The Berne Declaration, BankTrack on the Thun Group Paper on Banks and Human Rights (December 2013); 
Ariel Meyerstein, ‘Are Big Banks Short-Selling Their Leverage over Human Rights?’, The Guardian, October 31, 2013, http://
www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/banks-short-selling-leverage-human-rights.
305.  See, for example, “Human Rights Guidance Tool for the Financial Sector”, UNEP Finance Initiative, http://www.unepfi.org/
humanrightstoolkit/; “About”, Finance Against Trafficking, http://financeagainsttrafficking.org/. 
306. See e.g.  CSRD et al vs Andritz AG [2014] OECD Watch, http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_326. 
307.  “German Companies Are Selling Unlicensed Surveillance Technologies to Human Rights Violators — and Making Millions”, 
Global Voices Advocacy, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/09/05/exclusive-german-companies-are-selling-
unlicensed-surveillance-technologies-to-human-rights-violators-and-making-millions/.Ben Wagner, Exporting Censorship and 
Surveillance Technology (Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries (Hivos), 2012), https://www.hivos.
org/sites/default/files/exporting_censorship_and_surveillance_technology_by_ben_wagner.pdf; Cindy Cohn, Trevor Timm, 
and Jillian York, Human Rights and Technology Sales: How Corporations Can Avoid Assisting Repressive Regimes (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation [EFF], 2012), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/human-rights-technology-sales.pdf; Dual Use Items: Big 
Business Profits Put before Human Rights, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s21JCGcdDX8; Carola Frediani, ”A 
Global Campaign to Monitor the ‘Digital Weapons’ Trade”, TechPresident, 8 April 2014, http://techpresident.com/news/
wegov/24901/curtailing-international-surveillance-tech-trade.
308.  Francesca Marotta, Request from the Chair of the OECD Working Party on the Responsible Business Conduct (United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 27 November 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
LetterOECD.pdf.
309.  Loek Essers, “Google, Facebook to Discuss Online Extremism at Dinner with EU Officials”, PCWorld, 8 October, 2014, http://
www.pcworld.com/article/2813132/google-facebook-to-discuss-online-extremism-at-dinner-with-eu-officials.html. See 
also Council of Europe, ICANN’s procedures and policies in light of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic 
values, DG2014/12, and other materials available at “Internet governance”, Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/t/
informationsociety/icann-and-human-rights.asp. 
310.  See, for example, “Indonesian Wage Trial: Human Rights Violations ‘Systemic’”, Clean Clothes Campaign, http://www.
cleanclothes.org/news/2014/06/24/indonesian-wage-trial-human-rights-violations-systemic; Janell Ross, “Major American 
Brands Silent on Alleged Rights Abuses At Overseas Factories”, Huffington Post, 21 July 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/07/21/american-brands-abuses-factories-jordan-labor-conditions_n_903995.html.
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process may be relatively static and concentrated311 but for others their contractual networks are as 
dynamic as they are vast, while commodities can present their own distinct challenges in terms of 
traceability.312 
Supplier codes of conduct ranked amongst the earliest business and human rights initiatives and 
pre-date the GPs.313 While uptake of this model by consumer-facing companies was relatively rapid 
in some sectors, strong critiques of practice also quickly emerged, for instance, with regard to 
reliance by third-party auditors on a superficial checklist approach, on one hand, and for lack of 
coordination amongst purchasers leading to “audit-fatigue” amongst inspected businesses, on the 
other.314 Subsequent innovation has aimed to address these problems with, for example, the launch 
of virtual data-sharing platforms315 and an increasing emphasis on capacity strengthening measures 
for suppliers along with other stakeholders.316 
Yet egregious abuses continue. In 2013, over 1,000 mainly female garment workers were killed and 
more than 2,500 injured in the Savar building collapse. Various factors contributed to the “Rana 
Plaza” disaster, amongst them breaches of construction, health and safety regulations and labour 
standards by local suppliers based in the factory, who were suppliers to large numbers of well-known 
European and American brands, and defective inspection arrangements and social audits, on the 
part of purchasers, that failed to pick them up. 
These problems, as well as a broader context of exploitation and marginalisation of female garment 
workers in Bangladesh, were widely documented317 and had contributed to earlier workplace 
disasters.318 The Rana Plaza catastrophe, because of its horrendous scale, attracted unprecedented 
public attention and outrage, and triggered a significant multi-actor mobilisation. Brands were 
convened by the ILO319 and global unions to coordinate an arrangement for the payment of 
compensation to workers. In May 2013, within a few weeks of the tragedy, brands and retailers 
entered into a five-year binding agreement with Bangladeshi and global trade unions. The Accord 
on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh commits more than 150 companies to collaborative 
efforts to ensure safety in almost half of the country’s garment factories, through measures such 
as independent inspections by trained fire and building safety experts, public reporting, mandatory 
repairs and renovations to be financed by brands, a central role for workers and unions in both 
oversight and implementation, supplier contracts with sufficient financing and adequate pricing 
and worker training.320 Other international organisations have sought to support these efforts.321 
 
311.  Many companies rely extensively on single suppliers, for example, Apple/Foxconn: Connie Guglielmo, “Apple’s Supplier Labor 
Practices In China Scrutinized After Foxconn, Pegatron Reviews”, Forbes, 12 December 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
connieguglielmo/2013/12/12/apples-labor-practices-in-china-scrutinized-after-foxconn-pegatron-reviewed/.
312.  United Nations Global Compact and BSR, A Guide to Traceability: A Practical Approach to Advance Sustainability in 
Global Supply Chains (2014), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/supply_chain/Traceability/Guide_to_
Traceability.pdf.
313.  For example, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Fair Labour Association, Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production Program 
(WRAP) and Social Accountability International (SAI) were launched before the GPs: see further Working Group IV.
314.  Jeremy Prepscius, “Building Sustainable Supply Chains”, The Guardian, 6 August 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/blog/building-sustainable-supply-chains.
315.  “Sedex Global partners with World Bank Institute to develop Open Supply Chain Platform”, Sedex, 12 May 2014, http://www.
sedexglobal.com/world-bank-institute-partners-with-sedex-global-to-develop-open-supply-chain-platform/.
316.  See, for example, cases in Shift, From Audit to Innovation: Advancing Human Rights in Global Supply Chains (New York: 
2013), http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/From%20Audit%20to%20Innovation-Advancing%20Human%20Rights%20
in%20Global%20Supply%20Chains_0.pdf. 
317.  Khorshed Alam and Laia Blanch, Stitched Up: Women Workers in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector (War on Want, 2011), 
http://www.waronwant.org/attachments/Stitched%20Up.pdf.
318.  Liana Foxvog et al., Still Waiting — Six Months after History’s Deadliest Apparel Industry Disaster, Workers Continue to 
Fight for Reparations (Clean Clothes Campaign and International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), 2013); Syeda Sharmin Absar, 
“Women Garment Workers in Bangladesh”, Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 29 (July 20, 2002), 3012–16.
319.  International Labour Organization, The International Labour Organization Response to the Rana Plaza Tragedy (2013), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/article/wcms_241219.pdf.
320.  The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety, http://bangladeshaccord.org/; Foxvog et al., Still Waiting — Six Months 
after History’s Deadliest Apparel Industry Disaster, Workers Continue to Fight for Reparations, 29. 
321.  National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, One Year after Rana Plaza (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 25 June 2014), http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/NCP-statement-one-year-
after-Rana-Plaza.pdf. A further initiative led by US purchasers is the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, see “About the 
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety”, Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/
about/about-the-alliance. 
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Yet, various companies have refused to sign the accord, opting for non-binding commitments to 
improved factory safety. Moreover, the Rana Plaza Donor’s Trust Fund, set up under the accord has 
still received only half the US$40 million needed to compensate workers or their families, while only 
half the companies associated with factories in the collapsed building have contributed to the fund 
at all.322 
7.6 Transparency and corporate reporting 
With the rise of ethical investment, and increasing recognition of the materiality of social and 
sustainability issues, in terms of investment risk,323 corporate sustainability reporting, as a device 
by which companies can be held accountable to markets, has become increasingly prominent, to the 
extent that some would suggest there has been a “disclosure revolution”.324 In line with this trend, 
the final step called for by the GPs’ due diligence process is for businesses to “communicate” on how 
they are addressing their human rights impacts.325 This may be done in a variety of ways, including 
formal and informal public reporting, in-person meetings, online dialogues, and consultations 
with affected rights-holders. Information provided should be: (i) published in a format, and with 
a frequency, matching the scope and severity of impacts, and should be accessible to intended 
audiences, for example, company communications should be in relevant languages, address any 
issues of literacy amongst impacted rights-holders and be accessible even to remote communities 
affected by their activities; (ii) sufficient to permit evaluation of the adequacy of company responses 
to any specific impact; (iii) designed not to pose risks to rights-holders or others such as human 
rights defenders, journalists, local public officials or company personnel, or to breach legitimate 
commercial confidentiality requirements. Businesses whose operations or operating contexts pose 
risks of severe human rights impacts are expected to report formally (GP21). 
Measures taken by States and, in the European case, regionally, to encourage or require corporate 
reporting on human rights and supply chain transparency have been discussed above (Section 
6.1). Many such measures are too new to permit a review of their influence upon business practice. 
Voluntary frameworks and guidance on corporate sustainability reporting, discussed next, have 
existed for much longer, and companies are in any case likely to use these to produce sustainability 
reports, whether voluntarily or as a result of new legal requirements.
 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an international not-for-profit organisation. It has developed, 
within a multi-stakeholder process, a comprehensive Sustainability Reporting Framework, comprising 
Reporting Guidelines, Sector Guidance and other resources that provides “metrics and methods for 
measuring and reporting sustainability-related impacts and performance”.326 The GRI ranks as the 
“first-mover” of sustainability reporting and is widely used: European enterprises using the GRI 
Framework to produce sustainability reports rose from 270 in 2006 to over 850 in 2011. 
The GRI has provided basic guidance on reporting on human rights from 2006.327 A 2009 survey 
of corporate reports undertaken for the GRI and the UNGC (which requires participants to include 
human rights within the scope of the annual Communication on Progress328) identified some creative 
approaches by companies to human rights reporting, but concluded that, overall, corporate human 
322.  “Who Needs to Pay Up?”, Clean Clothes Campaign, http://www.cleanclothes.org/ranaplaza/who-needs-to-pay-up.
323.  Margaret Wachenfeld, Investing the Rights Way: A Guide for Investors on Business and Human Rights (Institute for Human 
Rights and Business, 2013), http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Investing-the-Rights-Way/Investing-the-Rights-Way.pdf. 
324.  Paul Hohnen, “The Future of Sustainability Reporting”, EEDP Programme Paper 2012/02 (2012), http://www.chathamhouse.
org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/0112pp_hohnen.pdf.
325.  John Gerard Ruggie, Addendum: Human rights and corporate law: trends and observations from a cross-national study 
conducted by the Special Representative — Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/17/31/Add.2 (23 May 2011), http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31-Add2.pdf.
326.  “An Overview of GRI”, Global Reporting Initiative, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/
Pages/default.aspx.
327.  Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (2011), 32, https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/
G3-Guidelines-Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf.
328. “What Is a COP?”, United Nations Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/index.html.
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rights reporting was weak with regard to the criteria of balanced reporting (that is, presentation of 
both positive and negative aspects of an issue), completeness, and inclusion of the most relevant 
issues.329
Subsequently, GRI’s standard for human rights reporting has been expanded, in line with the GPs. 
Under this, a company is now expected to report on: (i) material issues, namely, those relevant to the 
human rights impacts of the company or operation, considering its sector and location; (ii) human 
rights due diligence, that is, the company’s human rights policy, assessment process; allocation of 
responsibilities for human rights within the organisation; (iii) measures to promote human rights 
awareness, such as training; (iv) monitoring of impacts of company activities; and (v) company 
measures to follow-up and remediate any human rights impacts detected.
In addition, the framework includes a wide set of performance indicators that allow the effectiveness 
of a company’s human rights due diligence processes and remediation to be measured.330 Human 
rights risks are further integrated into GRI’s 10 Sector Supplements — versions of the general 
reporting framework tailored to specific industry sectors, such as airport operators, mining and 
metals, media, event organisers, electrical utilities and also NGOs.331 UNICEF has issued guidance on 
how to integrate child rights into reporting under the GRI Framework.332 Along with the International 
Federation of Accountants, the GRI participates in the International Integrated Reporting Council, 
which aims to establish an internationally accepted, unitary framework for integrated financial and 
sustainability reporting.333 
Doubts are voiced about the value of current reporting practice as an accountability mechanism in 
relation to human rights. It is often thought that the businesses that most need to report on human 
rights, i.e., those with negative impacts, may be reluctant to do so, given commercial sensitivities, 
potential legal liability, and the likelihood of reputational damage.334 If the development of universal 
human rights indicators is seen by some as crucial for comparability across company reports, the 
potential for irrelevance, perverse outcomes and selectivity is emphasised by others.335 Equally, while 
civil society actors are at the forefront of calls for mandatory sustainability reporting requirements, 
they frequently criticise published reports as instruments for “green-” or “blue-washing”, the 
presentation of an unduly favourable image of company impacts on people and the environment, 
following from a selective approach to what information is communicated.336 One solution to this 
dilemma may be independent assurance of corporate sustainability reports. The GPs maintain, 
“independent verification of human rights reporting can strengthen its content and credibility”.337 
329.  Elizabeth Umlas, Corporate Human Rights Reporting: An Analysis of Current Trends (Global Reporting Initiative, The UN 
Global Compact, and Realizing Rights, 2009), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Human_Rights_analysis_
trends.pdf.
330.  Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (2011), 32; and Global Reporting Initiative, G4 Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines (2013), 70, https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-
Standard-Disclosures.pdf.
331.  “G3 / G3.1 Sector Supplements”, Global Reporting Initiative, https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/sector-guidance/
sector-guidance/Pages/default.aspx.
332.  Catherine Rutgers (ed.), Children’s Rights in Sustainability Reporting: A Guide for Incorporating Children’s Rights into GRI-
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Indicators to Measure the Corporate Responsibility to Respect”, Human Rights Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2015), http://papers.
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But the quality and reliability of assurance has also been impugned.338 Ultimately, in this complex 
area, it seems likely that a more potent mixture of mandatory disclosure rules, credible independent 
assurance, and continuing, enhanced investor and civil society scrutiny of company information will 
be needed if reporting’s potential as a lever to improve corporate sustainability and business respect 
for human rights is to be delivered.
8. Working group III: Access to remedies
8.1 Defining access to remedies in the context of business and 
human rights
Access to effective remedy for any violation of human rights is established under international 
law.339 States have the duty to afford remedies that are capable of leading to a prompt, thorough 
and impartial investigation; cessation of violations; and adequate reparation, including restitution, 
compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition. Where abusive activity 
is ongoing, states should ensure interim measures to prevent irreparable harm. Victims have a right 
to a truthful account of the facts and circumstances surrounding human rights violations and unless 
it causes further harm to the victim, public access and transparency to this information should be 
guaranteed. 
Victims therefore must be availed of the means of halting business activities that are harmful to 
their human rights and claiming effective remedy for damage done. Access to remedies is primarily 
addressed under GPs 25 to 31, albeit its substance is signposted earlier on, i.e., GP1 establishes a state 
duty to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress abuses, recognising that 
without such measures, “… the State duty to protect can be rendered weak or even meaningless.”340 
GP13 states the necessity for businesses to remediate adverse human rights impacts, and GP20 
provides that where a company is responsible for adverse impacts, it should provide for or cooperate 
in their remediation through legitimate processes. GP25 reaffirms the state duty to take appropriate 
steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when 
business-related abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction that those affected have 
access to effective remedy. 
The GPs rely on the notion of “grievance”, defined as “a perceived injustice evoking an individual’s 
or a group’s sense of entitlement, which may be based on law, contract, explicit or implicit promises, 
customary practice, or general notions of fairness of aggrieved communities”.341 On this basis, a 
grievance may arise before an actual human rights abuse does. A “grievance mechanism” is “any 
routinised, State-based or non-state-based, judicial or non-judicial process through which grievances 
concerning business-related human rights abuse can be raised and remedy can be sought.” 342 
338.  Alberto Fonseca, “How Credible Are Mining Corporations’ Sustainability Reports? A Critical Analysis of External 
Assurance under the Requirements of the International Council on Mining and Metals”, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management 17, no. 6 (November 1, 2010), 355–70.including how assurors may interpret the 
procedure’s requirements. Directions for further research are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd and ERP Environment.”,”DOI”:”10.1002/csr.230”,”ISSN”:”1535-3966”,”shortTitle”:”How credible are mining 
corporations’ sustainability reports?”,”journalAbbreviation”:”Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt”,”language”:”en”,”au
thor”:[{“family”:”Fonseca”,”given”:”Alberto”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2010”,11,1]]},”accessed”:{“date-parts”:[[“2014”-
,10,19]]}}}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
339.  United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 8; United Nations, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), Article 2; United Nations, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965), Article 6; United Nations, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, A/RES/39/46 (10 December 1984), Article 14; and United Nations, Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, (20 November 1989), Article 39. It is further provided for in a range of international humanitarian and international 
criminal law sources. See also United Nations, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (16 
December 2005).
340.  Ibid.
341.  John Gerard Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations’ Protect, Respect 
and Remedy Framework, Guiding Principle 25, Commentary.
342.  Ibid.
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8.2 Access to remedy through judicial mechanisms
8.2.1 Criminal law
Some States recognise the concept of corporate criminal liability343 but its scope and conditions vary 
considerably across jurisdictions. Some States provide a list of offences to which it applies344; others 
identify when it does not.345 Seventeen EU Member States now provide for some form of corporate 
criminal liability, which usually turns on a company’s failure to act with due diligence to prevent 
certain crimes. Sanctions may include confiscation of proceeds and fines.346 It has been suggested 
that where Member States recognise corporate criminal liability and have ratified the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, corporations may be prosecuted for international crimes, even if 
the Rome Statute itself does not apply to corporate actors.347 
It is still uncommon, however, for companies to be prosecuted for crimes connected to human rights 
abuses. Examples of exceptions include Switzerland, where a gold refiner suspected of money 
laundering was prosecuted in connection with alleged war crimes in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo348. In France, a judicial investigation took place for the sale of a surveillance system to the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya349. In Germany, a complaint was taken up against a timber manufacturer’s 
senior manager regarding abuses by its contracted security forces against a community in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.350 In the Netherlands, it is government policy to discourage Dutch 
companies from investing in settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, viewing these as illegal 
under international law, and the Dutch public prosecutor has confirmed that it considers such 
business activity a potential war crime.351
8.2.2 Civil law 
Civil or private law causes of action against businesses for harm or loss as well as failing to act 
with due care exist in most jurisdictions. Claimants relying on these in relation to alleged human 
rights abuses, however, must adapt their claims to fit private law concepts, substituting, for example, 
“assault”, “false imprisonment”, or “wrongful death”, for “torture”, “slavery” or “genocide”. For claims 
brought in negligence, plaintiffs must show that a company owed them a “duty of care”, which was 
then breached either by the company itself or through the conduct of individuals for whom it was 
vicariously liable, and that this breach resulted in harm.352 An advantage of tort-based claims is that 
343.  “Business and International Crimes”, Fafo, http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/. Regarding European countries, see further 
Clifford Chance, Corporate Liability in Europe (2012), http://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/PDFs/
Corporate_Liability_in_Europe.pdf 
344.  See Indonesia and Japan, ibid.
345. See France, ibid.
346.  Applicable to Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Augenstein, Study of the Legal Framework 
on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union.
347.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 39 I.L.M. 999 (17 July 1998). Article 25(1) restricts 
ICC jurisdiction to natural legal persons. France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, for 
example, criminalise genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes within their national laws. International Commission 
of Jurists (ICJ), Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes: Corporate Complicity & 
Legal Accountability (Geneva: 2008), http://www.icj.org/report-of-the-international-commission-of-jurists-expert-legal-panel-
on-corporate-complicity-in-international-crimes/.
348.  Tom Miles and Emma Farge, “Switzerland Opens Probe into Gold Refiner Argor for Congo Dealings”, Reuters, November 4, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/congo-gold-idUSL5N0IP29K20131104.
349.  International Federation for Human Rights, Amesys Case: The Investigation Chamber green lights the investigative 
proceedings on the sale of surveillance equipment by Amesys to the Khadafi regime (2013), http://www.refworld.org/
docid/511cb668a.html.
350.  “Criminal Complaint Filed Accuses Senior Manager of Danzer Group of Responsibility over Human Rights Abuses against Congolese 
Community”, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), http://www.ecchr.de/danzer-en.html.
351.  Mark B. Taylor, Human Rights Due Diligence: The Role of States — 2013 Progress Report (International Corporate 
Accountability Roundtable, 2013), 11, http://accountabilityroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ICAR-Human-
Rights-Due-Diligence-2013-Update-FINAL.pdf.
352.  Richard Meeran, “Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the 
Position Outside the United States”, City University of Hong Kong Law Review 3 (2011), 1. Under English law, whether or not 
a duty arises is dependent on a three-stage test: (a) was the harm foreseeable; (b) was there sufficient proximity between the 
parties; and (c) is it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care?
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they may reinstate victims to a position that they would have been in — at least in financial terms — 
had the negligence not occurred. They can also create a deterrent against future wrongdoing.353 The 
French Parliament is currently considering a bill that would amend the penal, civil and commercial 
codes to put a duty on French companies to monitor their human rights impacts and take action 
accordingly. Companies would be liable for abuses unless they could demonstrate that they had 
put in place due diligence systems, while a defence to liability would be proof that the company was 
unaware of any activity having negative human rights impacts and that it made every effort to avoid 
such impacts.354
8.2.3 Administrative law 
In some States, administrative law is used to penalise companies for breaching regulations, for 
example, environmental or health and safety regulations.355 Penalties can include fines, restricting 
company operations in specific economic areas, exclusion from public procurement, publicising 
convictions and penalties, and confiscation of property.356
8.2.4 Constitutional law
It is possible, albeit challenging, to find constitutional causes of action for corporate-related human 
rights abuses. Traditionally, constitutional rights have been seen as protecting freedoms from 
excesses of State power. For a constitutional rights claim to proceed in connection with a business, 
then one of the following must apply: i) the constitution must expressly provide that legal persons 
(including corporations) are bound by constitutional rights provisions357; ii) a court must have 
recognised that some or all of the rights guaranteed in the constitution apply directly to non-state 
actors; or iii) the court must recognise: 
a)  that constitutional rights can be extended to a private actor either by virtue of its being an 
agent of the State or because its activities amount to “State action”358; or because it is 
carrying out “functions of a public nature”.359 
b)  that constitutional rights require States to protect rights-holders against third party 
interferences with his or her rights; or
c)  that the court has a duty to uphold constitutional rights, or at least to apply constitutional 
values in deciding cases, even if the actors involved are private parties.360 
Comparative studies highlight a fairly conservative jurisprudence with regard to constitutional rights 
in the private sphere, more so with regard to business-related abuses. Successful cases are few in 
number and confined to restricted areas such as defamation, privacy or labour disputes. Securing 
locus standi is difficult, especially where victims are reliant upon public interest groups to pursue 
 
353.  Ibid. 
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Diligence: A Compliance Standard for Responsible European Companies’, European Company Law 11, no. 2 (2014), 86.
355.  Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Annual Briefing - Corporate Legal Accountability: Executive Summary (2013), 
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/corp-legal-acc-annual-briefing-final-nov-2013.pdf.
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compliance with the law, combined with implementation of an ethics programme and periodic reporting on its progress 
in implementing the designated reform programme. See further: United States Sentencing Commission, US Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (2012), para.8D1.4, page 527, http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/
Chapter_8.pdf.
357.  See, for example, The Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), section 8(2), 8(3) and 
39(2); in India, certain fundamental rights are expressly guaranteed against non-state actors, e.g., Articles 15(2), 17, 23 and 
21. See Surya Deva, Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations — India (International Commission of 
Jurists, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2034813.
358.  Stephen Gardbaum, “Where the (state) Action Is”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 4 (2006), 760. 
359.  The United Kingdom, Human Rights Act 1998 (1998), Section 6(3)(a) and 6(3)(b) http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/
ukpga_19980042_en_1. See further Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human 
Rights Act (The House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2007). 
360.  This German constitutional law doctrine known as Mittelbare Drittwirkung is premised upon the idea that the judiciary, 
as an arm of the state, is bound by fundamental rights in all its operations. See further Eric Engle, “Third Party Effect of 
Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung)”, Hanse Law Review 5 (2009), 165–173.
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cases on their behalf. One positive example, however, is a Seoul High Court ruling in July 2013 that 
Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Corp were liable to pay compensation of 100 million (US$88,000) to 
each of four South Korean workers for “crimes against humanity” and forced labour during Japan’s 
colonisation of Korea from 1910–1945. The court held that the originating company, Japan Iron and 
Steel, had committed acts that were against international law and the constitutions of Korea as well 
as Japan.361
8.2.5 Regional human rights mechanisms in Europe and Asia
At present, there is no regional human rights mechanism in Asia. The response to business and 
human rights issues of regional human rights mechanisms in Europe is discussed in section 
5.1 above.
8.2.6 Barriers to accessing remedy through judicial mechanisms
The GPs identify judicial mechanisms as fundamental to access to remedy but note that their 
effectiveness is dependent upon judiciaries and the judicial systems being impartial, having integrity 
and following due process. Further, GP26 highlights that States must not erect legal, procedural or 
practical barriers to prevent cases from reaching their courts. Yet such barriers exist and typically 
make seeking access to remedy for corporate-related human rights abuses very difficult for victims. 
This is demonstrated, for instance, by the discrepancy between the vast numbers of reported 
business-related human rights abuses and the small number of cases reaching court, and the even 
smaller number that succeed.362 
Whilst identifying a cause of action under domestic law is one challenge, the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens can be another. This allows a court to decline jurisdiction on the basis that the courts 
of another State provide the more appropriate forum, for instance, given the location of the parties, 
witnesses or evidence, or because the courts of the other forum (usually that of the host Statee) are 
more familiar with the applicable law. Studies of cases dismissed on this basis have found that they 
are rarely if ever refiled in an alternate forum.363 Further legal and procedural barriers include the 
“act of State” doctrine, rules on immunity, and statutes of limitations, as well as restrictions on class 
actions or other forms of group litigation.364
Practical barriers to legal redress are highly relevant because many individuals and communities 
impacted negatively by business activities often experience poverty and social exclusion. Such rights-
holders often lack the financial resources needed to pay for lawyers and other costs of filing a case. 
Navigating the legal system can be difficult if victims do not have the requisite knowledge, skills or 
language. Many poor people live in illegality and avoid the legal system for fear of exposure; they may 
mistrust courts, or be unable or unwilling to use legal vernacular to frame injurious experiences.365 
Moreover, human rights lawyers may be inexperienced in dealing with business cases; or lawyers with 
the requisite skills may be reluctant to take such cases on, due to legal uncertainty, financial risks, 
political sensitivity or judicial corruption. 
The complex corporate structures of transnational businesses alongside the doctrine of separate 
corporate personality which raises a presumption against “piercing the corporate veil” to hold a parent 
company liable for the wrongs of a subsidiary presents a critical legal barrier to remedy. Whilst the 
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Grave Human Rights Abuses (Fafo, Amnesty International and Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, 2010), http://www.fafo.no/
pub/rapp/20165/20165.pdf.
363.  Gwynne Skinner et al, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business 
(The International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, CORE, and the European Coalition for Corporate Justice, 2013)
364.  See further Skinner et al., ibid.; and Taylor et al., Overcoming Obstacles to Justice: Improving Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Business Involvement in Grave Human Rights Abuses.
365.  Michael R. Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in LDCs”, 
IDS Working Paper 178 (2003), 16–19, https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp178.pdf.
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mismatch between corporate legal structures and the business reality of economic interdependence 
of companies within a group has been often criticised,366 courts remain hesitant to weaken this 
general rule. As such, parent companies are only rarely held liable at home for the transnational 
actions of members of their corporate group. Exceptionally, a number of negligence actions have 
succeeded in the UK on the basis that a parent company has been responsible for the occurrence 
of human rights abuses in a host State.367 In 2012, a UK court held a parent company liable in 
negligence for harm to employees of one of its South African-based affiliates in the area of health 
and safety.368
8.3 Extraterritorial jurisdiction over business-related human rights 
abuses
For a variety of reasons, victims may try to seek remedies in either the State in which the perpetrator 
company is domiciled (“the home State’) or another State with a basis for taking jurisdiction over 
the case. The GPs take the position that international law does not impose any duty upon States 
to assume responsibility for regulating the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their 
territory by adjudicating such cases; on the other hand, the GPs also state that international law does 
not prohibit States from doing so “provided there is a recognised jurisdictional basis.”369 
Currently, acceptance of jurisdiction and adjudication by home-State courts with regard to 
extraterritorial abuses by companies domiciled or resident in their jurisdiction is very limited. Most 
instances have occurred under the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS), under which US courts have 
applied international human rights standards in cases between private parties on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction over gross human rights abuses.370 Though cases initially focused on torture 
by public agents,371 subsequent claims have raised corporate complicity with State agents in the 
perpetration of human rights abuses.372 A 2013 judgement of the US Supreme Court in case of Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum373 ostensibly sought to limit the ATS as an avenue of recourse for victims of 
business-related abuses, though later decisions of the US lower courts indicate that this route may 
not be entirely closed off for the future.374
8.3.1 Extraterritorial adjudication in Europe
In general, the scope of application of the ECHR, like other treaties, is territorial, and “jurisdiction” 
under Article 1 refers to the national territory of contracting States. Despite the obligation upon 
366.  See, for example, Jodie A. Kirshner, “Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?: 
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute”, Berkeley Journal of International Law 30 (2012), http://scholarship.
law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol30/iss2/1 
367.  Richard Meeran, “Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position 
Outside the United States”.
368.  Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
369.  John Gerard Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations’ Protect, Respect 
and Remedy Framework, Guiding Principle 9. para.4.
370.  The ATS provides that US district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
371.  In 1980, in the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, two Paraguayan nationals present in the US successfully used the ATS to sue 
another Paraguayan citizen for torture he had perpetrated on them in Paraguay: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala [1980] 630 F 2d 876, 
878 (2d Cir.). 
372.  See, for example, Doe v. Unocal [2002] 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir.), opinion vacated and reh’g en banc granted; Doe v. Unocal 
[2003] 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.). 
373.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co and Shell Transport and Trading Company Plc [2013] 133 S. Ct. 1659. In this case, 12 
Nigerian nationals resident in the US made a claim against the companies on the basis that their Nigerian subsidiary had 
enlisted, aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in committing crimes against humanity, arbitrary arrest and detention 
and acts of torture. In a majority opinion, the US Supreme Court held that where a statute makes no clear indication of 
extraterritoriality, as is the case in the ATS, there is a presumption against its extraterritorial application, while also noting that 
prudential concerns about judicial interference in foreign policy are particularly strong in ATS litigation. It was held however 
that where claims “touch and concern the territory of the United States”, and do so with sufficient force, this may displace 
the presumption.
374.  See Al Shamari v. CACI, in which four Iraqi torture victims brought a claim against a US-based private contractor for providing 
interrogation services at Abu Ghraib prison. See: “Al Shimari v. CACI et al.”, Center for Constitutional Rights, http://ccrjustice.
org/alshimari.
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Member States to provide an effective remedy,375 it is only in exceptional circumstances that the 
ECtHR will accept jurisdiction over acts or omissions performed or producing effects outside a State’s 
territory.376 
The Brussels I Regulation/Lugano Convention allows companies domiciled in one EU Member State 
to be sued in that State for damages caused by harms occurring in another State covered by the 
Regulation.377 European States must also recognise and enforce judgments for civil damages entered 
by other States. These rules have provided a platform for a handful of corporate-related human 
rights cases. In People of Nigeria v. Shell,378 a Netherlands court accepted jurisdiction over three 
cases in which Nigerian fisherman and farmers claimed that Royal Dutch Shell had been negligent 
in overseeing oil production by its Nigerian subsidiary. In Yao Essaie Motto v. Trafigura Ltd,379 a UK 
court exercised jurisdiction over a claim against a British company for its role in dumping toxic waste 
in the Ivory Coast.
While the Brussels I Regulation currently does not confer jurisdiction on EU Member State courts 
over claims lodged against third-country subsidiaries and contractors of European corporations, the 
laws of some European States do allow claimants to sue these entities if they can be considered a 
necessary or proper party to the claim. For example, the foreign subsidiary of a UK-based mining 
company was joined as a co-defendant to a claim brought in the UK courts by Peruvian nationals for 
alleged complicity with the government in using violence against protestors.380 In Germany, § 23(1) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure confers civil courts jurisdiction over monetary claims if the defendant’s 
assets are located within Germany. In the Netherlands, if there is a possibility that a Dutch-domiciled 
parent company can be held liable, then its foreign subsidiaries can come under the jurisdiction of 
the Dutch court. Additionally, the principle of forum necessitates determines grounds for the exercise 
of international civil jurisdiction over claims that would normally not fall within national courts’ 
jurisdiction if effective opportunities to bring those claims in foreign fora are absent.
8.3.2 Extraterritorial adjudication in Asia
To date, no court in Asia has adjudicated over extraterritorial corporate-related human rights abuses. 
One development to note though is the Singaporean Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014.381 This 
establishes criminal and civil liability, and significant penalties, for business entities whose activities 
cause haze which results from burning of forests and peatlands in neighbouring countries.382 Section 
4 of the Act states that it “shall extend to and in relation to any act or thing outside Singapore which 
causes or contributes to any haze pollution in Singapore,” entailing liability even for foreign companies 
without assets in Singapore. Note however, that liability derives from harm caused in Singapore, 
which presents a different situation from the extraterritoriality cases described above where the 
harm occurred outside of the jurisdiction of the court approached. 
375.  European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Article13.
376.  See, for example, Al Skeini and Others v. UK [2011] ECHR–GC, §§ 131 et seq; Jörg Polakiewicz, “Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect Human Rights: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe and Japan”.
377.  The Council of the European Union, Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, No 44/2001 (22 December 2000); Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2007 OJ L339/3 (30 Oct 2007). 
378.  Oguru v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2009] Court of the Hague, Docket Number HA ZA 09-579 (Neth.). See, e.g., Milieudefensie, 
The People of Nigeria Versus Shell: The Course of the Lawsuit, https://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/factsheets/the-course-
of-the-lawsuit/view.
379. Motto & Ors v. Trafigura Ltd & Anor [2011] EWHC 90206 (Costs) (29 June 2011).
380. Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals Plc, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475.
381.  The Republic of Singapore, Transboundary Haze Pollution Bill, No. of 2014 (2014), https://www.reach.gov.sg/Portals/0/
EConsult/144/Draft%20Transboundary%20Haze%20Pollution%20Bill%202014%20Public%20consultation.pdf.
382.  Civil liability is incurred if any person in Singapore (a) sustains any personal injury, contracts any disease, sustains any mental 
or physical incapacity or dies; (b) sustains any physical damage to property; or (c) sustains any economic loss, including a loss 
of profits. An entity will be criminally liable if it: (i) engages in conduct, or condones conduct by another entity, which causes 
or contributes to haze pollution in Singapore; (ii) manages another entity which owns or occupies land overseas, if that other 
entity engages in conduct, or condones the conduct of another, which causes or contributes to haze pollution in Singapore. 
Fines of up to S$100,000 may be imposed for each day that the Pollution Standard Index (PSI) threshold is crossed, up to an 
aggregate fine of S$2 million.
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A second example in Asia of a trans-boundary case relates to the Laotian-based Xayaburi Dam which, 
once built, will supply most of its power output to the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT). In June 2014, the Thai Supreme Administrative Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear a case 
filed by Thai villagers living along the Mekong River against EGAT and four other government bodies, 
who claim that environmental and health impact assessments were inadequate thus invalidating 
relevant government agreements relating to the construction of the dam and the electricity supply.383 
8.3.3 The viability of judicial mechanisms for business-related human rights abuses
Whilst an “expanding web of liability” exists to potentially close some of the current “gaps” in remedy 
for corporate-related human rights abuses, this does not yet translate into effective systems of 
remedy. According to Zerk, “… in practice, from the perspective of those seeking to hold companies 
to account, the system is patchy, uneven, often ineffective, and fragile.”384 The use of extraterritorial 
adjudication also remains controversial. It can provide redress for victims where this would otherwise 
be lacking; and can also contribute to deterrence and generally strengthen respect for human rights 
and the rule of law. Arguably, however, it can distract from efforts to strengthen local access to 
justice, regulation and good governance in states where abuses take place. It may also encroach on 
their sovereignty and, by drawing courts into such matters, carry risks in the areas of foreign policy 
and diplomacy.385
8.4 State-based non-judicial mechanisms 
Even effective, well-resourced judicial systems cannot address all wrongs. Sometimes a judicial 
remedy is not required or favoured by claimants. GP27 highlights state-based non-judicial 
mechanisms as an important complement to judicial remedies in these situations. Expanding the 
mandate of administrative, legislative and other non-judicial mechanisms — which may be “mediation-
based, adjudicative or follow other culturally appropriate and rights-compatible processes…” — is 
recommended by the GPs. The GPs specifically highlight NHRIs and National Contact Points under the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
NHRIs are independent bodies established by national law or constitutions to promote and protect 
human rights, for instance, through monitoring, investigations, research and education.386 The 
UNHRC recognises that the mandate of NHRIs includes business and human rights387 and NHRIs 
are increasingly putting this mandate into action both in Europe and Asia.388 The Scottish and 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissions, for example, have considered the issue of public 
383.  “Justice for the Mekong – Thai Villagers Back to Court”, Chiangrai Times, June 22, 2014, http://www.chiangraitimes.com/
justice-for-the-mekong-thai-villagers-back-to-court.html.
384.  Jennifer Zerk, Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a Fairer and More Effective System of Domestic 
Law Remedies (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/
issues/business/domesticlawremedies/studydomesticelawremedies.pdf. 
385.  Nadia Bernaz, “Enhancing Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations: Is Extraterritoriality the Magic Potion?”, 
Journal of Business Ethics 117, no. 3 (2013), 508.
386.  United Nations General Assembly, Principles relating to the status of National Institutions (Paris Principles), Resolution 
48/134 (4 March 1994), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/116/24/PDF/N9411624.pdf?OpenElement.
387.  United Nations General Assembly, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/
HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1, (15 June 2011).
388.  In 2010, NHRIs’ International Coordinating Committee issued its Edinburgh Declaration (”The 2010 Edinburgh Declaration 
[10th Biennial Conference of the ICC]”, International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights), http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/BusinessHR/Pages/10th%20%20Biennial%20
Conference%20of%20the%20ICC.aspx, and subsequently both the Asia Pacific Forum of NHRIs and European Network 
of NHRIs have developed regional action plans on business and human rights: “NHRI Capacity Building”, International 
Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC), http://nhri.
ohchr.org/EN/Themes/BusinessHR/Pages/Capacity%20Building.aspx. Business and Human Rights: A Guidebook for 
NHRIs was published on behalf of the ICC in 2013: Nora Götzmann and Claire Methven O’Brien, Business and Human 
Rights: A Guidebook for National Human Rights Institutions (International Coordinating Committee of National Human 
Rights Institutions and Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2013), http://www.humanrights.dk/publications/business-
and-human-rights.
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procurement.389 India’s National Human Rights Commission, in focusing on labour standards, has 
developed a specific approach to responding to suspected bonded labour, using a combination of 
its powers to trigger inspections by relevant agencies, alternatively to inspect businesses itself and, 
where needed, issue discharge certificates to free workers and organise their rehabilitation, and take 
legal action against employers.390 
In Asia, victims of abuses are increasingly seeking out NHRIs as a means of accessing remedy. Between 
2007 and 2012, the Malaysian NHRI, SUHAKAM received 39 complaints against logging companies, 
plantations, security and finance companies for trespass and damage to native customary land as a 
result of logging activities, denial of rest days for employees, late payment of salary, unfair dismissal. 
Similarly, 1,009 of the 5,422 human rights cases handled by Komnas HAM, the Indonesian Human 
Rights Commission in the period January–November 2012 were complaints against businesses in 
areas such as land and labour disputes. Victims are also starting to file complaints with the NHRI of 
the State where the perpetrating company is based.391 
Countries adhering to the OECD Guidelines are required to have an NCP to promote respect for the 
Guidelines and to handle complaints about breaches by corporations, which some NCPs approach 
through mediation and conciliation.392 As a result of sustained civil society campaigns393 and OECD 
support for capacity strengthening, NCPs are adopting more proactive approaches to human rights 
issues. For example, the Italian NCP, together with the OECD Secretariat, have taken steps to promote 
coherence amongst OECD registered companies operating in Myanmar.394 Further, the Norwegian NCP 
has undertaken a full investigation of alleged abuses of indigenous peoples’ rights by a Norwegian 
mining company in the Philippines.395
8.5 Non-State-based grievance mechanisms
The GPs promote non-State-based grievance mechanisms on the basis that they can offer a remedy 
to victims where grievances do not raise actionable matters of law. They can be faster and cheaper 
than legal action; they can provide an “early warning system” about potential abuses before situations 
escalate, and they provide a means of enabling companies to improve stakeholder relationships 
whilst empowering communities to engage effectively with companies.396 The GPs identify two 
categories of such mechanisms: (a) regional or international human rights bodies and (b) operational 
or project-level grievance mechanisms designed and administered either by the company alone or 
with its stakeholders, or by an industry association or a multi-stakeholder group (see section 9).397 
GP28 establishes that States are to facilitate access to these mechanisms. GP31 sets out eight 
389.  “Our Work”, Scottish Human Rights Commission, http://scottishhumanrights.com/ourwork; and Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission, Public Procurement and Human Rights in Northern Ireland (Belfast, 2013), http://www.nihrc.org/
uploads/publications/NIHRC_Public_Procurement_and_Human_Rights.pdf.
390.  National Human Rights Commission, Business And Human Rights: The Work of the National Human Rights Commission of 
India On the State’s Duty to Protect (New Delhi: 2014).
391.  For example, villagers from Cambodia and Thailand, along with their NGO representatives, delivered a complaint to SUHAKAM 
raising human rights and environmental concerns about the work of Malaysian company, Mega First, on the Don Sahong 
Dam project in Laos. “No Fish, No Food: NGO Coalition Files Complaint Against Don Sahong Dam Developer”, EarthRights 
International, http://www.earthrights.org/media/no-fish-no-food-ngo-coalition-files-complaint-against-don-sahong-dam-
developer
392.  The OECD hosts a database of “specific instances”, the term for complaints. See “Database of specific instances”, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/.
393.  OECD Watch has led a long campaign for improved handling of specific instances by NCPs: OECD Watch, http://oecdwatch.
org/.
394.  “The Italian NCP in Myanmar”, Punto Di Contatto Nazionale, http://pcnitalia.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/en/news/item/285-
the-italian-ncp-in-myanmar.
395.  Jill Shankleman and Susan Tamondong, Report of the fact-finding mission to Mindoro, the Philippines (Royal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2013), http://www.responsiblebusiness.no/files/2013/12/intex_fivh_fact_finding2.pdf 
396.  Emma Wilson and Emma Blackmore, Dispute or Dialogue? Community Perspectives on Company-Led Grievance Mechanisms 
(International Institute for Environment, 2013), http://pubs.iied.org/16529IIED.html.
397.  See Human Rights & Grievance Mechanisms, http://grievancemechanisms.org/ and Access Facility, a descriptive database 
of non-judicial mechanisms and case stories: ACCESS Facility, http://www.accessfacility.org/. See also: Shift, Remediation, 
Grievance Mechanisms and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights (New York: 2014), http://shiftproject.org/
sites/default/files/May%202014%20Shift%20BLP%20Workshop%20Report%20Remediation.pdf
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criteria for ensuring their effectiveness. These are their legitimacy, accessibility and predictability, 
fairness and equitability between parties, transparency, rights compatibility, continuous learning and 
the requirement that such mechanisms be based upon engagement and dialogue as a means for 
addressing the grievance and delivering effective remedy.
Practical experiences have, however, raised concerns about non-State-based operational-level 
grievance mechanisms. Where national legislation does not comply with human rights standards, 
remedies provided may not be compatible with human rights. Victims may be offered (and they may 
accept) compensation that does not reflect the damage caused or their entitlement, for instance, to 
restitution, other human rights and cultural preferences.398 Confidentiality may hinder the deterrent 
effect, and non-judicial mechanisms may be ill-equipped to address gross and systemic human 
rights abuses. This last concern arose in relation to the Olgeta Meri Igat Raits (“All Women Have 
Rights”) Framework of Remediation Initiatives established by Barrick Gold to address sexual violence 
against women committed by security officers around its Porgera Joint Venture mine in Papua New 
Guinea.399 Local women who were sexually assaulted were offered monetary compensation, health 
and education services, but only if they waived their legal rights to sue the company in future.400 The 
legitimacy of this approach and its impact on State law enforcement has been heavily questioned.401
8.6 Improving access to remedy
In light of the legal, procedural and practical barriers highlighted in this section, there are important 
debates about what steps should be taken to ensure effective access to remedy. Some take the 
view that solutions lie at the national level. A recent report recommends that States should legislate 
to establish criminal and civil liability for companies that fail to implement due diligence policies, to 
provide for collective redress mechanisms, and for legal aid to be extended to victims of corporate 
human rights abuses occurring outside the territory.402 Currently, the only means of punishing 
businesses in many jurisdictions is through fines, which may be inadequate for a variety of reasons: 
they may not necessarily have the desired deterrent value; the liability to pay does not always rest 
upon the entity that is ultimately responsible, and they may viewed as not being commensurate with 
serious human rights abuses.403 One proposal has been that companies found guilty of such abuses 
should have their right to operate withdrawn.404 Access to information, disclosure and transparency 
are critical, as victims need to be aware of their human rights and of available remedies in order to 
pursue them. Most recognise the importance of building the capacity of public authorities, business 
enterprises and civil society to better prevent abuses in the first place. A recent UNHRC resolution 
requested OHCHR to continue to work on domestic law remedies for gross human rights abuses and 
asked the UNWG to launch an inclusive and transparent consultative process to facilitate the sharing 
of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, both judicial and non-judicial, and to 
consider the benefits and limitations of a legally binding instrument.405 
398.  ACCESS Facility and the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Expert Meeting Report: ACCESS to 
Remedy in Context of Business and Human Rights: Improving the Effectiveness of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms, (The 
Hague: April 3, 2014), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Report%20Expert%20Meeting%20
on%20Grievance%20Mechanisms_ACCESS%20Facility_The%20Hague_%203-4%20April%202014_0.pdf
399.  Barrick Gold Corporation and the Porgera Joint Venture, Olgeta Meri Igat Raits (“All Women Have Rights”): A Framework of 
Remediation Initiatives in Response to Violence against Women in the Porgera Valley (2012), http://www.barrick.com/files/
porgera/Framework-of-remediation-initiatives.pdf.
400.  Jonathan Kaufmann, Letter to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 
2013), http://business-humanrights.org/en/doc-letter-to-un-ohchr-regarding-the-porgera-joint-venture-remedy-framework.
401.  Sarah Knuckey, “On Australia’s Doorstep: Gold, Rape, and Injustice”, The Medical Journal of Australia 199, no. 3 (2013).
402.  Gwynne Skinner et al., The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business. 
403.  Jennifer Zerk, Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a Fairer and More Effective System of Domestic 
Law Remedies.
404.  Email communication with Sif Thorgeirsson, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 11 September 2014.
405.  Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/26/L.1.
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The UNWG can and has received communications from alleged victims. It cannot however adjudicate 
on these nor impose sanctions, only exhort States and companies to prevent or redress abuses.406 
Hence, the proposals for international agreements to oblige States to provide remedies in either 
national criminal or civil law for business-related abuses (see section 2.2). One focus, encouraged 
by the SRSG, has been the idea of a treaty to criminalise corporate conduct leading to “serious” 
or “gross” human rights abuses, taking inspiration from the UN Convention Against Corruption.407 
A more recent idea has been for a tribunal of experts to hear and apply civil law principles and 
alternative dispute resolution methods such as arbitration and mediation to resolve cases involving 
corporate-related human rights abuses.408
9. Working group IV: Multi-stakeholder collaboration
9.1 Defining multi-stakeholder initiatives and Corporate  
      Responsibility Coalitions
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) involve companies, other non-State actors such as NGOs and 
sometimes governments and public bodies in setting standards with regard to the social and 
environmental dimensions of business behaviour, and contributing to aspects of good governance, 
including transparency, participation and accountability. By alternative means of ensuring compliance 
by corporate actors with human rights standards, for handling grievances arising from alleged 
violations and for broadly securing businesses’ social license to operate in a globalised context, they 
can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for managing the human rights impacts of global corporate 
activity.409 Corporate responsibility coalitions are another alternative governance mechanism used to 
address human rights. These may be defined as “independent, non-profit membership organisations 
that are composed mainly or exclusively of for-profit businesses that have a board of directors 
composed predominantly or only of business people; that are core-funded primarily from business; 
and whose purpose is to promote responsible business practice.”410 According to one study, such 
coalitions can have the following impacts: first, they may raise awareness and make the case for 
responsible business; second, they can help companies to embed responsible practices into core 
operations and value chains; third, they may support the development of common visions and 
agendas for action; and fourth, they can constitute a platform for collective action to drive scale and 
systemic change.411
9.2 Rationales for MSIs
Both the models discussed above reflect a broader trend towards private rule-making. Indeed, 
a shift away from State-based regulation has been viewed by some as inevitable in a globalised, 
transnational, multi-sector world,412 where a “regulatory fracture” within the global economy puts 
highly globalised systems of production beyond individual States’ regulatory reach.413 Some 
 
406.  UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights’ work in 
handling individual cases of alleged violations and abuses (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2014) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/WGBrief_Communications_with_States_and_non-State_
actors_12.03.2014.pdf. 
407.  The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, Recommendations on Follow-up to the Mandate (2011), 5, http://business-humanrights.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-special-mandate-follow-up-11-feb-2011.pdf.
408.  Claes Cronstedt et al., An International Arbitration Tribunal on Business and Human Rights (2014), http://www.l4bb.org/
news/IntlArbTribunal25Feb2014.pdf.
409.  Peter Utting, “Introduction: Multi-stakeholder regulation from a development perspective”, in Darryl Reed et al. (eds.), 
Business Regulation and Non-State Actors: Whose standards? Whose development? (London: Routledge, 2012). 
410.  David Grayson and Jane Nelson, Corporate Responsibility Coalitions: the past, present and future of alliances for sustainable 
capitalism (Stanford University Press and Greenleaf Publishing, 2013). 
411.  Ibid.
412.  Maurits Barendrecht et al., Rulejungling: When Lawmaking Goes Private, International and Informal (HiiL, 2012), http://www.
hiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/HiiL_TrendReport2_compleet_041012_DEF%20(2).pdf.
413.  Boaventura de S Santos and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, “Law, Politics and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic 
Globalisation”, in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalisation from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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perceive States and intergovernmental organisations as now lacking the institutional capabilities 
and capacities to address problems satisfactorily. Others view an increase in non-State regulatory 
instruments as being driven by a rise of neo-liberal policies.414 Yet others suggest that their 
appearance is as a result of pressure from transnational advocacy movements seeking new means 
of holding corporations to account for social and environmental “externalities”. Their emergence have 
also been attributed to a corporate imperative to respond quickly with risk management tools that are 
capable of deflecting State-based regulation, quelling reputational damage and ensuring the viability 
of business operations in the face of social resistance.415
According to the SRSG, MSIs are a necessary “gap-filler” that can help to manage corporate activities 
that slip through existing frameworks, either by design or default416; some suggest this to be the 
case apropos the steady marginalisation of labour in the management of production and workplace 
relations over recent decades.417 The purpose of human rights and business MSIs is, according to 
this view, to allocate shared responsibilities and establish mutual accountability mechanisms for 
human rights within complex networks that can include any combination of host and home States, 
corporations, civil society actors, industry associations, international institutions and investor groups.
9.3 Scope of MSIs
Current MSIs encompass a range of activities including: norm-development and standard-setting, 
monitoring, verification and certification, awareness-raising, providing a platform for sharing 
dilemmas, analysing problems and finding collaborative solutions; encouraging experimentation 
with forms of collaborative governance; promoting learning and capacity-building; and providing 
grievance mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution.418 In pursuing these tasks, most MSIs 
rely on collaborative approaches.419 Whereas early MSIs concentrated upon working conditions in 
global supply-chains and the extractive sector, today a variety of initiatives exist to tackle issues for 
wide range of specific industries or issues. Alternatively, some bring together companies, civil society 
and governments to dialogue and act on a whole plethora of sustainability and human rights related 
issues, for example, the UN Global Compact. 
MSIs may require their members to comply with relevant national laws, or alternatively, to 
meet standards going beyond current national legal requirements by referencing international 
standards such as the UDHR or ILO Conventions. Certain MSIs may be grouped into a category 
characterised as “non-State market-driven” governance systems. The key characteristics of these 
sorts of regimes are that they: (i) create binding and enforceable internal rules for their members 
or stakeholders; (ii) set standards and monitor compliance with both standards and internal 
rules; (iii) may provide certification for a product or service following monitoring and verification 
processes; and (iv) may have a grievance mechanism or dispute resolution procedure. Some argue 
that these MSIs “offer the strongest regulation and potential to socially embed global markets.”420 
Examples include the Forest  Stewardship Council (FSC),421 the Fair Labor Association,422 the Ethical 
414.  Tim Bartley, “Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel 
and Forest Product Fields”, Politics and Society 31 (2003).
415.  Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, “Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?”, World Politics 
56(1) (2003), 1–42.
416.  John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business. See also Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
417.  Claire Methven O’Brien, “Reframing Deliberative Cosmopolitanism: Perspectives on Transnationalisation and Post-
national Democracy from Labor Law — Parts I/II”, German Law Journal 9 (2008), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/
index.php?pageID=11&artID=983, and Claire Methven O’Brien, “The UN Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights: re-embedding or dis-embedding transnational markets?”, in Christian Joerges and Joseph Falke (eds.), Karl Polanyi, 
Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (Oxford: Hart, 2011). 
418.  See Mariette van Huijstee, Multistakeholder Initiatives: A strategic guide for civil society organizations (Amsterdam: SOMO, 
2012); Scott Jerbi, Assessing the roles of multi-stakeholder initiatives in advancing the business and human rights agenda 
(International Review of the Red Cross, 2012), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review-2012/irrc-
887-jerbi.htm; MSI Integrity, http://www.msi-integrity.org/.
419.  Scott Jerbi, Assessing the roles of multi-stakeholder initiatives in advancing the business and human rights agenda.
420.  on and Governance 1 (2007).
421.  See Forest Stewardship Council, https://us.fsc.org/.
422.  See Fair Labor Association, http://www.fairlabor.org.
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Trading Initiative,423 the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil424 and others established specifically to 
regulate primary commodity industries. 
Within this category of MSIs, participating companies respond primarily to the need to ensure 
that the goods or services they sell are not disadvantaged in the marketplace through association 
with bad environmental or social impacts; alternatively that their goods and services benefit from 
association with good practices and impacts. Non-State market governance regimes can be regarded 
as promoting and enforcing norms that are public goods, though a risk of being market-driven is that 
markets do not always incentivise environmentally or socially-responsible behaviour.
9.4 MSI governance
Given the variety of players involved in MSIs, each with different interests, visions and stakes, 
resources and forms of power at their disposal, having a clear internal governance framework 
based on principles such as transparency, accountability, equitable stakeholder representation and 
participation is crucial to an MSI’s effectiveness. Equally essential is that the MSI maintain outward 
transparency and accountability with regard to standards, working procedures, and complaints 
mechanisms.425 This raises the question of which stakeholder category, if any, should be “in charge”. 
The European Parliament, for instance, has indicated that in the area of CSR a leading role should 
be afforded to businesses, which “must be able to develop an approach tailored to their own specific 
situation…”426 On the other hand, having labour or civil society participants in leadership roles could 
better ensure that rights-compatibility of standards and governance arrangements are paramount, 
lending greater credibility and legitimacy to the MSI and ultimately delivering greater benefit to 
businesses taking part.
With the aims of strengthening MSI governance and harmonising practice across them, a number 
of meta-MSI governance initiatives have been established. The ISEAL Alliance is an NGO that aims 
to “strengthen sustainability standards systems”.427 Membership is open to “any multi-stakeholder 
sustainability standards and accreditation body” that can show it meets the ISEAL Codes of 
Good Practice and commits to “learning and improving”. Though not eligible for membership, 
governments, researchers, consultants, private sector bodies, non-profits and other “stakeholders 
with a demonstrable commitment to the ISEAL objectives” can also participate. A code for impact 
assessment launched by ISEAL in 2010 requires members to develop and implement a monitoring 
and evaluation plan, by identifying the impact they seek to achieve, defining strategies, choosing 
indicators and collecting data, conducting regular analysis and reporting as well as additional impact 
evaluations, and setting up feedback loops to improve their standard’s content and systems over 
time.428 Another initiative that aims to map and evaluate business and human rights MSIs is the US-
based Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity. Its objective is to analyse whether MSIs are 
effective human rights mechanisms and how their effectiveness can be improved.429 
Analysis, standards and guidance of the kind that meta-MSIs intend to generate ought to help 
harness the potential of MSIs to contribute to good governance and the rule of law, in spite of a 
dynamic global environment that can readily elude slower and more formal State-based forms of rule-
making, monitoring and enforcement. Yet it will remain important to guard against a “cut-and-paste” 
423.  See Ethical Trading Initiative, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/.
424.  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/. These include the Roundtables on responsible soy (RTRS), the 
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI) and Roundtable on sustainable biofuels (RSB). 
425.  Mariette Van Huijstee, Multistakeholder Initiatives: A strategic guide for civil society organizations.
426.  Raffaele Baldassarre, Report on corporate social responsibility: accountable, transparent and responsible business 
behaviour and sustainable growth, 2012/2098(INI)) / A7-0017/2013 (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0017+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
427.  The four goals of ISEAL Alliance are to: Improve the impacts of standards; Define credibility for sustainability standards; 
Increase the uptake of credible sustainability standards; and Improve the effectiveness of standards: ISEAL Alliance, http://
www.isealalliance.org/.
428.  The ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standards (Impacts Code). See: 
‘Impacts Code’, ISEAL Alliance, http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-practice/impacts-
code.
429.  MSI Integrity, http://www.msi-integrity.org/.
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approach with regard to MSI design, which should be sensitive and responsive to the particularities 
of their sector(s) and context.430 
9.4.1 Government involvement with MSIs
In some cases governments are key targets of MSIs: the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), for instance, seeks governments’ commitments to revenue transparency.431 In general, though, 
there is no presumption of government involvement although in some cases, government buy-in has 
been critical to the success of individual initiatives. For example, it has been suggested that the 
arrival of an additional batch of governments a decade into its existence played an important role in 
strengthening the governance and effectiveness of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights.432 By contrast, government absence has been important to success in other MSIs. In the case 
of the Fair Labor Association (FLA), although the initial convening role of the US Government was 
important in bringing together the stakeholders, its later withdrawal apparently permitted the FLA 
to be more agile and creative. More specifically, it allowed the FLA to operate in exporting countries 
without being challenged as an agent of US foreign or trade policy.433 
The impact of MSIs can be boosted where there is alignment with State-based regulation and policies. 
Incorporating references to MSI certification schemes, for example, into screening and evaluation 
procedures during public procurement processes has potential to be a “market-making” step, given 
the status of governments as “mega-consumer”.434 MSIs can also play a role in laying the groundwork 
for State intervention by scoping out in advance its necessary elements, viable regimes, and likely 
implementation challenges in practice.
9.4.2 Civil society engagement with MSIs
Most MSIs include civil society organisations and in many cases, the MSIs’ effectiveness can depend 
upon their participation. The importance of involving trade unions in MSIs dealing with workers’ rights 
cannot be over-stated.435 Yet, CSOs involved in MSIs need to constantly evaluate their participation. 
One question they should ask is how their participation in an MSI aligns with their overall goals and 
strategies to achieve change.436 CSOs taking part in MSIs often come under scrutiny from others in 
their community who fear they may be co-opted by other stakeholders or that the collaboration with 
other members of the MSI may undermine broader advocacy agendas. Another key consideration 
is that involvement in MSIs can be highly demanding, in terms of time, staff and money, and CSOs, 
especially those in the global South, may experience multiple demands from MSIs that they do not 
have the resources or capacity to fulfil. 
9.5 Examples of MSIs in the area of business and human rights
This section describes a sample of MSIs active in the business and human rights area.437
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI): Launched in 1998 with the support of the UK government, the 
ETI is an alliance of companies, trade unions and NGOs that promotes respect for workers’ rights 
around the world. Currently, the ETI focuses on: promoting good workplaces via support for suppliers 
430.  Mariette Van Huijstee, Multistakeholder Initiatives: A strategic guide for civil society organizations.
431.  Ethical Trading Initiative, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/.
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International and European Law 30:78 (2014).
434.  Mariette Van Huijstee, Multistakeholder Initiatives: A strategic guide for civil society organizations; Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission, Public Procurement and Human Rights in Northern Ireland, and Stumberg et al., Turning a Blind Eye? 
Respecting Human Rights in Government Purchasing. 
435.  Ibid.
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for a CSO to choose a role within the MSI that matches its organisational identity as it is projected internally as well as 
externally, in order to maintain its legitimacy and negotiating position.




in building strong management, human resource and industrial relations systems; payment of 
living wages; integrating ethics into core business practices; tackling workplace discrimination and 
improving audit practices.438 Company members are expected to commit to implementing the ETI 
Base Code of labour practice,439 which draws on core ILO Conventions, and to adopt its Principles of 
Implementation.440 These require companies to demonstrate a clear commitment to ethical trade 
which respects labour standards; to integrate ethical trade into their core business practices; to 
drive year-on-year improvements to working conditions; to support suppliers to improve working 
conditions; and to report openly and accurately about their activities. Member companies must 
also work in partnership with trade unions and NGO members on projects aimed at tackling ethical 
trade issues, and submit annual reports to the ETI Board, setting out steps they are taking to tackle 
problems concerning working conditions in their supply chains. The ETI Secretariat, together with 
trade union and NGO representatives, conducts random validation visits to a minimum of 20% of 
ETI supplier members. 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI): The EITI is a global coalition of 
governments, companies and civil society working together to improve government openness and 
accountability in the management of revenues from oil, gas and mineral resources.441 EITI countries 
are required to disclose information on tax payments, licenses, contracts, production and other key 
elements around resource extraction.442 The EITI Standard lays out seven requirements on how to 
report activity in the oil, gas and mining sectors along the value chain, from extracting a resource to 
converting it into public benefit. These are: i) permitting effective oversight by the multi-stakeholder 
group; ii) timely publication of EITI reports containing iii) contextual information about the extractive 
industries; and iv) full government disclosure of extractive industry revenues, and disclosure of 
all material payments to government by oil, gas and mining companies; v) a credible assurance 
process, applying international standards; vi) publication of reports that are comprehensible, actively 
promoted, publicly accessible, and that contribute to public debate; and vii) for the stakeholder group 
to take steps to act on lessons learned and review the outcomes and impact of EITI implementation. 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO): Established under the Swiss Civil Code, the 
RSPO is based in Malaysia, with a liaison office in Indonesia.443 The RSPO’s membership comprises 
stakeholders from seven sectors of the palm oil industry: oil palm producers, palm oil processors 
and traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, banks and investors, environmental and 
development NGOs. Its mission is to (i) advance the production, procurement, finance and use of 
sustainable palm oil products; (ii) develop, implement, verify, assure and periodically review credible 
global standards for the entire supply-chain of sustainable palm oil; (iii) monitor and evaluate the 
economic, environmental and social impacts of the uptake of sustainable palm oil in the market; 
and (iv) engage and commit all stakeholders throughout the supply chain including governments and 
consumers.444 The RSPO’s regulatory standards are pluralistic, drawing on national laws, international 
standards, customary laws, public discourses and lex mercatoria.445 Certification of members’ palm 
oil production units follows verification of the production process by accredited agencies according 
to various indicators. Amongst these indicators are: commitment to the principle of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent with regard to land acquisitions; compliance with international standards on human 
rights, labour and the environment; respect for customary rights of communities; environmental 
provisions on pesticide usage, agro-chemicals, maintenance of the quality of water and soil fertility, 
biodiversity, waste, energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions; labour standards, including on 
 
438.  “Our strategy”, Ethical Trading Initiative, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/our-strategy.
439.  “ETI Base Code”, Ethical Trading Initiative, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code.
440.  “Principles of Implementation”, Ethical Trading Initiative, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/resources/key-eti-resources/
principles-implementation.
441.  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, https://eiti.org/.
442.  Forty-eight countries implement the EITI, with 31 currently compliant with its standards. Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, Fact Sheet (2014), https://eiti.org/files/EITI_Factsheet_EN_0.pdf. 
443.  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/.
444.  “About Us”, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/about.
445.  “Membership Documents”, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/resources/key-documents/
membership.
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freedom of association, child labour and sexual harassment; impact assessments in advance of new 
plantings; commitments to transparency and accountability, and a grievance procedure for dispute 
resolution.446 RSPO’s grievance mechanism, which is competent to receive complaints relating to its 
members, has a mandate to decide on the legitimacy of the complaint and to decide on the course 
of action that the member needs to take, with reference to its own statutes, by-laws and Code of 
Conduct.447 Additionally, the RSPO makes available a dispute settlement facility to support RSPO 
members (notably growers), local communities and other stakeholders to use mediation to resolve 
disputes.448 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs): Established in 2000, the VPs aim 
to ensure that companies respect human rights in the context of security operations to protect their 
facilities, personnel and assets.449 VPs norms require: regular consultations between companies and 
host governments, and local communities; proportionality in the use of force; company engagement 
in promoting protection of human rights by security contractors; monitoring of the progress of 
investigations into alleged abuses; ensuring security contracts reflect VPs terms and requirements; 
and background checks on private security companies that participants intend to employ.450 The VPs 
membership comprises seven States, 11 NGOs, 21 companies and five organisations with observer 
status. In response to concerns about transparency, the VPs were amended to establish minimum 
requirements for participation; a dispute resolution process, allowing concerns about participants’ 
performance to be raised; clearer accountability mechanisms; and a measure of public reporting 
on implementation. A greater focus is now put upon local implementation through “in-country 
processes”, that is, multi-stakeholder fora that support implementation and integration of the VPs at 
a national level.451 Despite this, dialogue amongst VPs members remains confidential and reporting 
requirements are voluntary.
The Global Network Initiative (GNI): The GNI comprises a group of companies, NGOs, investors 
and academics that collaborate towards the protection and advancement of freedom of expression 
and privacy in the ICT sector.452 It was launched in the context of increasing pressure being put on 
ICT companies to comply with domestic laws in ways that undermine human rights, in particular 
from governments and their law enforcement agencies. The GNI is based on a set of “Principles on 
Freedom of Expression and Privacy”. These oblige participating companies to respect and protect 
the freedom of expression and privacy rights when confronted with government demands, laws or 
regulations that compromise these in a manner inconsistent with internationally recognised laws and 
standards. Correspondingly GNI companies undertake to avoid or minimise the impact of government 
restrictions, including on information available to users and opportunities for users to create and 
communicate ideas and information, regardless of frontiers or media of communication. They also vow 
to protect personal information so as to protect the privacy rights of users.453 A set of Implementation 
Guidelines guide companies on how to operationalise the Principles in an accountable manner.454 
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC): EICC attempts to improve social, ethical, 
and environmental responsibility in the global electronic industry supply chain. Founded in 2004 by 
446.  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil (2013), http://www.
rspo.org/file/RSPO%20P&C2013_with%20Major%20Indicators_Endorsed%20by%20BOG_FINAL_A5_v1.pdf.
447.  “Complaints”, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/members/complaints.
448.  “Dispute Settlement Facility”, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/members/dispute-settlement-
facility.
449.  Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/. Note the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers as a complementary initiative addressing directly the responsibilities of private 
security firms in conflict zones. See International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (Switzerland: 2010), 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf.
450.  Ibid.
451.  For commentary, see “Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights”, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/special-initiatives/voluntary-principles-on-security-and-human-rights.
452.  See Global Network Initiative, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/.
453.  See “Principles”, Global Network Initiative, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php.
454.  See “Implementation Guidelines”, Global Network Initiative, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/
index.php.
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a small group of electronics companies, it now comprises of nearly 100 electronics companies.455 
EICC members must commit to implementing a Code of Conduct which references international norms 
and standards including the UDHR, ILO Core Labour Standards, OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and ISO standards, throughout their supply-chain. All EICC members’ Tier 1 suppliers are 
required to implement the Code.456 The EICC offers assessment tools to help members measure and 
understand if, and to what extent they are meeting EICC standards and membership requirements.457 
Where they are not being met, it provides tools that may help to remedy gaps in standards and 
establish systems to prevent reoccurrences in the future. The EICC does not, however, publicly 
comment on individual members’ implementation or activities. 
9.6 Examples of business-led corporate responsibility coalitions
As discussed above, business-led corporate responsibility coalitions are sector-specific initiatives 
providing companies with the opportunity to engage with each other as members of a common 
“epistemic” or knowledge-based community, in order to discuss shared dilemmas and challenges 
and possible solutions. According to a recent survey, there are now more than 110 national and 
international general-focus business-led corporate responsibility coalitions, as well as several 
hundred more sector- and issue-specific ones.458 Five examples of such coalitions addressing 
business and human rights issues are briefly described below: 
The Global Business Initiative on Human Rights (GBI): Led by a core group of eighteen 
major corporations headquartered in each of the world’s major geographical regions, the GBI 
works through two tracks: Member Peer Learning, which enables participating companies to share 
practices, challenges and innovations with regard to the implementation of the GPs; and Global 
Business Outreach, where member companies engage with other businesses around the world to 
raise awareness and to support capacity building.459 GBI also seeks to support constructive business 
inputs into international policy agenda. For example, it recently issued its position on the UN Human 
Rights Council’s adoption of the resolution regarding the binding treaty on business and human 
rights.460 
CSR Europe: Established as an international non-profit organisation, CSR Europe is a membership 
network comprising 70 corporate members and 39 national partner CSR organisations from around 
Europe.461 In all, over 10,000 European-based companies are engaged through a platform, which 
seeks to support business towards enhancing sustainable growth and to make positive contributions 
to society. Its portfolio involves supporting companies in building sustainable competitiveness, 
fostering cooperation between companies and their stakeholders, and strengthening Europe’s global 
leadership on CSR. Its workstreams are based on the EU’s Europe 2020 strategy; consequently, 
they are orientated around the five targets of reducing unemployment; boosting investment in 
research and development; tackling climate change and energy sustainability; increasing educational 
opportunities; and fighting poverty and social exclusion.462 CSR Europe also collaborates with CSR 
organisations across the world.
ASEAN CSR Network: The ASEAN CSR Network was launched in 2011. It is an initiative of the 
ASEAN Foundation and business organisations from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
 
455.  See Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, http://www.eiccoalition.org/.
456.  See “Code of Conduct”, Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/code-of-conduct/.
457.  See “Assessment”, Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/assessment/.
458.  David Grayson and Jane Nelson, Corporate Responsibility Coalitions: the past, present and future of alliances for sustainable 
capitalism.
459.  See Global Business Initiative on Human Rights, http://www.global-business-initiative.org/.
460.  Five early recommendations for business: Responding to the prospect of an international treaty on Business and Human 
Rights (October 2014). See Mark Hodge, Five Early Recommendations for Business: Responding to the prospect of an 
international treaty on Business and Human Rights (Global Business Initiative on Human Rights, 2014), http://www.global-
business-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Article_BHR_Treaty.pdf.
461.  See CSR Europe, http://www.csreurope.org
462.  See Europe 2020 targets, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/targets/
index_en.htm. 
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Thailand and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Viet Nam. Its purpose is to encourage 
businesses within ASEAN to take account of economic, social and environmental impacts in the way 
they operate by aligning their business strategies and operations with the needs and expectations 
of stakeholders. As a normative base, the Network refers extensively to the Ten Principles of the UN 
Global Compact and ISO 26000. It describes itself as a platform for networking, exchange of best 
practice and peer discussions; a repository of ASEAN knowledge on CSR; a capacity-builder through 
training and the provision of common standards and benchmarking; an advocate for CSR; and a 
representative of the ASEAN business community to regional and intergovernmental agencies on 
policy issues regarding CSR. Interestingly, it also specifies that it is not “… a market place for CSR 
consultancies; a philanthropic or grant-giving organisation; an implementer of social or environmental 
projects at national level; or a regulating or ‘policing’ body”.463
The Equator Principles (EPs): The EPs provide a risk management framework for financial 
institutions committed to assessing and managing environmental and social risk in large-scale 
projects.464 Of global and sector-wide application, the EPs are applicable to four financial products: 
project finance advisory services; project finance; project-related corporate-loans; and bridge loans. 
Launched in 2003, and revised in 2006 and 2013, at present, 80 financial institutions in thirty-
four countries have adopted the EPs, covering over 70% of international project finance in emerging 
markets. Banks that are signatories to the EPs commit to meeting the performance standards set 
by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) when providing project finance to clients. The 2013 
revision of the EPs was intended to align them with the UN Framework.
International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM)465: The ICMM’s membership 
comprises 21 mining and metals companies and 32 national and regional mining associations and 
global commodity associations. Member companies are required to implement and measure their 
achievement against ten sustainable development principles; make public commitments towards 
improving sustainability performance and report annually on progress made. Principle 3 commits 
member companies to uphold fundamental human rights and to respect cultures, customs and 
values in dealings with employees and others affected by their activities.466 The ICMM enters into 
strategic partnerships with other stakeholders. 
9.7 Evaluating MSIs and their impacts
Whereas policy-makers have actively promoted MSIs, in line with a paradigmatic shift from 
“government to governance”467, this, according to one collective view, “…does not mean that they are 
necessarily the better way to govern”.468 Experiences of individual MSIs suggest some successes, but 
also areas of weakness. Impact assessments of MSIs are rare; so far, those undertaken have mostly 
studied the effectiveness of internal governance and processes for ensuring compliance, rather than 
ultimate benefits for rights-holders. 
An assessment by the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) of members’ implementation of the ETI Code 
demonstrates the challenges of evaluation.469 The ETI’s study was conducted over three years; 
undertook five case studies to trace impacts through the supply chains across a sample of eleven ETI 
463.  “About Us”, ASEAN CSR Network, http://www.asean-csr-network.org/c/about-us/asean-csr-network.
464.  “About the Equator Principles”, Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep.
465.  “About Us”, International Council on Mining & Metals, http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us.
466.  “10 Principles”, International Council on Mining & Metals, http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-development-
framework/10-principles.
467.  Bop Jessop, “The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development”, International Social 
Science Journal 50 (1998). 
468.  The World Bank, Increasing the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives through active collaboration (Wilton Park 
Conference Report: 2014), https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1314-Report1.pdf.
469.  Stephanie Barrientos and Sally Smith, The ETI Code of Labour Practice: Do workers really benefit? Report on the ETI Impact 
Assessment 2006 (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2006), http://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/
default/files/resources/Impact%20assessment%20summary.pdf.
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members470; collected qualitative and quantitative information from all key stakeholders, including 
retailers and brands, agents, factory and farm managers, trade union and non-governmental 
organisations at international and national levels and workers; and interviewed over 400 workers from 
23 supply sites, including men and women, and migrant and contract workers as well as permanent 
workers. Even then, the evaluation team drew attention to the limitations of the methodology, 
pointing out that ETI member companies source from tens of thousands of suppliers in over 100 
countries, so that studying a representative sample of the supply base was impossible. The team also 
noted the possible bias towards more progressive suppliers in the selection process. Amongst the 
conclusions, the study found some improvements to working conditions, mostly in the areas of health 
and safety, child labour, reduction in regular and overtime hours, minimum wage, meeting State 
insurance and pension requirements; however, these results varied across sectors. Serious non-
compliances persisted with regard to freedom of association, discrimination, regular employment 
and harsh treatment, and benefits of implementation of the ETI Code were found mainly to accrue to 
permanent, rather than contract or migrant workers, while there was little reduction in gender-based 
discrimination. More positively, management awareness and compliance with legislation at assessed 
sites increased significantly.
A scarcity of empirically-based studies of this kind leaves the ground open for an ongoing debate 
about MSIs with a broad spectrum of views on almost every point of contention. Proponents urge that 
a proliferation of governance mechanisms including MSIs brings the benefits of pluralism: different 
types of rule-making and increased rule-making capacity can mean thicker protection for human 
rights.471 Where MSIs provide a well-designed grievance mechanism, this may respond to the needs 
and interests of rights-holders more efficiently, accessibly and sensitively than State-based formal 
remedial processes472 which may be too inflexible to achieve sound, rights-compliant solutions, 
especially where abuses derive from complex socio-economic situations. As an example, where child 
labour is revealed in a supply-chain, a mediation-based grievance mechanism provided by an MSI can 
take account of the reasons why children are being employed in reaching a resolution, while a court 
case may not. Sceptics, on the other side, question the scope for MSIs, in reality, to ensure access to 
justice, adequate, open and just remedies, especially for the disenfranchised.473 
Certainly there remain live questions about the accountability of MSIs to rights-holders, and the 
impacts on MSIs of pre-existing power imbalances between rights-holders or victims and companies, 
on one hand, and on whether MSIs exacerbate or mitigate such asymmetries. The relative merit of a 
voluntary approach over formal regulation backed by law is another contentious issue, and concern 
has been expressed that MSIs encourage States to renege on their own duties to protect. On one 
view, MSIs should only come into play in the event of an actual governance failure, such as the inability 
to pass or enforce standards.474 Where MSIs assume that there is a “business case” for compliance 
with human rights this is also problematic: whilst on one level this makes sense, in terms of seeking 
alignment with corporate mandates, what happens when the business case cannot be made? 
On the basis of a survey of MSIs across the sustainability, environmental and human rights fields, 
Abbott and Snidal conclude there is a significant orchestration deficit,475 resulting in a “a patchwork 
470.  The three country studies were in South Africa (fruit), Vietnam (garments and footwear) and India (garments). The two 
company studies concerned a UK company’s horticultural supply chain and Costa Rican bananas. 
471.  Martijn W. Scheltema, “Does CSR Need More (effective) Private Regulation in the Future?” in Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis 
Morly Frishman and Laura Kistemaker (eds.), The Law of the future and the future of law: Volume II (The Hague: Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher, 2012).
472.  Caroline Rees, “Mediation in Business-Related Human Rights Disputes: Objections, Opportunities and Challenges”, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper (2010), http://ebooks.narotama.ac.id/files/Berkeley%202010-2011%20
(pdf)/Mediation%20in%20Business-Related%20Human%20Rights%20Disputes%20%20Objections,%20Opportunities%20
and%20Challenges.pdf
473.  Surya Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
474.  Jonas Moberg and Eddie Rich, “Governance of the last resort? — When to consider a multi-stakeholder approach”, Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (21 May 2014), https://eiti.org/blog/governance-last-resort-when-consider-multi-
stakeholder-approach. The authors reflect upon their experiences of leading the EITI.
475.  Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Strengthening International Regulation through Transmittal New Governance: 
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (2009).
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of uncoordinated schemes competing vigorously for adherents, resources, legitimacy, and public 
notice.”476 They suggest that international organisations can, and should, provide the missing 
“orchestration” by engaging intermediaries and leveraging their combined capacities. 
Scant attention has so far been given to the longer-term implications of MSIs on norms, practices 
and expectations of human rights more generally. MSIs pluralise human rights protection at the 
municipal level by introducing, into traditionally public terrain, alternative private fora for determining 
applicable human rights norms and standards and for adjudicating or mediating disputes arising in 
connection with corporate-related rights abuses. This seems likely to trigger changes to human rights 
discourse and praxis, whose consequences should be tracked. As one commentator notes, “MSIs 
entail opportunity costs as their processes may substitute for other avenues of pursuing change, 
such as efforts to mobilise democratising citizens’ movements or to create broader collations of 
pro-reform actors across multiple scales of governance….”477 It is important, then, to consider the 
role of MSIs within the whole ecosystem of human rights protection. To this end, the idea of creating 
joint learning platforms of communities of practice for those who run and participate in MSIs, though 
valuable seems incomplete: the discussion needs to be extended to include actors and observers 
also from “traditional” rights institutions.478
SECTION IV: BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT
By providing a global framework regarding the human rights duties and obligations of States and 
business, the GPs embody important progress. Steps taken to operationalise the GPs have encouraged 
innovation by government actors, the corporate sector, amongst CSOs, labour unions and NHRIs and 
other institutions. Yet change on the ground is slow and partial, and severe business-related human 
rights abuses remain endemic across industry sectors across Asia and Europe. Although it is too early 
to draw conclusions regarding the impact of the GPs and other current approaches to this persistent 
problem, it would be prudent to remain alert as to whether these are “fit for purpose” to deal with 
further complex problems associated with sustainable development including climate change and 
vaulting inequality.479 
Transnational corporations today are powerful, dynamic, networked entities which control and 
dispose of vast natural and social wealth. They continue to be formally driven by the distinctly “private” 
principles of profit and shareholder value, but lack mechanisms of democratic accountability. This 
state of affairs has substantially challenged the pursuit of socially and environmentally sustainable 
economies. The profile of human rights in the quest to redress the balance has arguably not been 
as high as is required. Recognising this deficit, the rhetoric of the “post-2015” agenda seeks to 
centralise human rights within the forthcoming Sustainable Development Goals to be adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in September 2015.480 
476.  Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for International 
Organizations’ Regulation and Governance 7 (2013), 95–113. See also John Gerard Ruggie, “Global Governance and ‘New 
Governance Theory’: Lessons from Business and Human Rights”, Global Governance 20 (2014).
477.  Mariette Van Huijstee, Multistakeholder Initiatives: A strategic guide for civil society organizations.
478.  The World Bank, Increasing the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives through active collaboration.
479.  Oxfam International, Working for the few. Political capture and economic inequality, (Oxfam Briefing Paper 178, 2014), http://
www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-working-for-few-political-capture-economic-inequality-200114-en.pdf.
480.  The World We Want 2015, a platform created by the United Nations and civil society to amplify peoples voices in the Post-2015 
Agenda held national, global and thematic consultations, the summary of which called for “a new agenda built on human 
rights, and universal values of equality, justice and security.” It also emphasised the central importance of empowerment 
and participation, gender responsive and rights based governance, human rights accountability and monitoring (including 
corporate accountability) and access to justice: The World We Want, Global Thematic Consultation on Governance and the 
post-2015 development framework (2013), http://www.worldwewant2015.org/governance/finalreport; See also UN System 
Task Team on the post-2015 development agenda, Towards freedom from fear and want: human rights in the post-2015 
agenda, (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20
Pieces/9_human_rights.pdf.
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The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) emphasised the vital role and positive contributions of 
the private sector but paid scant attention to the negative impacts of business activity upon human 
rights, poverty and the environment with regard to achieving the goals.481 It seems that some attempt 
is being made to rectify this imbalance in the SDGs.482 The UN System Task Team for example calls 
for businesses to be accountable to the public, especially for the management of public goods and 
services, highlighting particularly the importance of including the GPs as part of the normative, policy 
and accountability framework for the private sector in connection with the post-2015 agenda.483 
Pinpointing the need “to realign the power relationships between corporations, states and 
communities at the country level and to shift the power dynamics at the multilateral level so that the 
rich and the strong are no longer privileged at the expense of the poor and the marginalised…”, it has 
vouched that such a human-rights based framework would grant people “… the right to decide for 
themselves how natural resources should be utilised, without having to contend with the monopolies 
of a few powerful companies or leaders.” NHRIs and civil society groups are strongly calling for the 
same.484 The EU has also stated its commitment to ensure “inclusion of a rights-based approach, 
encompassing all human rights, and gender equality, in the post-2015 agenda”.485 
The challenge of appropriately positioning the role of the private sector within the sustainable 
development agenda equally and importantly touches upon how the State prioritises human rights in 
attaining sustainable development and how it positions itself within the business and human rights 
regulatory regime. This paper highlights increasing efforts by States to fulfil their duty to protect 
against business-related human rights abuses pointing to examples across Asia and Europe. Yet, 
it is clear that in too many instances, weaknesses in the rule of law, fragile human rights cultures 
and reluctance to regulate corporate power are still leaving individuals and communities vulnerable 
to business-related human rights abuses and without meaningful remedy, despite the existence of 
other regulatory mechanisms provided by corporate self-regulation or MSIs. 
This 14th ASEM Seminar on Business and Human Rights provides a unique opportunity to reflect on 
what steps are needed at regional and national levels to bring effective human rights accountability 
to the business sector in ways that achieve a common vision of human-centred and sustainable 
development. It is important to critically evaluate the progress to date, taking a careful and honest 
look at both the successes and failures. In doing so, it is important to remember that the GPs did 
not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, they epitomise decades of struggle by labour, communities, human 
rights defenders, and CSOs, in Asia and Europe, as well as human rights principles and discourse 
transacted by experts and institutions, regionally and internationally. By the same token however, 
the challenges demand transformative rather than incremental change if our future economic 
development is to unfold in a human rights-compatible and human rights-promoting way. A step-
change in political will is required of governments in implementing effective systems for protections 
against business-related human rights abuses and ensuring this is mirrored within policy-making 
in multilateral forums, including in the realm of trade and investment. Equally, business needs to 
approach its due diligence obligations with a clear and unequivocal imperative to respect human 
rights through their core business operations and practices and across their value-chains. 
481.  Penny Fowler and Sumi Dhanarajan, Business and the Millennium Development Goals: Your Call to Action (Oxfam Policy and 
Practice, 2008).
482.  Lou Pingeot, Corporate Influence in the Post-2015 Process (Bischöfliches Hilfswerk MISEREOR e.V, Brot für die Welt, Global 
Policy Forum, 2014), https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Corporate_influence_in_the_Post-2015_
process_web.pdf.
483.  UN System Task Team on the post-2015 development agenda, Towards freedom from fear and want: human rights in the 
post-2015 agenda.
484.  See, for example, Mabedle Lourence Mushwana, Re: National Human Rights Institutions and the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda, Ref: 19/2/4 (13 October 2014), http://www.humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/business/icc_chairperson_
letter_on_sdg_15102014.pdf.
485.  European Council, Conclusions on EU priorities at the UN Human Rights Fora (10 Feb 2014), http://eu-un.europa.eu/
articles/en/article_14578_en.htm. 
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APPLYING THE UNITED NATIONS’ GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES IN ASIA AND EUROPE:
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Bengt JOHANNSON, CSR Ambassador for Sweden
(Concluding remarks delivered at the closing plenary of the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
We have had useful discussions as today’s wrapping up session has shown. There have been a 
number of useful recommendations for our future work. May I take this opportunity to highlight a few 
conclusions I have made for myself:
1.  The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are fully accepted by governments, 
CSOs, National Human Rights Institutes (NHRIs) and the business community. I have not heard 
any comment saying that the UNGP is the wrong approach.
2.  I have also noticed that we have managed to have an equal representation from Europe and Asia. 
This is of course a basic condition for a balanced discussion.
3.  The conference has had a large and active representation by governments, CSOs and NHRIs 
but only a limited participation by companies. The same goes for the UN meeting in Geneva in 
December 2013. This is a problem and until we have solved it we need to bear it in mind. On 
national level I am sure the issue is easier to handle.
4.  I noted with interest that the issue of trust was mentioned today. From my Nordic perspective 
this is an important issue.  We are proud of having built up a society where trust is an important 
element. This has important consequences for relations between government and business. If 
we trust each other there will also be a different mix of hard and soft law.
5.  It was mentioned today that Europa has a CSR baggage of voluntary policy and Asia has a CSR 
baggage of charity. I feel this image is a bit over-simplistic and needs to be depicted with many 
nuances. Europe has complemented the reliance on companies’ own efforts with a number of 
legislative initiatives. The EU directive on non-financial reporting being just one. Asia has also 
moved away from charity in many respects but there are moments when we all recognised that 
companies have obligation to assist weak societies.
6.  The National Action Plans has during the discussions been seen as a way to pick up all the 
proposals and process them through a multi-stakeholder dialogue. The initiative by Netherlands 
to present its NAP later today is a good example. Even if there are few NAPs published today 
many countries such as my own are working on them and I foresee that we will have a harvest 
period next year.
7.  The issue of coherence in government administration has been highlighted. The diverging views 
of different ministries seem to plague any countries. Also here the NAP process is an instrument 
that presents a convenient opportunity to square off such differences.
8.  I have noted many useful additional comments on aspects such as education, capacity building, 
SMEs, how to do a human rights impact assessment.
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PROFITS, PLANET AND PEOPLE: 
MAKING SENSE OF THE DUTIES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL STAKEHOLDERS
Frédéric TIBERGHIEN, Technical Coordinator  &  Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
France, & State Counsellor - Conseil d’Etat
(Concluding remarks delivered at the closing plenary of the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
As we come to the end of the 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights, I would like to thank 
you - my fellow colleagues and participants - for your contributions to the Seminar. When I reflect over 
the discussions of the past three days, I realise that there were many thematic concerns on the topic 
of ‘human rights and businesses’ to which we sought answers. These main thematic areas can be 
distilled into distinct questions:
1. Which human rights are businesses concerned with? 
It is very useful to begin with a brief cataloguing of those rights that are affected by business activities, 
particularly if we want to define the notion of “sphere of influence” and focus on the details of how the 
private sector is involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. We know that business 
has influence over:
1. civil and political rights – such as the right to life; the right to freedom and security of the person; 
the right to be protected from torture; the right to privacy; the right to freedom of opinion and of 
expression; the right to seek, receive and impart information; and the freedom of association.
2. economic, social and cultural rights – rights protecting the individual against forced labour, child 
labour; the right to health, to a decent or adequate standard of living, education, vocational 
training; and a right to a healthy environment.
Business also affects the rights of particular groups such as women, children, employees and their 
trade union representatives, indigenous people, migrant workers and their families, and people with 
disabilities. 
While it has been acknowledged that these rights do lie within the sphere of influence of the private 
sector, we also noted that the latter have limited scope to address these rights directly because 
business is not in charge of protecting these rights: States have the main responsibility for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. And of course, other rights rely completely on States such 
as voting rights or civil rights.
2.  What is the content of the available toolbox for business to promote 
human rights? 
Ten tools were identified in the Seminar which provide a useful framework for how businesses can 
improve their effect on human rights:
1. Adherence to a CSR framework – there are numerous CSR frameworks available; some are 
global such as the United Nations Global Compact, others are sectoral (such as textile, or tourism 
industry related); some are compulsory, others are voluntary such as the UN Guiding Principles. 
Businesses can be demanded to declare what frameworks they follow and adhere to.
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2. Supply chain management – It is a response to a new acceptance of the firm or corporation: 
the networked corporation. It is also a means to enlarge human rights concern among SMEs 
and suppliers or subcontractors. Codes of conduct between suppliers and businesses should be 
encouraged and verified: social audits should be conducted in the suppliers’ factories.
3. Management tools – Management standards such as the AA 1000, the SA 8000, the ISO 
14001, the ISO 26000 or ISO 31000 can be adopted by business to improve its performance.
4. Compliance mechanisms and control – Frameworks and standards are effective if and only if 
they are accompanied with compliance and verification mechanisms, preferably by independent 
third parties.
5. Reporting and due diligence – CSR reporting is already practiced by many businesses 
especially with sustainability reporting. International frameworks such the GRI already exist and 
human rights assessments can be similarly conducted. But there was an emphasis during our 
discussions that there is not yet an accepted framework on human rights reporting.
6. Non-financial ratings – There are a lot of agencies who conduct on demand, non-financial ratings 
based on companies’ social and environmental performance. Although not fully discussed, the 
influence of non-financial ratings, provided they are made public, on corporate behaviour should 
be explored further. I refer, on that topic, to the theory on “the reputational effect” or on “the 
licence to operate”.
7. Stakeholder engagement – We have already examples of engagement by companies with their 
stakeholders. They should not be limited to their investors and shareholders but should also 
include those in the community who are affected by their activities 
8. Stakeholder dialogue – It can be divided into two dialogues. The first one, the social dialogue 
between employers and employees, is well known. In international firms, it can be enhanced by 
the creation of a social body regrouping the representatives of all the employees: it is the role of 
the framework agreements.  The dialogue with civil society actors (consumers, NGOs, community 
organisations etc), the “civil dialogue”, is a more recent concern and is not yet well organised by 
business.
9. The leverage on States – Corporate codes of conduct can also provide a leverage to improve 
State and business behaviour in HR. The background paper identified how in the 1970s the 
Sullivan principles, the first code of conduct in business, forced South African companies to 
review their conduct to follow non-discriminatory policies, contrary to the South African apartheid 
system’s job reservation act, which was abolished in 1979 thanks to the pressure of US firms.
10. National Action Plans
The toolbox is already well furnished and it belongs to business to use all these tools to improve the 
HR implementation.
3.  What is the contribution of business to human rights implementation?
There has been a mixed reaction to this, both positive and negative. 
On the negative side, some corporations are distrusted and criticized for their behaviour (eg, the use 
of tax havens and for committing fiscal fraud). There are also many known examples of the harmful 
practices conducted by mining and extractive companies, private security firms, and investment 
banks. Some companies are also engaged in activities which represent a threat for public health such 
as the tobacco or alcohol industry, the car industry, the nuclear industry (with the waste management 
problem). Some businesses have had quite a negative impact on labour issues such as a cheap 
labour framework and bad working conditions (for example, the sub-contracting in the textile sector 
by major retailers).
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On the positive contribution of businesses to human rights implementation, we now see a greater 
implementation of the environment rules and standards from their home countries in the business 
operations of multinational companies, even if these are not compulsory in the country of operations. 
Multinational companies also often offer better working wages and better working conditions, which 
exert a “traction effect” on the domestic firms. 
So there is a mixed judgement on this. If we were teachers evaluating their pupils we would conclude 
“can do better or much better”. On that basis, some activists recommend the “name and shame” 
approach, in order to praise or to blame the best and the worse contributions of business to 
sustainable development in general and to human rights in particular. At this stage, let us conclude 
that business is both the problem and the solution. 
4.  Why is the contribution of business to sustainable development and 
human rights so controversial?
Five factors have to be taken into account to answer this question. 
First of all, one has to consider the externalities problem – According to his 1957 article, ‘Political 
economy of gratuity’1 – Bertrand de Jouvenel, one of those who invented the prospective science, 
companies or plants produce divisible goods but also indivisible harms which have a deep influence 
on society. The danger for us is to look only at the goods or at the harms and to forget they are closely 
linked. The first step of a socially responsible company is to publicly acknowledge that its activities 
can produce harms and that, when they do so, they are responsible for it. It is critical for certain 
sectors such as the extractive industries, and the banking sector.
Secondly, for many firms, the origin of their CSR behaviour lies in the consequence of a scandal, 
a crisis, a disaster or a discrimination they provoked or were involved in. The background paper 
mentions also the resistance against abuses or violations of human rights by business or the fighting 
of peoples or of minorities for their human rights. If monetary compensation has often been used to 
make amends for these disasters or scandals, the very concept of CSR has been a result of people 
protesting against this aspect of business behaviour.
Thirdly, we are not all in agreement about the role of business in society. Following Winston Churchill, 
some view private enterprise as a “predatory target to the shot”, some as a “cow to be milked” 
and too few as a “horse pulling the wagon”. Those who consider firms as a “predatory target to be 
shot” want to limit the role and influence of business in society because it is deemed to be mainly 
negative. Those who consider corporations as “a cow to be milked” want to develop its role in order 
to extract the maximum wealth from it (be it a shareholder through profits, an employee through 
wages or the State through taxes). Those who consider firms as pulling the wagon recognise the 
private sector’s potential to contribute more than just financial profits, wages and taxes to society. 
They try to encourage entrepreneurs and corporations and favour what we generally call a “pro-
business legislation”. They also encourage enterprises and corporations to enlarge their sphere of 
responsibilities well beyond their economical ones, in environmental and social spheres but also in 
education and training, in the cultural sphere.
Fourthly, what is the nature of the firm? You may recall Ronald H Coase’s influential article of 1937 
‘the nature of the firm’2, which was one of the early reflections on the importance of corporate 
governance issues. Reflecting on that piece together with our discussions, we have to recognise two 
different approaches of the firm do exist. Some consider that the firm derives its existence from a free 
contract (with employees, clients and shareholders) and it has a contractual nature, independently 
from society and State. In this approach, the role of the marketplace is unlimited and the role of 
1.  Arcadie. Essais sur le mieux-vivre (Paris, Gallimard, coll. Tel), fistly published in1968 by  SÉDÉIS (Société d’étude et de 
documentation économique, industrielle et sociale) in Futuribles.
2. Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16. (Nov., 1937), pp. 386-405.
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States is limited; and the freedom of business is a fundamental right, which has to be combined with 
the human rights (I refer on this to Brice Lalonde’s keynote speech). In this contractual approach, CSR 
is a voluntary behaviour of the firm and assimilated to a kind of philanthropy.
Others think that the firm does not exist by itself but only by law (and thus by society) which allocates 
it a sphere of action, defines the role and the limits of the marketplace and the main rules the firm has 
to comply with. In this institutional approach of the firm, CSR is regulated by law and compulsory: the 
“licence to operate” delivered to the firm, implicitly or explicitly by society or by the State, is revocable 
at any moment. 
Fifthly, there is no common agreement on the goals of the firm. Some of us may agree with Milton 
Friedman who famously said there is one and only one social responsibility of business: to use it 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits. The performance of the firm has 
to be measured with a simple bottom line, the ‘profit and loss’ one. 
Others disagree with this and assert that the goal of the firm is to maximize its added value for all the 
stakeholders. The performance of the firm has to be measured in that case with a   triple bottom line 
(profit, planet and people to be short). It is the stakeholder’s value theory.
Finally, with so many diverse views on the nature, the role and the goals of the firm, it is no surprise 
we did not reach a total consensus on business and human rights. 
5. How can the behaviour of firms be regulated?
Here again, there are different views on the available means to achieve this.
1. Self-regulation– Companies can regulate themselves through the enacting of codes of ethics or 
of conduct. It is the preferred mean of regulation in the contractual approach of the nature of the 
firm. But self-regulation is often deemed insufficient and has a low effectiveness due to the lack 
of external control.
2. Co-regulation – Company behaviour can be regulated through negotiations with stakeholders. 
In the stakeholder’s value theory, the firm has to answer to the expectations of all its stakeholders 
and dialogue with them allows it to determine the frameworks to adopt in order to meet these 
expectations. MSIs reflect the results of this permanent negotiating process. We find them for 
example in the Equator Principles, the EITI and the Kimberly Process. Mainly, these frameworks 
are sectoral: their ambition is to solve the issues encountered in a specific economical sector.
3. Domestic laws – Some countries have adopted laws regulating corporate behaviour in different 
respects. The adoption of such laws can be indicative of a sign of distrust towards companies but 
is also consistent with the institutional approach of the firm. Progress is dictated by law imposing 
the domestic vision on the role of the firm. The difficulty for international corporations is to be 
subjected to different laws in different countries for the same activity, for example in sustainable 
reporting. So they prefer regional or international standards.
4. Adherence to international standards – Corporations have no legitimacy to design or 
redesign the content of human rights. Human rights are defined by international instruments 
negotiated by States. And interestingly enough, the content of most of the CSR frameworks 
is directly derived from all the major international conventions signed after world war II: the 
1998 ILO Declaration encapsulating the fundamental rights of labour (ILO n° 87 on freedom 
of unionization, n° 98 on collective bargaining, n° 25 and 109 on forced labour, n° 100 on 
equal pay, n° 111 on discrimination in labour, n° 138 on the minimum age for work, n° 182 on 
children labour); the environmental conventions adopted after the Rio Summit of 1992, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the specific conventions adopted afterwards 
(The two 1966 covenants, the conventions on the rights of women,  or on the rights of the 
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child, amongst others). The Preamble of the UDHR mentions that all organs of society concur to 
the implementation of human rights. And business is one of these organs of society. And it is 
the reason why the adherence of firms to CSR frameworks recalling the rights encapsulated in 
international treaties has to be encouraged or imposed.
6. What is the respective role of hard law and soft law?
Be it ‘minimum wages’, ‘minimum age’, ‘minimum vocational training’ in social law, ‘maximum effluents 
rejections’ or emissions in environmental law: hard law most often deals in terms of ‘minimum’ and 
‘maximum’.  Soft law is more ambitious: it goes beyond minimum or maximum standards and gives 
firms the opportunity to go further than the minimum or the maximum enacted by law. 
The UN Guiding Principles are considered soft law as, following J. Ruggie’s declarations, they do not 
create any new obligations. They were adopted as a fall-back position after an international treaty on 
the responsibility of corporations, promoted by the sub-commission of human rights of the UN, had 
been clearly rejected in 2003 by northern States and businesses. So we have to live provisionally with 
a soft law standard, the only one that was reachable. 
The danger of soft law is the risk of privatisation of law but this danger is strictly contained if the soft 
law instruments reflect themselves, as we just saw, the international agreed standards, as it is the 
case with the UNGP and many other standards.
One of the main features of CSR is precisely this one: the dynamics of CSR relies on two legs or on 
the combination between hard law and soft law, between compulsory standards (for example the 
domestic laws of each country) and voluntary principles and standards. And everybody knows that 
the soft law of today may become the hard law of tomorrow. And soft law is also generating rights and 
obligations: let us recall the Casky v. Coca Cola case in the Federal court of California in 2002. Or the 
mere fact that a code of conduct attached to a labour contract or a supplier contract can give birth 
to rights and obligations.
7. What is the role of international law in CSR regulations?
International treaties belong to hard law and they impose only minimum standards for States: the 
lowest common denominator. But it is becoming longer and longer and more and more difficult to 
negotiate international conventions: they are nowadays nearly 200 States against 45 in 1945. 
Like M.L. King, I made a dream about an international treaty on the responsibility of corporations. 
But what do we do until such a treaty is possible and adopted? Do we wait or do we move forward?
More importantly we have to consider if this treaty would not be too little, too late? Using the current 
climate change negotiations and the right to a healthy environment as an example, States may try as 
much as they can but the outcomes are usually insufficient compared to expectations: in reducing 
carbon emissions, experience has demonstrated that many of the innovations that have helped 
countries move towards their intended reduction levels have been market driven or local authorities 
driven. 
Should we rely only on States and on their commitments, we will probably never reach the target. I 
believe that if we were to reach our targets, it would be thanks to all stakeholders and to business in 
particular.
In the human rights field, we have a similar situation: if States are the duty bearers, the convergence 
of efforts by all organs of society is necessary to reach the target of human rights implementation. So 
business is the problem but also a contributor to the solution. And until an international treaty defines 
their duties in human rights, business has to be enlisted as far as possible.
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8. Is CSR a sign of new business models, of a new culture and/or of a 
new model of international governance?
Behind the debate about the role of corporations in society and their contribution to a sustainable 
development, new business models are emerging. Some firms are considering “bottom of the pyramid 
models”, focusing on the social inclusion of the poor. Social entrepreneurs are creating new ventures 
searching first for social impact, ahead of financial results. Impact investing is also a growing concern 
in finance.
There are also signs of a cultural shift in corporate behaviour: more and more companies acknowledge 
that human rights are a concern that needs to be incorporated into CSR strategies. Increasingly 
conflict resolution is done through negotiation and engagement with stakeholders and civil society 
organisations. We could term it as an end to the culture of impunity with civil society actors demanding 
transparency and accountability in business activities (remedy harm, control of risks and sanction 
against human rights violations).
In terms of governance model, the growth of MSIs is indicative of the emergence of de-centralised 
governance patterns and the realisation that the future belongs to alliances between stakeholders 
(corporations, NGOs, trade unions, local authorities etc). Governments are more and more short-
term minded while planetary challenges require long-term minded decision makers. Open multi-
stakeholders alliances is also a way to promote long-term solutions. Referring to Brice Lalonde’s 
speech, we could be leaving what we called the Westphalian era, the one during which States were 
the sole actors in international relations. 
9. Is the CSR agenda the same in Europe and in Asia?
The background paper (section 4.4) has listed the human rights challenges in Asia but did not give 
an equivalent list for Europe. Europe has also its own challenges, according to our main rapporteurs: 
environment protection and the fight against discriminations on the labour market (gender equality; 
part-time workers; safety at work; harassment, amongst others). 
CSR priorities vary from region to region but should it be considered a pity that Asia and Europe do 
not have the same agenda? 
It should not be considered so because CSR is aimed at bringing solutions to real problems in different 
societies, in specific sectors of economy. No one size fits all: we need different action plans to answer 
to the expectations expressed by the stakeholders. Priorities are to be defined through the dialogue 
with stakeholders and the action plans can be very different from one country to another, from one 
company to another. Anyway, it is time to act. Experts note the proximity between CSR and quality 
management: following the Deming wheel, a responsible corporation has to plan, do, check and act 
or adjust. As in human rights, the implementation is critical.
10.  Is there a danger in taking a risk management approach for 
business and human rights?
One entrance door into CSR is the risk approach. When the UK considered encouraging business to 
adopt a CSR policy, the Department of Trade and Industry issued a directive in 2000, obliging listed 
companies to mention in their annual report the material risks created by their activities. CSR is the 
answer to these risks: the company has to identify them, to disclose them and to put in place action 
plans to minimise or eliminate them, for example in the supply chain. 
However, the risk approach is not relevant in human rights. Any violation of human rights is 
unacceptable and a zero risk approach has to prevail in human rights: no violation of human rights is 
tolerated from States or from corporations.
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11.  On which forces to rely on in order to promote human rights in 
business?
The development of a strong CSR commitment in business requires a strong civil society and its 
empowerment from the State.  
We mentioned, among the necessary actors are the trade unions, the NGOs, the activists and the HR 
defenders, the media, the education system, the NHRIs. As we dedicated some of our discussion to 
them already, I would add the consumers and clients organisations which are a counter-power vis-à-
vis corporations. Labels play an important role in informing the consumers about the adherence of 
companies to CSR frameworks. We must forget neither the investors nor the representatives of the 
savers: as social responsible investment is a growing trend on the financial markets, they are voting 
in the annual meetings and negotiate engagements from the managers of listed companies. In that 
respect, the development by companies of a civil dialogue besides the social dialogue is also critical 
to CSR development.
12. What are the State’s duties?
The State is the only entity that has to ensure that business violations of human rights are not tolerated.
Our discussions have recalled that:
1. States are the ultimate duty-bearers for human rights obligations.
2. With regard to business and human rights, States also have specific duties as a public sector 
employer, a purchaser (public procurement), an investor and fund manager (public participations 
in companies), an insurer (pension funds management and credit for exports).
3. States should adopt business and human rights legislation consistent with international 
standards.
4. It is vital for States to organise the remedies –both judicial and non-judicial – to protect human 
rights defenders and whistle blowers. 
5. Education plays an important role in human rights protection, in HR public awareness and in HR 
violations prevention.
6. States need to tackle corruption at all levels. 
7. Trade and investment agreements should address and include labour and environmental 
standards.
8. States must allocate more responsibilities to civil society and social partners, knowing that 
social progress requires a social sphere independent from the political sphere and governed by 
the negotiations between employers and employees.
9. States should harmonise their political decision processes with scientific findings and 
technological impact assessments.
10. National Action Plans on human rights and business should be adopted and implemented.
If CSR requires a strong civil society, it also requires a strong State, able to take decisions and to avoid 
human rights violations.
On this note, I would like to observe that all players and actors have a long list of duties to perform. 
We go back home and have a long list of things to do.
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
AICHR ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
ATS  The US Alien Tort Statute
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CDDH Council of Europe Steering Committee on Human Rights 
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CoE Council of Europe
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DIHR Danish Institute for Human Rights
ECA Export Credit Agencies
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EGAT Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
EICC Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition
ETI Ethical Trading Initiative
EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EO Executive Order
EP Equator Principles
ESC European Social Charter
ESG Environmental, social and corporate governance
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FLA Fair Labor Association
FLEGT  EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Scheme
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSC Forest Stewardship Council
GBI Global Business Initiative on Human Rights
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GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Global Network Initiative
GP United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
HCP High Contracting Party
HRBA Human Rights-Based Approach to Development
HRD Human Rights Defenders
HRIA Human Rights Impact Assessment
HRIAM Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management
ICAR International Corporate Accountability Roundtable
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICHRP International Council on Human Rights Policy
ICGLR International Conference of the Great Lakes Region
ICMM International Council for Mining and Metals
ICT Information and Communications Technologies
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI International Finance Institution
IGO Inter-Governmental Organization
ILO International Labour Organization
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MCA Ministry of Corporate Affairs
MNC Multinational Corporation
MNE Multinational Enterprise
MSC Marine Stewardship Council
MSI Multi-stakeholder Initiative
NAP National Action Plan
NCP National Contact Point
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NHRI National Human Rights Institution
OECD Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner  for Human Rights
PIE Public Interest Entities 
111
RSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palmoil
SASAC State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
SEC US Securities and Exchange Commission
SECP Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
SIA Sustainability Impact Assessment
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
SOE State-Owned Enterprises
SRI Socially Responsible Investment
SRSG UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWIA Sector Wide Impact Assessment
SZSE Shenzhen Stock Exchange
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TNC Transnational Corporation
UCC Union Carbide Corporation
UCIL Union Carbide India Limited
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNGC United Nations Global Compact
UNHRC UN Human Rights Council
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNPRI UN Principles for Responsible Investment
UNWG  UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises
VPs Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
WTO World Trade Organization 
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ANNEX 2: SEMINAR PROGRAMME 
Day 1 – Tuesday, 18 November 2014
Venue: Crowne Plaza West Hanoi
09:00 - 12:30
Side Event on Human Rights and Businesses:
Collective Bargaining 
Organised by the Institute for Human Rights Studies, Institute for Workers and Trade 




ZHANG Yan, Executive Director, Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)
Opening Speech on Behalf of the Host, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
NGUYEN Thanh Hoa, Vice Minister of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(10 min)
Opening Speech on Behalf of the Organisers 




Rolf RING, Deputy Director, Raoul Wallenberg Institute 
Keynote Address 
Brice LALONDE, Special Advisor on Sustainable Development to the UN 
Global Compact (15 min)
Elaine TAN, Executive Director, ASEAN Foundation (15 min)
16:50 – 17:20 Joint presentation of Background Paper by Main Rapporteurs (30 min)
Claire METHVEN O’BRIEN, Strategic Advisor, Danish Institute for Human 
Rights
Sumi DHANARAJAN, Research Associate, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, 
National University of Singapore
19:00 – 20:30 Welcome Dinner (welcome speech by H.E. HA Kim Ngoc, Vice Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Viet Nam)
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Day 2 – Wednesday, 19 November 2014
Venue: Crowne Plaza West Hanoi
Simultaneous Working Groups
09:00 - 18:00
Working Group 1: State Duty to Protect Human Rights Against 
Violations by Businesses 
Moderator:    Delphia LIM (Harvard Kaufman Fellow)
Rapporteur:     Claire METHVEN O’BRIEN (Danish Institute for Human 
Rights)
Working Group 2: Corporate Responsibility and its Contribution to 
Human Rights Implementation
Moderator:    Jermyn BROOKS (Transparency International)
Rapporteur:   Shahamin ZAMAN (CSR Center) 
Working Group 3: Monitoring, Reporting and Access to Remedies
Moderator:    Jerome CHAPLIER (European Coalition for Corporate Justice)
Rapporteur:   Sumi DHANARAJAN (National University of Singapore)    
Working Group 4: Multi-stakeholder Cooperation
Moderator:    Maria Elena HERRERA (Asian Institute of Management)                
Rapporteur:    Karin BUHMANN (Roskilde University and Copenhagen 
Business School)
Day 3 – Thursday, 20 November 2014
Venue: Crowne Plaza West Hanoi 
Closing Plenary
09:30 - 10:30
Rapporteurs’ Summary on Each Working Group
Chair: Marine DE CARNÉ, Ambassador for Bioethics and Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, France
Working Group 1: State Duty to Protect Human Rights Against 
Violations by Businesses 
Presentation – Claire METHVEN O’BRIEN (15 min)
Working Group 2: Corporate Responsibility and its Contribution 
to Human Rights Implementation
Presentation – Shahamin ZAMAN (15min) 
Working Group 3: Monitoring, Reporting and Access to Remedies
Presentation – Sumi DHANARAJAN (15min)
Working Group 4: Multi-stakeholder Cooperation 
Presentation -  Karin BUHMANN (15 min)
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Day 3 – Thursday, 20 November 2014
Venue: Crowne Plaza West Hanoi 
10: 50 – 11:40 Q&A Discussion
13:00 - 15:00
Panel Discussion on Protecting Migrants: the Role of the Private 
Sector 
Chair: Thierry SCHWARZ, Director for Political and Economic Department, 
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)
• Christopher NG (UNI Global Union)
• Viet Anh DUONG (Center for Development and Integration)
• Serena LILLYWHITE (Oxfam)
15:00 - 15:30 Concluding Remarks 
Bengt E. JOHANSSON, Ambassador for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Sweden
Frédéric TIBERGHIEN, Technical Coordinator & Representative of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France, & State Counsellor - Conseil d’Etat 
<end of programme>
19:00 – 21:00
Side-event: National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights 
Organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Danish Insti-
tute for Human Rights  
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ANNEX 3: CONCEPT PAPER
According to a 2013 Global Trends report, 40 of the world’s 100 largest economic entities in 2012 
were business corporations1. Given their economic clout, the influence of businesses also extends to 
socio-political issues, and increasingly, their role and accountability in human rights protection and 
promotion has come under examination. 
Under international law, States are the only recognised legal bearers of human rights obligations and 
consequently only they can be held accountable for human rights violations. However, the preamble 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls on “every individual and every organ of society” 
to promote respect for these rights and to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance2. And as Prof. Louis Henkin noted “’Every individual and every organ of society’ excludes 
no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to all of them”3.
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First, it promoted a growing consensus that because business firms had the power to affect 
human rights, they should have direct human rights responsibilities. Second, it resulted in a series 
of recommendations that eventually led the UN Secretary General to appoint John Ruggie as the 
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1.   Corporate Clout 2013: Time for Responsible Capitalism, http://www.globaltrends.com/knowledge-center/features/shapers-
and-influencers/190-corporate-clout-2013-time-for-responsible-capitalism
2. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), preamble
3.  Henkin, Louis, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 
25:5,  1999,  17-25, page 25
4.  See the 1984 draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations
 http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2000.WG.2.WP.1.Add.2.En 
5.  The working group was set up in 1998 to study and report on human rights and business. 
6.  At the core of the 14 norms was the proposal that transnational corporations and other business entities should be brought 
directly under the ambit of international human rights law, humanitarian law, international labor law, environmental law, anti-
corruption law and consumer protection law (Hillmanns 2003: 1070). The Report called for expanding international human 
rights obligations to include transnational corporations as well. Not surprisingly, the report aroused strident opposition on the 
part of a significant section of the business community and governments (Amold 2010). 
7.  Ruggie, John, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2011
8.  http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
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also established a working group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises9. 
STATE DUTY TO PROTECT
Under international human rights treaties, States have the positive responsibility to ensure the rights 
of all persons under their jurisdiction (or within their territories) are not violated and as such ensure 
the observance of human rights by all third parties10. While States are not held responsible for human 
rights abuse committed by private enterprises per se, they could be in breach of their international 
legal obligations “where such abuse can be attributed to them, or where they fail to take appropriate 
steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuse”11. However, when it comes to 
legislation, there is no agreement as to which branch of law should be the test a company’s violation 
of human rights (domestic criminal law; public international law; tort or company law?) and it is not 
clear if the State’s ‘duty to protect’ includes adjudicating extra-territorial violations of trans-national 
corporations12. 
In order to provide a conducive environment for human rights, States may promote certain measures 
to regulate business activities13. In the European Union’s (EU) 2012 action plan to implement the new 
EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, Article 25 supports the implementation 
of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights14. The EU has plans to improve the 
functioning of the internal market by seeking transparency and disclosure on human rights aspects 
(amongst others) by European companies15. 
9.  Furthermore, the UNHRC also set up a Forum on Business and Human Rights (under the Working Group’s guidance) to 
“discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles [on Business and Human Rights] and 
promote dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights, including challenges faced in particular 
sectors, operational environments or in relation to specific rights or groups, as well as identifying good practices.” (paragraph 
12, UNGA Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4 ). UNGA Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4, available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement.
10.  For example, see the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention for the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women; Convention of the Rights of Child and its Optional Protocol (OPSC);  Convention on the Rights 
of People with Disabilities; Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers
11.  Ruggie, John, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2011
12.  France, in its 2004 legal reforms, extends criminal liability to all legal entities under French law, including to those crimes 
committed outside its territories. For more details, see   H. Ascensio, ‘Extraterritoriality as an Instrument’, Contribution 
to the work of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on human rights and transnational corporations and 
other businesses, available at http://www.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/IREDIES/Contributions_en_ligne/H._ASCENSIO/
Extraterritoriality__Human_Rights_and_Business_Entreprises.pdf. 
  Another example is the American Alien Tort Claims Act, (ATCA) is a federal statute that provides courts with jurisdiction to 
consider all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of which America is a party. 
Advisory Council of Jurists (ACJ) Reference on Human Rights, Corporate Accountability and Government Responsibility, The 
13th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, Kuala Lumpur, 27-31 July 2008 –Part 
2: Supplementary Paper 
13.  For example, in the USA, the Dodd-Frank Act required US-listed companies to disclose payments to governments and other 
operations. In France, under the Grenelle 2 Act, the government is required to submit a three-yearly report to Parliament 
on how firms are fulfilling their reporting requirement and on action to “promote corporate social responsibility” taken at 
national, European and international level. In Indonesia, CSR has been introduced in three laws: the Investment Law (Law No. 
25/2007); the Limited Liability Company Law (Law No. 40/2007); and the State-Owned Enterprises Law (Law No. 19/2003). 
  More details available at http://csr-asia.com/csr-asia-weekly-news-detail.php?id=10419. For a comprehensive list of CSR 
disclosure efforts by national governments and stock exchanges, see http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/
Government%20disclosure%20efforts.pdf 
14.  Identifying the responsibilities of both the European Commission (EC) and the member states, the action plan called for the 
EC to prepare human rights guidance for companies in three sectors (oil & gas; information communication technology; and 
employment & recruitment agencies) and for small and medium-sized enterprises, and to also report on EU priorities for 
the effective implementation of the Guiding Principles; the plan called for member states to develop national plans for the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles. 
  The 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, document 11855/12 is available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf . The EC’s sector-specific 
human rights guides can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-
responsibility/human-rights/index_en.htm  
15. Lambrinidis, S.  (2013), Keynote Address, UN Forum on Business & Human Rights, Geneva, 4-5 December 2012.
117
In Southeast Asia, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been incorporated in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN’s) 2009 Socio-Cultural Community 
Blueprint as part of its aim to engage the private sector in the development of the ASEAN 
community16. CSR is also included in the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights’ 
(AICHR’s) five-year work plans and is one of the topics on which AICHR will conduct a thematic study 
- in 2012 it held its first coordination meeting on the topic17. 
State owned or controlled businesses are also subject to the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights and often are in the best position to ensure that the relevant policies and guidelines 
for human rights protection are implemented. Furthermore, when States decide to contract out 
their public functions to private enterprises, they do not relinquish their international human rights 
obligations and can be held responsible for a private company’s actions – especially when private 
security firms are hired for detention and immigration services18. The 2008 Montreux Document 
which was finalised by 17 States affirms the obligations and responsibilities of States19 in relation 
to private military and security companies. Although not legally binding, the Document provides 
recommendations and a good practice toolkit to assist States in establishing oversight and control 
mechanisms over private military and security companies20. 
While the manner in which companies manage their supply chains21 is also increasingly scrutinised, 
the ability of States to support (and not just advocate) responsible supply chain management needs 
to be addressed, especially in the informal sector where work may be sub-contracted to home workers 
and difficult to monitor for human rights observance22. 
Competitive production costs are also a challenge in relation to responsible supply chain management, 
especially when it comes to living wages23. While anti-competitive business practices, import barriers 
and domestic subsidies all play their share in distorting price levels, price competitiveness remains 
a crucial element for financial success of companies. Even though countries may push for better 
access to markets and fair trade, trade agreements remain sensitive in relation to responsible supply 
chain management because in order to retain their competitive position, countries have to “balance 
the desire to provide low production costs with the duty to protect the right of adequate standards of 
living for workers”24. 
16.  See section C.3 “Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)” in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, 
available at http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-19.pdf 
17.  CSR has also been added to the revised work plan (2009-2015) of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) which aims to 
narrow the development divide and enhance ASEAN’s competitiveness as a region. In addition to providing training on CSR 
concepts and their effective implementation, the work plan intends to “Develop and implement a comprehensive program to 
build capacity of CLMV countries [Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam] for effective implementation of international best 
practices on corporate social responsibility. 
  See C3. Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI 
Work Plan 2 (2009-2015), available at http://aseansummit.mfa.go.th/14/pdf/Outcome_Document/IAI%20Strategic%20
Framework%20-%20Work%20Plan%202%20_2009-2015%5B1%5D.pdf 
18. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1020/2001, 78th session, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (2003)
19.  The Montreux Document highlights the responsibilities of 3 types of States - Contracting States ( those States that hire 
private security and military companies), Territorial States (those States on whose territory these companies operate) and 
Home States (States in which the companies are based).
20. Full text with explanatory notes is available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf
21.  The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) defines supply chain responsibility (ICC 2007:2): “as a voluntary commitment 
by companies to manage their relationships with suppliers in a responsible way. As a result of their purchasing activities, 
companies may have some opportunities to influence constructively their suppliers’ social and environmental performance…
Whatever mechanism is used, the most effective way to achieve sustained improvement over time is through the development 
of a long-term collaborative relation between corporate buyers and their suppliers, through which suppliers can internalize 
change by participating in the shaping of social and environmental performance objectives, based on their own perception 
of their business capacity and needs.”
22.  This is especially true for child labour. As Opijnen and Oldenziel point out in the context of the EU where abolishment of 
child labour is high on the political agenda, “the further back in the supply chain the child labour occurs, the more difficult 
it is to detect by EU-based companies. It remains difficult to monitor and control the practices of entities at the roots of the 
supply chain, also when companies require suppliers to sign their supplier’s code of conduct”. Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris 
Oldenziel 2010: Responsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing 
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11.  Ruggie, John, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2011
12.  France, in its 2004 legal reforms, extends criminal liability to all legal entities under French law, including to those crimes 
committed outside its territories. For more details, see   H. Ascensio, ‘Extraterritoriality as an Instrument’, Contribution 
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15. Lambrinidis, S.  (2013), Keynote Address, UN Forum on Business & Human Rights, Geneva, 4-5 December 2012.
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While the State’s duty to protect is undisputed, achieving policy coherence within and between 
different state institutions remains to be achieved. As the Special Representative has stated, “[t] 
he most prevalent cause of legal and policy incoherence is that departments and agencies which 
directly shape business practices – including corporate law and securities regulation, investment, 
expert credit and insurance, and trade – typically work in isolation from, and uninformed by, their 
Government’s own human rights obligations and agencies”25. Such horizontal policy coherence 
also needs to be matched by vertical policy coherence26 between national and international law, 
particularly to enhance peer learning and to enhance capacity building on these issues at the 
international level27.
CORPORATE (SOCIAL) RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The corporate responsibility to protect human rights is “a global standard of expected conduct for 
all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists independently of States’ abilities and/or 
willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. 
And it exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights”28. Corporate responsibility has been defined by the European Commission (EC) as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”29. In recent years, there have been 
an increasing number of large multinational companies who have begun to publicly acknowledge 
responsibility for their corporate actions – reporting on corporate responsibility has increased with 
about 5,800 reports in 2010 compared to less than 50 in the early 1990s30.
As part of the efforts to regulate corporate behaviour, there have been many initiatives introduced 
which provide voluntary codes and industry specific guidelines to promote responsible business 
practices31 –the 2002 United Nations Global Compact is one of the best known voluntary frameworks 
which elaborates 10 principles in human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption to which 
participating companies should adhere. 
Like the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) itself, all these codes and initiatives are 
evolving; while they do offer several advantages and can be a powerful regulation tool when adopted 
by companies, they do suffer from their limitations – being voluntary, their adoption cannot be 
25.  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect,
respect and remedy” framework, United Nations Human Rights Council - A/HRC/14/27, 9 April 2010
26.  For more information, see United Nations (2011), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04
27.  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises,  Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy”
framework, United Nations Human Rights Council - A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009.
28.  Ruggie, John, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and
Remedy’ Framework, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2011
29.  In 2011, the EC published a new policy on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in which it put forward a new, simpler
definition of   CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”. In order to meet their responsibilities, 
enterprises “should have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns 
into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders”. 
 Please see European Commission (2011), ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and The Committee of the Regions,  COM(2011) 681 final, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/
itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5511 
30.  Lucci, P (2012), Post-2015 MDGs: What role for business? Overseas Development Institute. As another example, in 2006, 
there was only one company in China (State Grid) that filed a CSR report. This figure rose to 1,722 companies in 2012. 
http://www.syntao.com/Uploads/file/%E5%95%86%E9%81%93%E6%99%BA%E6%B1%87%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E6
%9C%9F-%E5%B0%81%E9%9D%A2%E9%93%BE%E6%8E%A5%E7%89%88.pdf 
31.  For example, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977); ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000);
United Nations Global Compact (2000); the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2000); The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (2002); United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises (2003); Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2007); Equator Principles (2006);
International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) certification schemes such as the recent ISO2006
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enforced32; being sector specific, they have limited application; some may lack formal compliance 
mechanisms and may have no means to monitor performance. 
Very often such initiatives may fail to fully inform or translate the international human rights 
obligations on which they are based (since international human rights instruments are targeted 
mainly to States) thereby making the full extension of these obligations to corporations, problematic33. 
Furthermore, their observance by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) is challenging  - while 
these companies have less capacity and more informal management structures,  they still can have 
a severe impact on human rights. 
Voluntary codes and initiatives to improve conditions in supply chain management34 also exist but they 
too, prove insufficient to deal with transparency and non-compliance with human rights standards in 
the supply chain. Although all actors in the supply chain are expected to follow the same standards, 
in practice transparency beyond first tier suppliers is difficult to monitor (especially on issues of child 
labour and in sectors such as the garment industry where work may be contracted to smaller units). 
Workers, SMEs or suppliers further down the chain may be disadvantaged by lacking knowledge, 
funds and access to relevant market information35. 
Non-compliance in supply chains also often takes place in countries where human rights standards 
are not guaranteed at the national scale or where enforcement remains weak (especially in relation 
to labour rights, migrant labour, child labour and living wages); in such situations even though reports 
emerge of companies exploiting weak regulation, their responsibilities towards their human rights 
obligations do not diminish36. 
The rights of indigenous groups have been protected in international human rights standards (for 
example, see the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO’s convention 
number 107 and 169) but the focus has been on State responsibilities and not much on the 
responsibilities of other actors. Nonetheless, many of these standards have relevance to the conduct 
of business activities, especially for lands traditionally owned or controlled by indigenous groups37. 
Additionally, newer guidelines such as the World Bank’s Operational Policy on Indigenous people 
(OP 4.10), International Financial Corporation’s Performance standard PS-7, Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s 2004 Akwé: Kon Guidelines impose responsibilities on corporations to ensure that both 
domestic and international indigenous standards are being observed before they commence any 
business activity in an indigenous community. The International Council on Mining and Metals has 
released a good practice guide for mining companies to address the impact of their activities on 
indigenous communities38.  
32.  This can be particularly challenging for business codes of conduct that call for the respect of cultural rights and non-
discriminatory labour practices. In France, the Cultural Diversity Charter (Charte de la Diversité) as signed by over 2000 
French companies requires signatories to ensure the promotion and the equitable respect of cultural diversity in their labour 
force; however, being a non-legal document, compliance is not legally binding on members. 
33.  Preuss and Brown’s study in 2012 shows that just over half (57.1%) of the 98 firms in the FTSE 100 index address human 
rights in either a separate human rights policy or in another CSR tool, such as a code of conduct or a CSR policy. Notably, 
almost a third (31.6%) of all firms adopted at least one CSR tool but do not discuss human rights in these. In addition, the 
content of the human rights policies was also found to be rather shallow, as of the 37 rights in the UN Declaration only six are 
addressed in half or more of the documents by the FTSE 100 firms. Preuss and Brown (2012), Business policies on human 
rights: an analysis of their content and prevalence among FTSE 100 firms, Journal of Business Ethics, Sep (I) 2012, Volume: 
109 Issue: 3
34.  Some of the standards include the SA8000, the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), FLO Fairtrade Standards, the 
Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI), the International Council of Toy industries (ICTI), Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production 
(WRAP), Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC), the international Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), Fair Wear 
Foundation (FWF), Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), the Better Sugar 
Cane Initiative (BSI), the Workers’ Rights Consortium, the Electronic Industry Citizen Coalition, the Rainforest Alliance and 
Utz Certified
35.  Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel 2010: Responsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and 
challenges for addressing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of EU-based companies.
36.  See, Hahn (2012), Corporate citizenship in developing countries: Conceptualisations of human-rights-based 
evaluative benchmarks. African Journal of Business Ethics 2012;6:30-38, Available from: http://www.ajobe.org/text.
asp?2012/6/1/30/104700
37.  See articles 25-29 of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
38. See http://www.icmm.com/publications/indigenous-peoples-and-mining-good-practice-guide
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While the State’s duty to protect is undisputed, achieving policy coherence within and between 
different state institutions remains to be achieved. As the Special Representative has stated, “[t] 
he most prevalent cause of legal and policy incoherence is that departments and agencies which 
directly shape business practices – including corporate law and securities regulation, investment, 
expert credit and insurance, and trade – typically work in isolation from, and uninformed by, their 
Government’s own human rights obligations and agencies”25. Such horizontal policy coherence 
also needs to be matched by vertical policy coherence26 between national and international law, 
particularly to enhance peer learning and to enhance capacity building on these issues at the 
international level27.
CORPORATE (SOCIAL) RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The corporate responsibility to protect human rights is “a global standard of expected conduct for 
all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists independently of States’ abilities and/or 
willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. 
And it exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights”28. Corporate responsibility has been defined by the European Commission (EC) as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”29. In recent years, there have been 
an increasing number of large multinational companies who have begun to publicly acknowledge 
responsibility for their corporate actions – reporting on corporate responsibility has increased with 
about 5,800 reports in 2010 compared to less than 50 in the early 1990s30.
As part of the efforts to regulate corporate behaviour, there have been many initiatives introduced 
which provide voluntary codes and industry specific guidelines to promote responsible business 
practices31 –the 2002 United Nations Global Compact is one of the best known voluntary frameworks 
which elaborates 10 principles in human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption to which 
participating companies should adhere. 
Like the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) itself, all these codes and initiatives are 
evolving; while they do offer several advantages and can be a powerful regulation tool when adopted 
by companies, they do suffer from their limitations – being voluntary, their adoption cannot be 
25.  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect,
respect and remedy” framework, United Nations Human Rights Council - A/HRC/14/27, 9 April 2010
26.  For more information, see United Nations (2011), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04
27.  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises,  Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy”
framework, United Nations Human Rights Council - A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009.
28.  Ruggie, John, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and
Remedy’ Framework, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2011
29.  In 2011, the EC published a new policy on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in which it put forward a new, simpler
definition of   CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”. In order to meet their responsibilities, 
enterprises “should have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns 
into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders”. 
 Please see European Commission (2011), ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and The Committee of the Regions,  COM(2011) 681 final, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/
itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5511 
30.  Lucci, P (2012), Post-2015 MDGs: What role for business? Overseas Development Institute. As another example, in 2006, 
there was only one company in China (State Grid) that filed a CSR report. This figure rose to 1,722 companies in 2012. 
http://www.syntao.com/Uploads/file/%E5%95%86%E9%81%93%E6%99%BA%E6%B1%87%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E6
%9C%9F-%E5%B0%81%E9%9D%A2%E9%93%BE%E6%8E%A5%E7%89%88.pdf 
31.  For example, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977); ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000);
United Nations Global Compact (2000); the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2000); The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (2002); United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises (2003); Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2007); Equator Principles (2006);
International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) certification schemes such as the recent ISO2006
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enforced32; being sector specific, they have limited application; some may lack formal compliance 
mechanisms and may have no means to monitor performance. 
Very often such initiatives may fail to fully inform or translate the international human rights 
obligations on which they are based (since international human rights instruments are targeted 
mainly to States) thereby making the full extension of these obligations to corporations, problematic33. 
Furthermore, their observance by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) is challenging  - while 
these companies have less capacity and more informal management structures,  they still can have 
a severe impact on human rights. 
Voluntary codes and initiatives to improve conditions in supply chain management34 also exist but they 
too, prove insufficient to deal with transparency and non-compliance with human rights standards in 
the supply chain. Although all actors in the supply chain are expected to follow the same standards, 
in practice transparency beyond first tier suppliers is difficult to monitor (especially on issues of child 
labour and in sectors such as the garment industry where work may be contracted to smaller units). 
Workers, SMEs or suppliers further down the chain may be disadvantaged by lacking knowledge, 
funds and access to relevant market information35. 
Non-compliance in supply chains also often takes place in countries where human rights standards 
are not guaranteed at the national scale or where enforcement remains weak (especially in relation 
to labour rights, migrant labour, child labour and living wages); in such situations even though reports 
emerge of companies exploiting weak regulation, their responsibilities towards their human rights 
obligations do not diminish36. 
The rights of indigenous groups have been protected in international human rights standards (for 
example, see the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO’s convention 
number 107 and 169) but the focus has been on State responsibilities and not much on the 
responsibilities of other actors. Nonetheless, many of these standards have relevance to the conduct 
of business activities, especially for lands traditionally owned or controlled by indigenous groups37. 
Additionally, newer guidelines such as the World Bank’s Operational Policy on Indigenous people 
(OP 4.10), International Financial Corporation’s Performance standard PS-7, Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s 2004 Akwé: Kon Guidelines impose responsibilities on corporations to ensure that both 
domestic and international indigenous standards are being observed before they commence any 
business activity in an indigenous community. The International Council on Mining and Metals has 
released a good practice guide for mining companies to address the impact of their activities on 
indigenous communities38.  
32.  This can be particularly challenging for business codes of conduct that call for the respect of cultural rights and non-
discriminatory labour practices. In France, the Cultural Diversity Charter (Charte de la Diversité) as signed by over 2000 
French companies requires signatories to ensure the promotion and the equitable respect of cultural diversity in their labour 
force; however, being a non-legal document, compliance is not legally binding on members. 
33.  Preuss and Brown’s study in 2012 shows that just over half (57.1%) of the 98 firms in the FTSE 100 index address human 
rights in either a separate human rights policy or in another CSR tool, such as a code of conduct or a CSR policy. Notably, 
almost a third (31.6%) of all firms adopted at least one CSR tool but do not discuss human rights in these. In addition, the 
content of the human rights policies was also found to be rather shallow, as of the 37 rights in the UN Declaration only six are 
addressed in half or more of the documents by the FTSE 100 firms. Preuss and Brown (2012), Business policies on human 
rights: an analysis of their content and prevalence among FTSE 100 firms, Journal of Business Ethics, Sep (I) 2012, Volume: 
109 Issue: 3
34.  Some of the standards include the SA8000, the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), FLO Fairtrade Standards, the 
Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI), the International Council of Toy industries (ICTI), Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production 
(WRAP), Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC), the international Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), Fair Wear 
Foundation (FWF), Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), the Better Sugar 
Cane Initiative (BSI), the Workers’ Rights Consortium, the Electronic Industry Citizen Coalition, the Rainforest Alliance and 
Utz Certified
35.  Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel 2010: Responsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and 
challenges for addressing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of EU-based companies.
36.  See, Hahn (2012), Corporate citizenship in developing countries: Conceptualisations of human-rights-based 
evaluative benchmarks. African Journal of Business Ethics 2012;6:30-38, Available from: http://www.ajobe.org/text.
asp?2012/6/1/30/104700
37.  See articles 25-29 of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
38. See http://www.icmm.com/publications/indigenous-peoples-and-mining-good-practice-guide
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International efforts such as the Global Sullivan Principles, the Global Reporting Initiative, and 
Social Accountability 8000 encourage companies to be transparent in their human rights impact 
assessment and reporting to their stakeholders and social partners. Due diligence is an important 
aspect of human rights impact assessment as it encourages companies to undertake regular 
assessments and include human rights risk assessment into company decision-making. Increasingly 
there have been calls for policy coherence in business enterprises as well, to link their human rights 
responsibilities to their wider organisational policies and practices and also for their other business 
activities39. In 2013, the Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN, together with Shift and Mazars, 
launched the Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI) which is a global, non-proprietary, 
initiative to develop public reporting and assurance frameworks based on the UN guiding principles40. 
GREATER ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
Providing access to remedy is closely tied to State responsibility to protect, reinforced in several 
international and regional human rights instruments which all emphasise the need for States 
to “conduct prompt, thorough and fair investigations; provide access to prompt, effective and 
independent remedial mechanisms, established through judicial, administrative, legislative and 
other appropriate means, impose appropriate sanctions, including criminalizing conduct and 
pursuing prosecutions where abuses amount to international crimes; and provide a range of forms 
of appropriate reparation, such as compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, and changes in relevant 
laws”41. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, provide government-backed standards 
for responsible conduct for multinational enterprises operating in or from OECD member countries. 
Although not legally binding, the OECD guidelines are unique in providing a dispute resolution 
mechanism for investigating and resolving complaints about corporate misconduct42; and reach 
further than just OECD countries with ten additional non-OECD countries adhering to them. 
In particular, special attention should be paid to vulnerable groups (including women, young people, 
indigenous communities and other minorities) to ensure that they have access to remedies and justice. 
Access to remedy can be provided by establishing State-based grievance mechanisms (judicial and 
non-judicial43) which can be supplemented “by the remedial functions of collaborative initiatives as 
well as those of international and regional human rights mechanisms” 44; States should facilitate 
public awareness and knowledge about such mechanisms and provide support where needed.
39.  For example, the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is currently working on proposals for an International 
Integrated Reporting Framework that will link a company’s strategy, governance and performance to its social and 
environmental context, in one report. http://www.theiirc.org/  
40.  The frameworks developed by RAFI will be “non-proprietary and publicly available to all companies and assurance providers 
to use in their work. They are intended to be relevant to, and viable for, all companies and auditors/assurance providers 
in any region, and to dovetail with existing reporting initiatives”. Detailed information can be found at http://business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/rafi-framing-document-2013.pdf 
41.  UNHRC (2009), Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right 
to Development, Report Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie,  Addendum - State obligations to provide access to 
remedy for human rights abuses by third parties, including business: an overview of international and regional provisions, 
commentary and decisions, A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 15 May 2009
42.  Governments that adhere to the Guidelines must establish a National Contact Point (NCP) to handle all matters relating to 
the Guidelines, including investigating complaints from NGOs and trade unions against companies who have failed to follow 
the Guidelines. NCPS can be based in a relevant government department or they can be independent structures comprising 
government officials, trade unions, employers unions and sometimes also NGOs. The OECD Guidelines were updated in 
2011. Relevant documents, including a comparison between the 2000 and 2011 texts, can be found at http://www.oecd.
org/corporate/mne/2011update.htm  
43.  State-based non-judicial mechanisms are grievance mechanisms initiated by the State with a mandate to handle grievances 
or to advise in adjudicative or mediation-based grievance procedures. Examples include National Contact Points in the 
42 States adhering to the OECD or National Human Rights Institutions. Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel 2010: 
Responsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing human rights 
and other CSR issues in supply chains of EU-based companies for the case-study of the garment industry in Bangladesh.
44.  United Nations (2011), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04
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Access to remedy can also be provided at the company level but is dependent on company goodwill 
and other contextual factors such as national policies and legislation45. In instances where workers’ 
involvement mechanisms are established, success is dependent on building capacity of workers and 
getting them to be actively involved46.Trade Unions are also important institutions for addressing 
rights violations but they can face the same difficulties. 
Constraints on access to remedy depend on who can access such mechanisms - in terms of the 
legal barriers that certain groups may face (for example, migrant workers may be excluded from the 
same level of legal protection) and also in terms of the restrictions placed on which persons have the 
legal standing to seek remedy; at which level abuses take place (judicial mechanisms may not have 
the mandate to address extra-territorial violations that take place throughout a company’s supply 
chain); how grievance mechanisms are designed (lack of awareness, trust and  transparency, lack of 
proper representation, inefficient timeframes for redress, high costs, inadequate compensation and 
restitution, fear of reprisal are all factors that may hinder efficient access to remedy)47. Mechanisms 
may be specific in scope and in what type of complaints can be brought forward48. 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION
Grassroot activists and the media have put corporate practices under greater scrutiny so that 
companies risk reputation by not complying with fair practices. However, while ‘name and shame’ 
approach may have some advantages49, increasingly dialogue and constructive engagement between 
all stakeholder groups is being followed and several human rights organisations have also entered 
into dialogue with businesses50. Many UN agencies have established their own multi-stakeholder 
partnerships to improve business practices in different sectors51.
The UN Guiding Principles recognise the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation (especially in 
providing access to remedy), and urge companies to engage in external consultations “with credible, 
independent experts, including from Governments, civil society, national human rights institutions and 
relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives”52. A growing number of business groups support community- 
45.  This is especially true for the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining which are considered as ‘enabling 
rights’ but are not implemented in all countries. According to a UNHRC survey about 66% of all companies worldwide 
recognise both freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Outside Europe and the USA this is about 
50%. For more details, please see Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel (2010), Responsible Supply Chain Management, 
Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of 
EU-based companies.
46.  For the example of workers’ involvement, see the case-study of the Workers’ Forum for factories producing for Reebok 
and Nike in India, mentioned in Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel (2010), Responsible Supply Chain Management, 
Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of 
EU-based companies.
47.  For more details, see United Nations (2011) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04
48.  While the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises provide a grievance mechanism, it has narrowed scope in being 
limited to “investment-like” business relationships only and has limited interpretation (complaints on living wages and 
biodiversity can be excluded. See Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel (2010), Responsible Supply Chain Management, 
Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of 
EU-based companies.
49.  When LIFE Magazine published a feature on child workers producing footballs for Nike in Pakistan in the 1990s, the 
company’s sales plummeted as a result of consumer boycotts. Thereafter, the company became the loudest advocate of fair 
working practices, contributing to the development and diffusion of fair labour standards. Lucci (2012), Post-2015 MDGs: 
What role for business? Overseas Development Institute
50.  For example, see Amnesty International’s Human Rights Principles for Companies www.amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/1998/ACT/
A7000198.htm. Human Rights and Global Witness have developed country specific recommendations for oil companies 
operating in Nigeria and Angola.
51.  For a comprehensive list, see http://www.business-humanrights.org. At the regional level, business networks such as CSR 
Europe (http://www.csreurope.org/home) and the ASEAN CSR Network (http://www.asean-csr-network.org/c/) engage with 
regional intergovernmental organisations and other regional actors as part of their efforts to improve CSR in their respective 
regions. The ASEAN CSR Network, which includes the ASEAN Foundation, framed a CSR Policy Statement for businesses in 
its participating countries to follow, http://www.asean-csr-network.org/c/news-a-resources/csr-policy-statement.
52.  United Nations (2011), UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
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International efforts such as the Global Sullivan Principles, the Global Reporting Initiative, and 
Social Accountability 8000 encourage companies to be transparent in their human rights impact 
assessment and reporting to their stakeholders and social partners. Due diligence is an important 
aspect of human rights impact assessment as it encourages companies to undertake regular 
assessments and include human rights risk assessment into company decision-making. Increasingly 
there have been calls for policy coherence in business enterprises as well, to link their human rights 
responsibilities to their wider organisational policies and practices and also for their other business 
activities39. In 2013, the Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN, together with Shift and Mazars, 
launched the Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI) which is a global, non-proprietary, 
initiative to develop public reporting and assurance frameworks based on the UN guiding principles40. 
GREATER ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
Providing access to remedy is closely tied to State responsibility to protect, reinforced in several 
international and regional human rights instruments which all emphasise the need for States 
to “conduct prompt, thorough and fair investigations; provide access to prompt, effective and 
independent remedial mechanisms, established through judicial, administrative, legislative and 
other appropriate means, impose appropriate sanctions, including criminalizing conduct and 
pursuing prosecutions where abuses amount to international crimes; and provide a range of forms 
of appropriate reparation, such as compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, and changes in relevant 
laws”41. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, provide government-backed standards 
for responsible conduct for multinational enterprises operating in or from OECD member countries. 
Although not legally binding, the OECD guidelines are unique in providing a dispute resolution 
mechanism for investigating and resolving complaints about corporate misconduct42; and reach 
further than just OECD countries with ten additional non-OECD countries adhering to them. 
In particular, special attention should be paid to vulnerable groups (including women, young people, 
indigenous communities and other minorities) to ensure that they have access to remedies and justice. 
Access to remedy can be provided by establishing State-based grievance mechanisms (judicial and 
non-judicial43) which can be supplemented “by the remedial functions of collaborative initiatives as 
well as those of international and regional human rights mechanisms” 44; States should facilitate 
public awareness and knowledge about such mechanisms and provide support where needed.
39.  For example, the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is currently working on proposals for an International 
Integrated Reporting Framework that will link a company’s strategy, governance and performance to its social and 
environmental context, in one report. http://www.theiirc.org/  
40.  The frameworks developed by RAFI will be “non-proprietary and publicly available to all companies and assurance providers 
to use in their work. They are intended to be relevant to, and viable for, all companies and auditors/assurance providers 
in any region, and to dovetail with existing reporting initiatives”. Detailed information can be found at http://business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/rafi-framing-document-2013.pdf 
41.  UNHRC (2009), Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right 
to Development, Report Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie,  Addendum - State obligations to provide access to 
remedy for human rights abuses by third parties, including business: an overview of international and regional provisions, 
commentary and decisions, A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 15 May 2009
42.  Governments that adhere to the Guidelines must establish a National Contact Point (NCP) to handle all matters relating to 
the Guidelines, including investigating complaints from NGOs and trade unions against companies who have failed to follow 
the Guidelines. NCPS can be based in a relevant government department or they can be independent structures comprising 
government officials, trade unions, employers unions and sometimes also NGOs. The OECD Guidelines were updated in 
2011. Relevant documents, including a comparison between the 2000 and 2011 texts, can be found at http://www.oecd.
org/corporate/mne/2011update.htm  
43.  State-based non-judicial mechanisms are grievance mechanisms initiated by the State with a mandate to handle grievances 
or to advise in adjudicative or mediation-based grievance procedures. Examples include National Contact Points in the 
42 States adhering to the OECD or National Human Rights Institutions. Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel 2010: 
Responsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing human rights 
and other CSR issues in supply chains of EU-based companies for the case-study of the garment industry in Bangladesh.
44.  United Nations (2011), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04
121
Access to remedy can also be provided at the company level but is dependent on company goodwill 
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involvement mechanisms are established, success is dependent on building capacity of workers and 
getting them to be actively involved46.Trade Unions are also important institutions for addressing 
rights violations but they can face the same difficulties. 
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same level of legal protection) and also in terms of the restrictions placed on which persons have the 
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the mandate to address extra-territorial violations that take place throughout a company’s supply 
chain); how grievance mechanisms are designed (lack of awareness, trust and  transparency, lack of 
proper representation, inefficient timeframes for redress, high costs, inadequate compensation and 
restitution, fear of reprisal are all factors that may hinder efficient access to remedy)47. Mechanisms 
may be specific in scope and in what type of complaints can be brought forward48. 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION
Grassroot activists and the media have put corporate practices under greater scrutiny so that 
companies risk reputation by not complying with fair practices. However, while ‘name and shame’ 
approach may have some advantages49, increasingly dialogue and constructive engagement between 
all stakeholder groups is being followed and several human rights organisations have also entered 
into dialogue with businesses50. Many UN agencies have established their own multi-stakeholder 
partnerships to improve business practices in different sectors51.
The UN Guiding Principles recognise the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation (especially in 
providing access to remedy), and urge companies to engage in external consultations “with credible, 
independent experts, including from Governments, civil society, national human rights institutions and 
relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives”52. A growing number of business groups support community- 
45.  This is especially true for the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining which are considered as ‘enabling 
rights’ but are not implemented in all countries. According to a UNHRC survey about 66% of all companies worldwide 
recognise both freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Outside Europe and the USA this is about 
50%. For more details, please see Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris Oldenziel (2010), Responsible Supply Chain Management, 
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46.  For the example of workers’ involvement, see the case-study of the Workers’ Forum for factories producing for Reebok 
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Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of 
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47.  For more details, see United Nations (2011) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
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48.  While the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises provide a grievance mechanism, it has narrowed scope in being 
limited to “investment-like” business relationships only and has limited interpretation (complaints on living wages and 
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49.  When LIFE Magazine published a feature on child workers producing footballs for Nike in Pakistan in the 1990s, the 
company’s sales plummeted as a result of consumer boycotts. Thereafter, the company became the loudest advocate of fair 
working practices, contributing to the development and diffusion of fair labour standards. Lucci (2012), Post-2015 MDGs: 
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50.  For example, see Amnesty International’s Human Rights Principles for Companies www.amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/1998/ACT/
A7000198.htm. Human Rights and Global Witness have developed country specific recommendations for oil companies 
operating in Nigeria and Angola.
51.  For a comprehensive list, see http://www.business-humanrights.org. At the regional level, business networks such as CSR 
Europe (http://www.csreurope.org/home) and the ASEAN CSR Network (http://www.asean-csr-network.org/c/) engage with 
regional intergovernmental organisations and other regional actors as part of their efforts to improve CSR in their respective 
regions. The ASEAN CSR Network, which includes the ASEAN Foundation, framed a CSR Policy Statement for businesses in 
its participating countries to follow, http://www.asean-csr-network.org/c/news-a-resources/csr-policy-statement.
52.  United Nations (2011), UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
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oriented development initiatives both at the local and international level53. In developing countries 
where domestic and foreign companies have become influential actors in development54 questions 
about the manner in which the private sector can best contribute to development in the post-2015 
development agenda are being raised55. Private investors56 and company shareholders57 are also 
increasingly being recognised as actors who can influence change in the manner in which business 
is conducted. 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) have an important role in reporting and monitoring human 
rights violations by non-state actors as well as providing guidance on human rights observance 
practices58. The Danish Institute for Human Rights has international renown for its Human Rights and 
Business Project which offers a number of services including a web-based self-assessment tool for 
companies on human rights compliance; business training courses for both companies and NHRIs, 
advice to improving codes and a human rights hotline providing advice to companies who may not 
have in-house human rights advisory services. Many NHRIs also exchange information with each 
other – for example, the South Korean and Philippine NHRIs have a verbal agreement to alert each 
other where an issue arises in relation to migrant workers. A similar agreement also exists between 
the Philippines and Malaysian NHRIs.
The 14th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights will be looking at key aspects of business and 
human rights, especially with regards to the situation in ASEM member countries and regionally in 
Asia and Europe. The four working group topics are:
1. State Duty to Protect Human Rights Against Violations by Businesses
2. Corporate Responsibility and its Contribution to Human Rights Implementation 
3. Monitoring, Reporting and Access to Remedies
4. Multi-stakeholder cooperation
Cross-Cutting Questions:
1. What are the limits to the responsibilities of corporations under international law and international 
criminal law? Are there regional differences about the role of businesses in society (eg, are there 
different understandings of the concept of corporate citizenship?) 
2. At the international level, what can be done to make CSR and human rights protection a bigger 
consideration in trade agreements and practices? What is the role of organisations such as the 
WTO and ILO in this aspect?
53.  For example, many ICT companies have been active in bridging the ‘digital divide’ - Hewlett Packard’s E-Inclusion initiative, 
Netcore Solutions in India, Vodacom developing community access centres in southern Africa, Cisco’s Netaid, Ericsson’s 
‘First On the Ground initiative’ and Microsoft’s ‘Refugee Registration Project’ are notable models.
54.  For example, the Netherlands National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development developed the 
MDG Scan, an assessment framework to measure the impact of private companies in developing countries, in contributing 
towards achieving progress of the MDGs.
55.  Lucci (2012), Post-2015 MDGs: What role for business? Overseas Development Institute
56.  The concept of Socially Responsible Investment explicitly recognises the “relevance to the investor of environmental, social 
and governance factors, and of the long-term health and stability of the market as a whole. It requires investors to pay 
attention to wider contextual factors including the expectations of the societies of which they are part. 
  See, UNPRI, “Principles of Responsible Investing”, http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=wp-content/uploads/1.
Whatisresponsibleinvestment.pdf 
57.  Shareholder resolutions have increasingly called on companies to include human rights due diligence into their operations. 
See http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/812-taking-action-to-respect-human-rights-shareholders-shift-from-policy-to-action 
or http://www.huffingtonpost.com/margaret-jungk/mcdonalds-shareholders-no_b_3317423.html for examples.
58.  The 2008 OHCHR publication Business and Human Rights:  A Survey of NHRI Practices provides information on the mandate 
and capacities of NHRIs to manage corporate-related grievances and issues. Measures that NHRIs can undertake include 
conducting public inquiries and fact-finding missions; investigating individual complaints; dispute resolution, enforcement 
of outcomes; ongoing compliance monitoring, dissemination of findings, advocacy,  developing educational tools for the 
community and to TNCs, governments and other stakeholders in particular. For more details see 
 http://www.reports-and-materials.org/OHCHR-National-Human-Rights-Institutions-practices-Apr-2008.doc 
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3. How can policy coherence on business practice and human rights protection be enhanced 
at the national and international level? What role and support can regional mechanisms and 
institutions provide in policy coherence?
4. Apart from reputational damage, what is the actual risk to companies for poor practice in respect 
to human rights standards?
5. What are the different approaches required for different industries and business sectors (eg, 
extractive industries, textiles, media, service providers, financial institutions etc) when it comes 
to human rights protection (in the context of each of the 4 working group topics)?
6. What considerations need to be kept in mind for vulnerable groups such as women, LGBT, 
children and indigenous communities as well as ethnic and religious minorities? 
7. Which organisations/institutions have the legitimacy to decide on business standards?
WG1: State Duty to Protect Human Rights Against Violations by Businesses
1. What measures, both preventive and remedial, can States take to redress human rights abuses 
by businesses, especially transnational corporations? (successful case-studies, best practices 
of state protection) At what level? What are the challenges faced by States in this regard? (legal, 
information, knowledge-sharing, lobby groups etc)
2. What is the State’s responsibility in ensuring observance of human rights by its transnational 
companies (TNCs) in another country, especially if the other country is not party to certain 
international treaties (or if it doesn’t regulate against that particular human rights violation)? 
What efforts can it undertake to prevent human rights violations by its TNCs?
3. When there is no region-wide enforcement or regulation of company fair practices, how can 
States improve human rights protection from corporate violation at the regional level?
4. What strategies can be utilised to ensure that States are able to adhere and follow the 
international labour standards to which they have subscribed?
5. What kind of cooperation is needed between States to ensure that economic production does 
not infringe upon the human rights of populations in host and home countries? How can States 
best utilise existing fora such as such the Universal Periodic Review to learn and apply in their 
own domestic protection duties? 
6. What kind of support (both legal and non-legal) could States provide to companies to encourage 
responsible supply chain management?
7. Due to the nature of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and their exemption from some federal laws, 
how do governments improve human rights observance while still maintaining SEZs’ purpose 
and effectiveness?
8. When contracting out State functions, how can States ensure that private firms will respect 
human rights? What (internationally accepted) training/certification do private contractors need 
to undergo? What is the collaboration required between states and private security companies 
at the local, regional and international levels? 
WG 2: Corporate Responsibility and its Contribution to Human Rights Implementation
1. How do businesses interpret their human rights obligations, especially on issues where there is 
no international consensus (for example, while there are standards on minimum wages, there 
are no standards for living wages59 so how do companies determine what constitutes living 
59.  Only in 26% of the countries in the world, the minimum wage can be said to be a living wage. The position in Europe is better, 
in 40% of Europe’s countries provides the minimum wage for an adequate standard of living. Opijnen, Marjon van and Joris 
Oldenziel 2010: Responsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and challenges for addressing prevailing 
human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of EU-based companies for the case-study of the garment industry in 
Bangladesh.
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 wages?)? When operating in countries where standard differ from their own home countries, 
which standards do companies follow?
2. While larger multinational companies often have the resources to include human rights into 
their company policies, how do SMEs, who often lack financial resources and access to financial 
assistance, incorporate human rights concerns into their business operations?
3. When local legal standards do not guarantee a minimum of rights, how can companies, especially 
SMEs, be encouraged and supported to uphold their responsibilities? 
4. How can human rights impact be included more frequently/made compulsory in other risk 
assessment exercises that companies undertake? What should such risk assessments include 
and how would they measure human rights impact?
5. What support can private businesses receive (from national, regional and international 
institutions) in understanding and implementing their human rights obligations? 
6. With many companies contracting work out to informal supply chains, how can companies 
monitor rights infringement by subsidiaries – especially in the informal work sector?
7. With whom – and to what extent - does the scope of responsibility lie, in relation to suppliers’ 
practices in the supply chain, given the influence that buyers can have on suppliers? 
8. How can social audits of supply chain conditions be improved to address all aspects of labour 
conditions and not just specific working conditions in production facilities?
9. What have been successful methods for businesses to commit to human rights standards (self-
regulation, collaborative initiatives or sectoral initiatives, codes of conduct, reporting obligations, 
legal undertakings etc)?
10. How can companies translate global human rights principles into internal operating policies? Are 
they expected to pay attention to certain principles in particular?
WG3: Monitoring, Reporting and Access to Remedies
1. What does ‘accountability’ mean in the context of non-judicial grievance mechanisms? What role 
do NHRIs/ombudsmen play in enforcing or monitoring non-judicial mechanisms?
2. What efforts can be undertaken to reduce the legal barriers to access remedy? (eg, In addition 
to being a vulnerable group, working children may be under-aged and require consent/
representation)
3. For company level grievance mechanisms, what scope is there for independent investigation and 
adjudication, in the context of possible bias? How do States encourage private companies to 
establish fair grievance mechanisms? 
4. What are the different monitoring mechanisms required in those countries where parent 
companies are based and in those countries where supply chain manufacturing occurs? How can 
 
 the challenge of providing effective grievance mechanisms for extraterritorial abusive activities 
of companies be addressed?
5. What role does ‘access to information’ play in ‘access to remedy’? How is this translated into 
practice (especially since in some countries, access to information laws may be limited to public 
sector enterprises only)?
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6. What collaborative multi-stakeholder initiatives exist to provide access to remedy? What are 
their advantages as compared to state-based or company-provided remedies? 
7. For the informal sector, how do States and parent companies monitor violations? How do workers 
in the informal sector seek grievance redressal? How do they receive information? 
8. Rights abuses can take place throughout the supply chain but it has proven difficult to establish 
grievance mechanisms at each level. How can these obstacles be overcome?
WG4: Multi-stakeholder cooperation
1. In designing different multi-stakeholder initiatives (such as the Global Compact), which 
stakeholder has the ultimate authority and responsibility in developing and implementing such 
guidelines?
2. As States retain their international human rights obligations when they participate in 
multilateral institutions such as international trade and financial institutions, what support can/
do international and multilateral institutions provide to helping them discharge their duties 
effectively? 
3. What are the human rights obligations of International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?  Do they merely 
have to respect human rights and make sure that their activities do not have harmful effects 
on the enjoyment of rights or do their obligations also entail a duty to protect and even fulfil 
human rights in certain circumstances? What support can they provide for socially responsible 
investment?
4. What efforts can be made at the regional and national level to encourage and support businesses 
to incorporate due diligence components as mentioned in the UN framework, into their operating 
practices?
5. When it comes to workers’ rights, how do the different stakeholders (companies, the ILO and 
trade unions) engage in an effective social dialogue? How can the capacity of workers be 
improved so as to take equal ownership of such a dialogue?
6. What is the role of the Unions – national and international? If unions are not legally accepted (or 
not independent) in the country how can workers organise and “claim” their rights?
7. How can shareholders and consumers improve their influence on businesses to incorporate 
human rights into their operations? How can companies engage in a collaborative civil dialogue 
with these stakeholders?
8. To improve their capacity to work with private corporations and business enterprises, what 
training do NHRIs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), especially grassroots organisations, 
require? 
9. At the regional level, what level of cooperation can be extended between NHRI networks to 
provide information, alerts and guidance on human rights and business? What role do regional 
organisations such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) play in improving capacity of member NHRIs? In 
improving monitoring of business observance of human rights?
10. In what capacity can local chambers of commerce and other national business associations 
(such as manufacturers’ or exporters’ associations) encourage members to be responsible for 
human rights protection – what support can they offer?
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